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Nordex: The German Wind Pioneer Riding the Energy Transition
I. Introduction & Episode Roadmap
Picture the windswept flatlands of Denmark in 1985. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev are holding their first summit. Apple's Macintosh is barely a year old. And in the small town of Give, two brothers are dreaming of something that most people consider industrial lunacy: building machines that can capture the invisible force whipping across the Danish countryside and turn it into electricity.
Four decades later, that quixotic vision has materialized into Nordex SE—one of the leading integrated, global manufacturers of innovative onshore wind turbine systems. The Group has installed around 57 GW of wind power capacity in over 40 markets in its corporate history and generated consolidated sales of around EUR 7.3 billion in 2024.
How did a tiny Danish startup survive the dot-com crash, multiple near-death experiences, the collapse of its native German market, Chinese competition, and a global pandemic—only to emerge as Europe's third-largest wind turbine manufacturer?
The answer involves a combination of technology pioneering, survival instincts, strategic M&A, and a deep understanding of the brutal economics of hardware businesses. The company currently has more than 10,400 employees with a manufacturing network that includes factories in Germany, Spain, Brazil, India, USA and Mexico.
Throughout this story, we'll encounter several recurring themes: the tension between being a technology pioneer and achieving economies of scale; the punishing economics of capital-intensive hardware businesses where margins are razor-thin and fixed costs are enormous; the strategic value of having a committed industrial parent; and the ever-present geopolitical chess game of the energy transition.
By concentrating on the onshore segment, the Company not only serves more than 90% of the global market for wind power but simultaneously avoids the need to invest considerable sums in radically different offshore technology, with the associated risks this would entail. This strategic focus—onshore only, no offshore adventures—has defined Nordex's identity and, arguably, its survival.
II. Founding Origins & The Danish Wind Revolution (1985-1994)
Denmark in the mid-1980s was an unlikely crucible for energy innovation. The tiny Scandinavian nation had been traumatized by the oil shocks of the 1970s, watching helplessly as petroleum prices quadrupled and energy security became a national obsession. But where other nations doubled down on nuclear or coal, Danish policymakers—drawing on the country's long tradition of decentralized cooperatives and its engineering heritage—bet on wind.
The company was founded in Give, Denmark in 1985. The development, project management, manufacturing, and servicing of high-end onshore wind turbines have always been the company's passion, vision, and core competence.
What's remarkable about Nordex's origins is the speed of execution. Just one year after Nordex was established in 1985, the very first Nordex-branded turbine was installed in 1986: the N27. With its 250kW generator, it was the world's most powerful turbine at that time. A light-wind version of the N27 with 150kW followed.
Developed by the visionary brothers Carsten and Jens Pedersen and Nordex's inaugural employee, Knud Buhl Nielsen, the N27 marked the beginning of a groundbreaking journey towards sustainable energy production.
To understand what the Pedersen brothers accomplished, consider the context: wind turbines in the early 1980s were largely experimental curiosities. Most were small—50 to 100 kilowatts—and unreliable. The N27, with its 27-meter rotor diameter and 250kW capacity, was audacious. It was the equivalent of a semiconductor startup in 1985 announcing they'd build a processor twice as powerful as anything Intel had.
Looking back on this milestone, Carsten Pedersen fondly recalls: "The first real Nordex turbine was the N27 with a rotor diameter of 27 meters, on a 30-meter tubular tower which we erected at our factory in 1986. At that time, it was one of the biggest turbines in the market and we thought that it was really big."
The Danish wind industry in this period operated like a tight-knit community of engineers, farmers, and idealists. Many early turbine customers were private investors, mostly farmers who wanted to build a wind turbine on their own land—a decentralized, grassroots model that stood in stark contrast to the centralized utility paradigm that dominated global energy.
By the early 1990s, Nordex had outgrown its Danish home market. The company's ambitions required larger facilities, more skilled workers, and access to bigger markets. The solution came from an unlikely source: the former East Germany.
By 1994, nacelle production commenced at Rerik, marking the company's first manufacturing site outside Denmark and supporting increased demand for onshore wind solutions. The move to Germany's Baltic coast, in the recently reunified nation, was strategic. Rostock and its surrounding areas offered a skilled workforce from the shipbuilding industry, port access for shipping components, and generous economic development incentives from a government eager to revitalize the East German economy.
This geographic shift would prove fateful. Though founded in Denmark, Nordex would become a fundamentally German company—with all the engineering excellence, bureaucratic meticulousness, and market sensitivities that entails.
III. The Megawatt Pioneer & Early Glory Days (1995-2001)
The mid-1990s marked Nordex's transformation from a small turbine maker into an industry pioneer. And the company achieved this status the old-fashioned way: by building something nobody else had.
Founded in 1985, the Nordex Group has a proven track record of launching industry-leading products – starting when we pioneered in the mass production of 1 MW turbines (1995), when we were first to enter the 2.5 MW class (2000).
The period culminated in technological innovation with the pioneering of 1 MW-class turbines in 1995, when Nordex introduced the N52 model as the world's first series-produced megawatt turbine. Prototypes, including the N52/800 (800 kW) in February and the N52/1000 (1 MW) in April, were erected to test scalability.
30 years of producing turbines of the megawatt class. In 1995, Nordex introduced the worldwide first series-produced megawatt turbine, the N52 with one megawatt.
Why did the megawatt milestone matter so much? In wind energy, size is everything. A larger rotor captures more wind energy—the relationship is proportional to the square of the rotor diameter. A larger generator produces more power per unit of fixed infrastructure cost. The levelized cost of energy falls dramatically as turbines scale up, because the tower, foundation, grid connection, and installation costs are relatively fixed regardless of how much electricity the machine produces.
Being first to crack megawatt-class series production gave Nordex a crucial head start. While competitors were still refining 500-600kW machines, Nordex was climbing the learning curve on larger, more economically viable turbines.
Production operations started in Germany in 1992, and in 2001 the company launched its initial public offering. Nordex expanded across the globe in the new millennium, starting production work in China and establishing Nordex USA Inc in Chicago.
Founded in 1985, the Nordex Group has been a pioneer in the wind energy for decades. Since entering the U.S. market in 2000, Nordex has expanded across North America, focusing on its two key markets: the United States and Canada.
The 2001 IPO came at what seemed like an opportune moment. The global technology boom had created enormous appetite for growth stocks, and renewable energy was capturing investor imagination as climate change awareness grew. Nordex's stock debuted on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange to enthusiastic reception.
But timing in financial markets is everything. And Nordex's timing would prove catastrophic.
IV. The Dot-Com Crash & Near-Death Experience (2001-2005)
The crash came with stunning violence.
Nordex stock was trading as high as €83.92 in July 2001 but, like so many tech stocks in the early 2000s, its value plummeted as the dot-com bubble burst, reaching lows of €5.76 in March 2003.
Nordex wasn't a dot-com company in any meaningful sense—it manufactured physical turbines, not vaporware. But in the post-2000 market environment, anything associated with "new economy" narratives was toxic. Wind energy, despite being fundamentally a hardware manufacturing business, had been marketed to investors as a growth story leveraging technology innovation. When the growth narrative collapsed, so did the valuations.
The carnage didn't stop at €5.76. The stock would ultimately bottom at €1.70 on April 25, 2005—a 98% decline from its peak. Shareholders who bought at the IPO were looking at a total wipeout.
The financial crisis coincided with real operational challenges. The early 2000s were a difficult period for wind energy generally, as government subsidy regimes fluctuated and the economics of wind power remained marginal in many markets. Orders slowed, pricing came under pressure, and Nordex burned through cash.
Yet the company found an unexpected lifeline through opportunistic acquisition. On October 1, 2001, the bankrupt company of Südwind Babcock-Borsig was fully implanted into Nordex, which then continued to produce Südwind turbines in the 1.5 MW class from 2001—originally developed by pro + pro Energiesysteme—under license.
This acquisition of a bankrupt competitor's assets was a microcosm of what would become a recurring Nordex survival strategy: using industry distress to acquire technology, capacity, or market position at distressed prices. When you're trading at €2 per share, you can't afford to be a buyer in robust markets. But you can pick up the pieces when competitors fail.
German wind-turbine maker Nordex said in December 2011 it had cut a total of 260 jobs and completed its cost-cutting programme which is expected to bring the company back to the black in 2012.
The period from 2001-2005 taught Nordex's management an enduring lesson about the wind turbine business: this is not a software company where losses can be financed indefinitely while pursuing network effects. This is a capital-intensive manufacturing business where cash flow matters, debt can kill you, and margin compression happens faster than margin expansion.
V. The Golden Era & Peak Optimism (2005-2015)
The recovery, when it came, was driven by policy. Europe's renewable energy directives, particularly Germany's Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) feed-in tariff system, created guaranteed prices for wind-generated electricity. Suddenly, wind projects were financeable, bankable, and profitable. Order books filled. Factories hummed.
Nordex began a decade-long climb from the valley of despair. The company developed increasingly sophisticated turbine platforms targeted at different wind conditions—a recognition that wind energy isn't one-size-fits-all.
As of 2013, the third generation of Nordex wind turbines included two platforms, rated at 2.4 and 3.3 MW. In Europe, Africa and North America Nordex manufactures and sells the Gamma series, a product family comprising the N90/2500, the N100/2500 and the N117/2400. The N90/2500 is a turbine being developed for strong winds. The N100/2500 consists of two versions, Highspeed and Lowspeed, the first one for rather windy locations, the second for medium wind conditions.
This product segmentation was sophisticated engineering. The N90 with its smaller 90-meter rotor was designed for high-wind coastal sites where structural loads are intense. The N117, with its expansive 117-meter rotor, was optimized for inland sites with lower average wind speeds—extracting maximum energy from lighter breezes.
In 2013 Nordex launched the Delta-Class-Series, entering series production in January 2014 with prototypes installed in mid-2013. There will be two new types of turbines, the N100/3300 strong-wind turbine and the N117/3000, which is designed for medium-wind sites. Both turbines feature the rotorblades already used in the Gamma-Series.
The Delta series represented Nordex's step into the 3MW+ class—another increment in the relentless scaling that defines the industry. Each generation of turbines was larger, more efficient, and more economical than the last.
Financial markets took notice. The stock recovered from its 2005 lows of €1.70 and began a multi-year ascent. By December 2015, Nordex shares had reached €32.90—a nearly 20-fold increase from the bottom, though still well below the €83.92 peak of 2001.
But even as the stock climbed, management recognized a fundamental problem: Nordex was too small. The wind turbine industry was consolidating. Competitors like Vestas and Siemens Gamesa had global scale, diverse geographic exposure, and R&D budgets that Nordex couldn't match. In an industry where winning large utility contracts required demonstrating financial staying power and global service capability, size mattered enormously.
Nordex's management team went looking for a transformative deal.
VI. The Acciona Merger: The Deal That Changed Everything (2016)
The deal that would reshape Nordex came together in October 2015 and closed in April 2016. It was less a hostile takeover than a carefully orchestrated merger of complements.
In 2016, the wind turbine manufacture business unit of Spanish conglomerate Acciona, Acciona Windpower, merged with those of Nordex to form Nordex Group. Acciona S.A. is now the main shareholder of the Nordex Group.
ACCIONA has completed the sale of its wind turbine manufacturing subsidiary, ACCIONA Windpower (AWP), to Nordex of Germany in a cash-and-shares transaction valued at €785 million.
The strategic logic was elegant. Nordex had strong presence in Europe but limited reach in the Americas and Asia. Acciona Windpower, while smaller in absolute terms, had established manufacturing and sales operations in exactly the regions where Nordex was weak—North America, South America, and India.
Mr Blanco said: "The employees of Nordex and Acciona Windpower are fully committed to the merger. We are a perfect fit in every respect and, working together, face excellent prospects for the future." The two wind turbine manufacturers have complementary technologies and market footprints, with Nordex's strong presence in Europe a good match for ACCIONA Windpower's established position in North and South America. In total, the two companies have installed 18 GW of wind power capacity in more than 25 countries.
Following said steps, Acciona S.A will be the major shareholder in Nordex with a 29.9% stake. The integration of AWP into Nordex will create a new, globally-positioned European powerhouse in the wind industry with manufacturing facilities in Germany, Spain, Brazil, the United States and soon India.
The financial engineering was sophisticated. Nordex will pay Acciona €366.4 million in cash and 16.1 million newly-created shares valued at €26 each. Acciona will use the cash to buy further shares from the current biggest shareholder SKion/momentum, an investment vehicle belonging to the Quandt family, a major shareholder in BMW.
ACCIONA obtained €596 million in net profit in the first half of 2016, close to six times the €103 million reported in the first half of 2015, basically as a result of €657 million in extraordinary earnings from the merger of ACCIONA Windpower (AWP) and Nordex, in which ACCIONA is a core shareholder.
What made this deal particularly clever was the nature of Acciona itself. Unlike a private equity firm looking for a quick flip, or a strategic buyer seeking synergies through consolidation, Acciona was a massive Spanish infrastructure and energy conglomerate with a 7GW wind project pipeline of its own. Having a turbine manufacturing subsidiary wasn't just a financial investment—it was vertical integration for Acciona's core development business.
The structure of the deal is interesting because it makes a long-term strategic partner of Acciona, which is the parent company of AWP and one of the biggest wind operators in the world, with some 7GW of installed generation capacity. It has a "vast project pipeline."
"From a strategic point of view we, as well as our Spanish partner, wanted to shape our own future," says Pierre Schneider, head of corporate development and M&A at Nordex.
The Acciona merger also brought a new CEO. José Luis Blanco, who had been running Acciona Windpower, initially came into the merged entity as COO and deputy CEO. Mr Blanco was born in 1970 and began his professional career in 1993 at Industrias Ferri, later going on to join Gamesa, where he assumed various executive positions and Management Board roles from 1997 to 2012.
Blanco was a wind industry lifer—someone who understood turbine manufacturing from the factory floor to the sales office. José Luis Blanco serves as CEO of Nordex Group for more than six years. Before that he held different roles within the wind industry, among them more than 3 years as CEO Wind Power at Acciona and different management roles at Gamesa.
This background would prove essential. Nordex was about to enter a period of severe operational stress.
VII. Crisis Mode: The Difficult Years (2017-2019)
The merger's timing, which seemed perfect in 2016, looked increasingly unfortunate by 2017. The German wind market—Nordex's historical stronghold—collapsed.
The cause was regulatory: Germany shifted from feed-in tariffs to competitive auctions in 2017. Under the old system, wind developers received a guaranteed price for their electricity, making project economics predictable. Under the new auction system, developers competed on price, driving bids lower and lower. Many projects that had been in development for years suddenly became uneconomic.
In its preliminary results for the full year 2017, Nordex reported sales of €3.08 billion, down from €3.4 billion the previous year. EBITDA earnings came to €242 million, down from €285.5 million in 2016. The company said its performance reflected some project delays.
The share price, which had peaked at €32.90 in December 2015, began a sickening decline. It fell below €20 in November 2016, below €10 in September 2017, and continued dropping.
In March 2017, Lars Bondo Krogsgaard resigned as CEO after announcing a dramatic guidance cut. The German manufacturer announced at the end of February it would reduce its forecast for the 2017 and 2018 financial years after a review of its budgets. The firm said the fall in revenues was due to "reduced expectations for businesses in certain core markets." Shares in the company fell around 35% after it announced revenues in 2017 should be €3.1-€3.3 billion, and €3.4-3.6 billion in 2018, down from an expected €4.2 billion. Nordex share price fell from €19.72/share prior to the forecast warning to a low of €13.10/share.
José Luis Blanco stepped up from COO to CEO. His inheritance was daunting.
On 5 September 2017, German wind turbine maker Nordex announced the plan to cut between 400 and 500 jobs by the end of the year. The job cuts will affect mainly Germany but also other branches in Europe. The job reduction is a result of the decline in demand. The plan will allow the company to achieve effective savings of EUR 45 million in 2018. Both personnel costs and cost of materials will be reduced.
The German market collapse wasn't isolated to Nordex. It devastated the entire domestic industry. Senvion's plight is largely due to the collapse of its domestic German onshore wind power market after a countrywide shift to competitive power contract auctions in 2018. The wind industry considers this shift a botched effort with policy flaws. Enercon leadership also stated that it blames the introduction of poorly structured tenders and failed political reforms for the collapse of Germany's onshore wind market, noting that orders had stopped, installing only 210 MW in Germany in the first 10 months of 2019. For comparison, Guidehouse Insights' tracking shows that Enercon installed 1,841 MW in Germany alone in 2016 before the market downturn.
Senvion, once one of Germany's leading turbine makers, filed for insolvency in April 2019. Senvion has filed for insolvency. This comes as little surprise in light of the recent struggles of the German wind turbine manufacturer. Wood Mackenzie's latest market share forecast highlighted the company's global positioning falling from a meager 4 percent of global share to less than 1 percent by 2025 as legacy orders from recent auctions dried up.
However, the ripples of Senvion's insolvency and Germany's market paralysis are stretching far and wide.
Nordex had narrowly avoided Senvion's fate through the Acciona relationship. But the crisis wasn't over.
VIII. Capital Lifeline & Acciona's Full Takeover Bid (2019-2020)
With Senvion's bankruptcy rattling the industry and Nordex's own balance sheet strained, Acciona made a decisive move.
The capital increase, in compliance with German regulation, was priced using Nordex's average share price of the past three days, €10.21, valuing the transaction at €99 million. ACCIONA, the reference shareholder of Nordex, accepted the proposal in view of the company's solid growth prospects with the goal of strengthening its balance sheet in a challenging market environment. ACCIONA thus contributes to improving Nordex's solvency and reinforces its commitment to the long-term success of the company as an independent global turbine manufacturer. ACCIONA's stake in Nordex will increase from 29.9% to 36.27%.
The transaction raised €99 million, allowing Nordex to increase its solvency. "The private placement enables Nordex to deliver its backlog without being hindered by balance sheets and the volatile market dynamics resulting from the Senvion insolvency," said Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta, global director of markets & investor relations at Acciona in a conference call. "It sends a strong signal of confidence to [Nordex's] clients, suppliers and financiers."
Under German corporate law, any shareholder crossing the 30% ownership threshold must launch a mandatory tender offer for the remaining shares. Acciona's stake increase to 36.27% triggered this requirement.
The proposed takeover of Nordex by Acciona has been dropped after shareholders were left unimpressed by the Spanish firm's offer. Just 0.14% of Nordex shareholders accepted Acciona's mandatory takeover bid in early January, so the Spanish company will retain a 36.41% stake in the manufacturer. The low uptake of the offer ends the takeover process, launched in early October after Acciona increased its stake in Nordex by injecting €99 million of extra liquidity in the turbine maker.
Acciona offered €10.34/share, which was above the three-month average of Nordex share prices when the takeover bid was announced. However, since then Nordex's share price has remained above €11/share, which could explain the low uptake on Acciona's offer.
The failed takeover was actually the best outcome for both parties. Acciona had demonstrated its commitment to Nordex (sending a "strong signal" to customers and suppliers), injected needed capital, and acquired a controlling stake—without having to pay the premium a full acquisition would require. Nordex retained its independent public company status, preserving its access to capital markets while gaining the backing of a committed strategic owner.
This hybrid structure—significant minority shareholder with operational alignment but independent public company status—would prove valuable in the turbulent years ahead.
IX. Pandemic, Supply Chain Chaos & Industry-Wide Turmoil (2020-2023)
If the German market collapse of 2017-2019 was painful, the period from 2020-2023 was existential. The wind industry faced a perfect storm: pandemic disruptions, supply chain breakdowns, commodity inflation, and quality issues across multiple OEMs.
Nordex reported heavy losses in an "exceptionally intense" 2022 hit by supply chain shortages and inflation, but CEO José Luis Blanco claimed the turbine maker is now more competitive.
Nordex SE has revised down its guidance for 2022 as inflationary pressure and disrupted supply chains dented its performance in the first nine months of the year, causing its loss to swell. The German wind turbine manufacturer now expects its operating margin (EBITDA margin) to be around minus 4% which is at the lower end of the guidance from May. In the nine months through September, Nordex saw its net loss widen to EUR 371.6 million from EUR 103.7 million a year earlier. Supply chain disruptions led to a decrease in wind turbine installations with new additions falling to 791 wind turbines with a total capacity of 3.6 GW in the period under review from 1,216 machines of a combined 4.9 GW installed a year earlier.
The math of wind turbine manufacturing is brutal. Contracts are typically signed one to two years before delivery, with prices locked in at signing. But component costs—steel, copper, rare earths, transportation—can fluctuate dramatically during that period. When steel prices double between contract signing and delivery, the manufacturer absorbs the loss.
Notably, prices have been continuously rising during 2022 and early 2023 for American and European manufacturers, with Vestas increasing to €1.2 million/MW, Siemens Gamesa to €0.8 million/MW, and Nordex/Acciona to €0.9 million/MW. These price escalations can be attributed to various factors, including the rising costs of raw materials such as steel and critical minerals, supply chain disruptions, and quality issues.
The company faced a very volatile period in 2021 and 2022, with significant supply chain disruptions, soaring inflation and, for us, a challenging cyber incident. This period of volatility was followed by a period of stabilization. With relevant milestones achieved, our 2024 results now mark the transition.
Nordex was not alone in its suffering. The entire Western OEM industry was hemorrhaging money. Siemens Gamesa faced billions in losses and quality issues with its onshore platforms. Vestas struggled with profitability. GE's renewable energy division posted massive losses.
Enerdata's analysis of the wind market reveals a significant shift towards Chinese manufacturers. American and European leaders, such as Vestas, Siemens Gamesa, and GE, are experiencing substantial declines in both take-in-orders and market share.
Acciona stepped in again with additional capital. Acciona has redoubled its bet on Nordex, investing 130 million euros in this transaction. The Group's aim is to financially support Nordex, at a difficult time, due to supply problems and inflationary pressures.
Spain's Acciona SA will provide EUR 139.2 million gross to Nordex SE as part of a capital increase that will boost its stake in the German wind turbine manufacturer to 39.6%.
The period illustrated the value of having a committed strategic shareholder. While purely financial investors might have fled or demanded restructuring, Acciona maintained its support through the worst of the crisis.
X. The Turnaround: Return to Profitability (2024-Present)
After years of losses, 2024 marked Nordex's return to profitability—and with emphatic results.
The Group has installed around 57 GW of wind power capacity in over 40 markets in its corporate history and generated consolidated sales of around EUR 7.3 billion in 2024. The Company currently has more than 10,400 employees with a manufacturing network that includes factories in Germany, Spain, Brazil, India, USA and Mexico.
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) significantly improved to EUR 296 million in the reporting year 2024 (FY 2023: EUR 2 million). This development corresponds to a margin of 4.1 percent (2023: 0 percent) slightly exceeding the upper end of the guidance.
We have consistently improved both our absolute EBITDA and EBITDA margin throughout the year and we ended the year with a total of 4.1% in EBITDA margin, with a robust free cash flow of EUR 271 million and a net cash position of €848 million.
The swing from €2 million EBITDA in 2023 to €296 million in 2024 represents an extraordinary operational turnaround. Several factors drove this improvement: pricing discipline on new contracts, normalization of supply chain conditions, operational efficiency improvements, and strong order momentum.
In the Projects segment, order intake totalled 8.3GW for the reporting year, 13% up on 2023. This corresponds to a total value of new orders reaching €7.5bn (2023, €6.2bn). The orders in the past year were received from 24 different countries and span across various turbine types. In the service segment, Nordex increased its order intake by 114% to €1.9bn (2023, €924m). As of the end of 2024, Nordex's order book stood at €12.8bn (2023, €10.5bn).
With relevant milestones achieved, our 2024 results now mark the successful transition to an era of profitable growth. First, we had a record order intake in 2024, resulting in a record high order book of EUR 12.8 billion. This remarkable achievement was driven by strong momentum in both our service and project businesses. Consequently, I am pleased to announce that Nordex is now the second largest onshore player worldwide in terms of order intake, excluding China. In EMEA, we remain number one for the third time in a row.
The guidance for 2025 reflects management's confidence. For the current year 2025, the Nordex Group expects consolidated sales of between EUR 7.4 and 7.9 billion and an EBITDA margin of between 5.0 and 7.0 percent. In view of the positive development in 2024, the company is sticking to its medium-term target of an EBITDA margin of 8 percent.
XI. Technology & Product Strategy Deep Dive
Nordex's competitive positioning rests on its technology platform—and specifically, its decision to focus exclusively on onshore wind turbines.
Nordex's wind turbine platforms represent the evolution of its core onshore technology, centered on scalable and adaptable designs that prioritize performance across diverse site conditions. The Delta4000 series serves as the company's flagship platform, targeting the 4 to 7 MW power class for onshore applications, building on a modular architecture that allows for flexible adaptations without altering core external dimensions. This platform incorporates proven components such as advanced control systems and variable rotor technologies.
The various models in the Delta4000 series are adapted to meet specific market requirements and offer variable outputs ranging from 4 MW to the 6 MW area, with rotor diameters of up to 175 meters.
The scale of progression is remarkable. Today, Nordex's Delta4000 series boasts a rated power more than 45 times that of the N27, showcasing the remarkable advancements in technology and engineering expertise. Over the past 40 years, the rotor diameter has increased 6.5-fold, now reaching an impressive 175 meters, with its swept area increasing accordingly by a factor of 42. Today, Nordex' wind turbines are manufactured with capacities ranging from 4 to 7 megawatts.
The company's onshore-only strategy is deliberate and consequential. By concentrating on the onshore segment, the Company not only serves more than 90% of the global market for wind power but simultaneously avoids the need to invest considerable sums in radically different offshore technology, with the associated risks this would entail.
Offshore wind requires entirely different engineering—floating platforms or fixed foundations, corrosion-resistant materials, service vessels instead of service trucks, and turbines in the 12-15MW class (compared to onshore's 4-7MW). The capital requirements are enormous, and the competitive dynamics different. Nordex's decision to stay onshore is a bet that focus beats diversification in this industry.
XII. Geographic Strategy & Market Position
The Nordex Group operates in all of the world's major wind markets with the sole exception of China, whose market is dominated by local suppliers. In 2016, Spanish manufacturer Acciona Windpower was integrated into the Group, significantly expanding Nordex's global presence in North and South America and India in particular.
Within Europe, Nordex maintains a strong position. Vestas, Nordex Group, Siemens Gamesa, Enercon and GE Vernova remain the top five turbine suppliers in Europe in 2024. Chinese OEMs installed just 242.4 MW of wind turbine in Europe last year, of which only 11.7 MW is in EU-27.
All of the top four global suppliers in 2024 were Chinese companies, with Denmark's Vestas ranking fifth. In Europe, European suppliers maintained dominance, capturing 92% of the regional market share, a 4% increase from 2023.
The U.S. market represents a significant growth opportunity. The company will manufacture nacelles, or wind turbine housings, for both the current N163 turbine variant and the newly announced N169/5.X, a product specifically tailored to the U.S. market, at its production facility in West Branch. "Following the suspension of nacelle production, we kept the Iowa manufacturing facility ready to resume operations," said Alberto Fernandez, chief operations officer of the Nordex Group. "It will primarily produce components for projects in the US and Canada. Recruitment and training processes are scheduled to commence in the second half of 2024."
Starting in 1H25, production capacities will be ramped-up in line with order volume development. The production capacity is planned to exceed 2.5 GW annually, creating further new jobs here in the US.
The Inflation Reduction Act has been a catalyst for this U.S. expansion. Shay said Nordex is increasing its manufacturing in the United States because of provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act, which went into effect Aug. 16, 2022. The act, signed into law by President Joe Biden, aims to increase domestic energy production and manufacturing and reduce carbon emissions. The act provides for tax credits for clean energy—including wind power—made domestically. Wind manufacturers may be eligible under the law to receive a tax credit for each blade, nacelle and tower they manufacture on American soil. The law also provides a bonus for clean energy project developers who source their iron, steel and a large percentage of their products from producers in the United States.
XIII. The Chinese Challenge: Existential Threat or Manageable Competition?
The elephant in the wind turbine room is China. Chinese manufacturers have achieved extraordinary scale and cost positions that European OEMs struggle to match.
Goldwind maintained its position as the world's leading wind turbine manufacturer in 2024, installing over 20 GW globally—a record for any single OEM in a calendar year.
Western OEMs struggled with declining installations, as total capacity connected outside China fell below 40 GW, the lowest level since the COVID-19 pandemic. Vestas remained the leading non-Chinese OEM, connecting more than 10 GW in 2024, followed by Siemens Gamesa and Nordex.
According to BloombergNEF, prices for onshore turbines delivered in China dropped by 57% from the first half of 2020 to the first half of 2024, while prices of turbines made outside China rose by 31% on average over the same period. Between 2019 and 2024 the median price of Chinese onshore turbines sold outside the country was almost 30% lower than prices from European and US peers. This is due to several factors, which include a strong local supply chain, stable raw material prices, cheaper labor costs, and intense price competition at home.
China is currently the world's largest wind turbine manufacturer, accounting for 60% of global production capacity. Europe and the US, which long dominated the wind market, stand at 19% and 9%, respectively. China dominates the wind supply chain, providing between 70–80% of the core components and refines almost 100% of the critical minerals required to build turbines.
However, European regulators are taking action. The EU Commission today announced that it will launch an inquiry into Chinese suppliers of wind turbines under the new Foreign Subsidies Regulation. The announcement comes as Chinese wind turbine manufacturers are pushing hard and winning some orders in Europe. They offer cheap turbines and generous finance which distorts the integrity of the European market and disrupts fair competition.
A new OECD report finds significant disparities between government support received by Chinese and European wind turbine manufacturers. The report highlights that Government-backed support for Chinese manufacturers has regularly been higher than the support available for their European counterparts for over a decade. In April 2024 the European Commission opened an investigation into Chinese suppliers of wind turbines under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation. The Commission suspects unfair competition is taking place. With sweeping powers that range from requiring the disclosure of documents to the cancellation of signed contracts, the ongoing FSR investigation aims to ensure a level playing field.
Europe's wind turbine manufacturing industry—the world's second largest after China—is far more promising. Including Norway and the UK, it employs 370,000 people, primarily in Germany, Spain, France and Denmark. By 2030, the workforce in just the EU could grow to 936,000, accounting for 16% of the potential new green jobs. Unlike the solar industry, in which most of the job potential comes from the installation of the technology, manufacturing accounts for the majority of the jobs in wind.
For Nordex specifically, the Chinese threat is real but manageable in the medium term. European customers prioritize supply chain security, service reliability, and regulatory compliance—areas where local presence matters. The EU's regulatory actions and energy security concerns create barriers to Chinese market entry that didn't exist for solar panels a decade ago.
XIV. Investment Framework: Bulls, Bears, and Key Metrics
The Bull Case:
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Industry tailwinds: Global electricity demand is projected to grow 50% over the next 15 years, driven by data centers, EVs, and decarbonization. Wind is cost-competitive and deployable at scale.
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European policy support: The EU's Green Deal, REPowerEU, and Wind Power Package create sustained demand growth in Nordex's core markets.
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Proven turnaround: The 2024 results demonstrate that the business model works. €296 million EBITDA with 4.1% margins shows operating leverage as volumes recover.
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Strategic owner: Acciona's 39.6% stake provides balance sheet support and demand visibility that purely public competitors lack.
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Onshore focus: By avoiding offshore wind's capital intensity and execution risks, Nordex can concentrate resources on winning in its core market.
The Bear Case:
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Chinese competition: If European regulators fail to maintain trade barriers, Chinese OEMs could undercut Nordex on price by 30%+.
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Policy risk: Wind subsidies and incentives can be modified or eliminated. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act faces potential rollback.
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Margin fragility: Even at target 8% EBITDA margins, this is a low-margin hardware business vulnerable to cost inflation and pricing pressure.
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Technology disruption: Step-change innovations in offshore wind, nuclear, or storage could reduce onshore wind's relative attractiveness.
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Scale disadvantage vs. Vestas: The market leader has roughly 2x Nordex's market share outside China, with corresponding advantages in R&D spending, supplier negotiating power, and customer relationships.
Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers Framework:
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Scale Economies: Moderate. Wind turbine manufacturing has meaningful scale economies in component procurement and R&D amortization, but logistics constraints limit how much scale matters (you can't ship a 175-meter blade around the world economically).
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Network Effects: None. This is a product business, not a platform.
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Counter-Positioning: Limited. Nordex's onshore-only focus isn't truly counter-positioned against Vestas/SGRE since they also compete in onshore.
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Switching Costs: Moderate. Turbine operators face switching costs through service contracts, spare parts inventories, and technician training—but these aren't insurmountable.
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Branding: Weak. Industrial purchasing decisions are made on economics, not brand loyalty.
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Cornered Resource: None identified. Nordex has no unique access to technology, talent, or raw materials.
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Process Power: Emerging. Years of operational challenges have forced Nordex to develop manufacturing and supply chain capabilities that are increasingly competitive.
Key Metrics to Track:
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EBITDA Margin: The single most important indicator of competitive health. Target is 8%; current is 4.1%. Progress toward this target indicates pricing discipline, cost control, and execution quality. Watch for margin compression as a sign of competitive pressure or operational problems.
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Order Book Value and MW: The €12.8 billion order book represents roughly 1.7 years of revenue visibility. Tracking order intake relative to production capacity indicates demand health and market share trajectory.
XV. Conclusion: A Survivor's Story
Nordex's four-decade journey from Danish startup to European wind champion is ultimately a story about survival. The company has navigated the dot-com crash, multiple recapitalizations, German market collapse, Chinese competition, pandemic disruption, and supply chain chaos. Each crisis that killed competitors made Nordex stronger—more disciplined, more geographically diversified, more operationally lean.
The 2024 results suggest the company has reached an inflection point. Record order intake, positive EBITDA, and net cash position indicate a business that has weathered its most recent crisis and positioned itself for growth.
But the work isn't done. The path to 8% EBITDA margins remains steep. Chinese competitors continue advancing. Policy support could waiver. The brutal economics of hardware manufacturing mean that success is never permanent.
What Nordex has proven, however, is resilience. In an industry where scale supposedly determines survival, a focused mid-sized player has found ways to compete—through geographic specialization, product focus, strategic partnership, and operational excellence.
The wind industry's future is undeniably bright. Global demand for clean electricity is accelerating, and wind power is among the most cost-effective ways to meet it. Whether Nordex captures its share of that opportunity depends on execution—maintaining cost discipline, winning competitive bids, delivering projects on time, and navigating the geopolitical complexities of the energy transition.
For long-term investors, Nordex represents a bet on European industrial competitiveness in a strategic sector—with all the risks and rewards that entails.
Myth vs. Reality Box:
Myth: Wind turbine manufacturing is a "green tech" growth story with tech-like economics.
Reality: This is a capital-intensive, low-margin manufacturing business more comparable to heavy industrial equipment than software. 4-8% EBITDA margins are considered healthy; execution risk is substantial.
Myth: Chinese manufacturers will inevitably dominate global wind markets as they did solar.
Reality: Wind turbines are harder to ship than solar panels (175-meter blades don't fit in containers), service requirements favor local presence, and European regulators are actively investigating unfair competition. The outcome is not predetermined.
Myth: Nordex is too small to compete with Vestas and Siemens Gamesa.
Reality: While scale matters, Nordex's 8.3 GW annual order intake demonstrates viable market position. The onshore-only focus allows competitive R&D spending relative to revenues.
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