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Gaztransport & Technigaz: The Invisible Monopoly Behind the LNG Revolution
Introduction: The Company You've Never Heard of That Controls Global Energy Shipping
Imagine a French engineering company headquartered in a sleepy Paris suburb, employing fewer than 800 people, yet commanding an effective monopoly over one of the most critical technologies in global energy infrastructure. A company that has achieved what Silicon Valley unicorns dream about—an asset-light licensing model with 60%+ EBITDA margins, virtually no capex requirements, and customers who have no viable alternatives. A company whose technology sits inside approximately 80% of the world's LNG carriers, invisible to most investors but essential to the global energy supply chain.
Gaztransport & Technigaz SA is a French multinational naval engineering company with headquarters in Saint-Rémy-lès-Chevreuse, France. Trading as the GTT Group, the company is an engineering organization specializing in membrane containment systems dedicated to the transport and storage of liquefied gas worldwide.
The company's core business revolves around its membrane containment systems, including the flagship Mark III and NO96 technologies, which are used in approximately 80% of the global LNG carrier fleet. Yet most investors have never heard of this remarkable enterprise.
Here are the numbers that should make any value investor sit up: In 2024, Gaztransport & Technigaz's revenue was 641.39 million, an increase of 49.96% compared to the previous year's 427.70 million. Earnings were 347.76 million, an increase of 72.70%. EBITDA increased by 66-68%, with a margin improving to 61%. The stock price rose by 14.35%, nearing its 52-week high.
The genius of GTT's business model lies in its simplicity: Gaztransport & Technigaz (GTT) of France is the technology company that earns royalties from every LNG carrier built in South Korea and elsewhere in the world when its designs are used. GTT's average royalties are generally kept confidential, though are estimated to be around $10 million per vessel with carriers costing between $180M and $200M in the current market.
This article explores how two rival French engineering firms became a global monopoly, how they survived a brutal twelve-year drought without orders, and how geopolitics from Algerian independence to the Ukraine crisis shaped their extraordinary destiny. For investors seeking businesses with genuine competitive moats, GTT's story offers lessons that extend far beyond the LNG industry.
The Historical Context: Why LNG Shipping Exists
The Physics That Created an Industry
Before diving into GTT's corporate history, understanding why its technology matters requires grasping a fundamental physics problem: natural gas is cheap and abundant but extraordinarily difficult to transport. Unlike oil, which flows easily through pipelines or tankers, natural gas at standard temperature and pressure is simply too voluminous to ship economically.
Naval architects focus more closely on the possibility of transporting natural gas in its liquid state, since one of the properties of methane is that its volume reduces by 600 times when cooled to cryogenic temperatures. Cooling natural gas to -163°C transforms it into a liquid that can be loaded onto ships and sailed anywhere in the world.
But this temperature presents an existential engineering challenge. At -163°C, steel becomes brittle and can shatter. The liquid wants to evaporate constantly, creating dangerous pressure buildups. And the thermal differential between the cargo and the outside environment—approaching 200°C—creates enormous structural stresses on the ship's hull.
The first idea is to design freestanding tanks. But this solution wastes usable volume, and the metal alloys used suffer considerably at -163°C.
From Algerian Independence to the First LNG Carriers
In the 1950s, European companies were looking for solutions to transport Algerian gas from the Sahara to Europe. The idea of a North African pipeline was scrapped due to regional instability at the time and this led to the first boom in the shipping of gas by sea in the form of a cryogenic liquid in LNG carriers.
The geopolitics of decolonization thus created an entirely new industry. With Algeria moving toward independence and North African pipeline routes deemed too risky, European energy companies faced a stark choice: abandon Saharan gas reserves or develop revolutionary shipping technology.
After the Evian Accords in 1962, France purchased its first LNG carrier—the Jules Verne—for operation on the route between Oran and France. Great Britain already had two of these vessels at this time.
This historical moment created the conditions for two French engineering teams to race toward solutions—a competition that would shape the global LNG industry for the next six decades.
The early LNG shipping industry underwent significant evolution since the first commercial carrier, the Methane Pioneer, began operations in 1959. Early vessels utilized spherical tank systems developed by Kvaerner; however, the industry would eventually shift toward more efficient membrane containment systems—the technology that Technigaz and Gaztransport would pioneer.
For investors, this origin story reveals a critical insight: GTT's market position wasn't built on superior marketing or first-mover advantage in a new consumer market. It emerged from solving an extraordinarily difficult engineering problem during a specific geopolitical moment, creating path dependencies that persist more than sixty years later.
The Birth of Two Rivals: Technigaz & Gaztransport (1963-1994)
Technigaz: The Mark Technology Emerges
In 1963 Gazocean, a company jointly owned by Gaz de France and NYK Line, created a subsidiary called Technigaz responsible for developing new LNG transportation technology.
Technigaz's engineering team took an approach that prioritized manufacturing simplicity. In 1964 Technigaz filed for a patent for "wallpanels for so-called membrane tanks" which was granted in 1968 and which led to the development of the Mark I containment system. Between 1968 and 1979, twelve LNG carriers were built using Technigaz Mark technology.
The Mark system uses corrugated stainless steel as its primary membrane, allowing the metal to expand and contract with temperature changes without fracturing. The corrugations act like an accordion, absorbing thermal stress. This elegant solution would prove its durability over decades of operation.
But corporate turbulence nearly destroyed Technigaz before its technology could mature. In 1983 Technigaz was sold to the Amrep Group which subsequently went bankrupt in 1984 and was itself taken over by the Bouygues Group.
Gaztransport: The Invar Innovation
While Technigaz pursued corrugated steel, another French team took a radically different approach. Gaztransport was founded on the 10 January 1966.
The company's founding team, led by Pierre Jean under direction from Audy Gilles of the Worms Group, developed a breakthrough using Invar®—a nickel-iron alloy discovered by Swiss physicist Charles Édouard Guillaume (who won the Nobel Prize for this work in 1920). Invar's remarkable property: it barely expands or contracts with temperature changes, eliminating the thermal stress problem entirely.
Shareholders in the new venture included Worms et Cie (51%), Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (24%), Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque et Bordeaux (15%), and Gaz de France (10%)—a consortium representing France's industrial and energy establishment.
In 1967 Phillips Petroleum and Marathon Oil, which held contracts to import gas into Japan, placed an order for two LNG carriers, Polar Alaska and Arctic Tokyo, that were built in the Swedish shipyard of Kockums. These ships remained in operation for 45 years.
In 1969 the Polar Alaska was launched, and between 1969 and 1978, ten LNG carriers used the NO systems developed by Gaztransport.
The Polar Alaska's 45-year operational lifespan—more than double typical ship lifespans—demonstrated the extraordinary durability of Gaztransport's Invar-based NO (Naval Oak) technology.
The Dark Years: 1978-1990
Then came a period that would have destroyed most technology companies. Gaztransport and Technigaz received no ship construction orders between 1978 and 1990—a devastating twelve-year drought.
The global oil crises of the 1970s had transformed energy economics. Oil prices spiked, making gas-intensive LNG projects less attractive. Economic recessions reduced energy demand. And the LNG industry, still in its infancy, simply didn't need new ships.
Most engineering firms would have folded. But both companies used this period to step up their R&D efforts, refining their technologies and preparing for an eventual recovery. This strategic patience—the willingness to invest through a decade without revenue—would prove decisive.
For investors, the dark years reveal GTT's hidden strength: its technology represents not just current engineering capability but accumulated know-how from more than sixty years of continuous development, including a decade of pure research without commercial distraction.
The Merger: Creating Modern GTT (1994)
Strategic Logic Amid Industry Transformation
In 1994 Technigaz was merged with Gaztransport to create Gaztransport & Technigaz.
The current company was established through a merger between rival companies Gaztransport SA and Technigaz SA in 1994.
The merger's logic was compelling on multiple levels. Gaztransport et Technigaz SA (GTT) was formed in 1994 through the merger of two French engineering companies: Gaztransport, founded in 1963, and Technigaz, established in 1965. Both predecessor companies had developed their own membrane containment systems for LNG transportation—Gaztransport created the NO (Naval Oak) system, while Technigaz developed the Mark membrane technology.
GTT (Gaztransport & Technigaz) is formed out of the merger of the former rival companies and the shipping division of Technigaz. GDF owns 40% of the new company, Total 30% and Bouygues Offshore 30% (which is acquired by Saipem in 2002 and sells its stake to H&F Luxembourg in 2008).
The Genius of the Licensing Model
The merged company inherited something more valuable than either predecessor possessed alone: two complementary technologies serving different customer preferences, combined with a pure licensing model that would prove extraordinarily lucrative.
Unlike traditional manufacturing companies that must finance factories, manage supply chains, and navigate labor disputes, GTT simply licenses its membrane designs to shipyards. The shipyards build the ships, hire the workers, and assume construction risk. GTT provides the intellectual property and engineering supervision—collecting royalties on every vessel built.
It collaborates with shipyards, shipowners, and classification societies through licensing contracts to distribute its technologies.
This capital-light model means GTT can scale infinitely without proportional increases in headcount or physical assets. When LNG orders surge, GTT's revenue surges with minimal additional cost. When orders decline, GTT has minimal fixed costs to cover. The business is fundamentally countercyclical at the profit level—downturns may reduce revenue, but they devastate margins less than at capital-intensive competitors.
For investors, the merger represents the moment GTT became not just a technology company but a tollbooth operator on global LNG shipping lanes.
The Technology Deep Dive: What Makes GTT Special
Mark III vs. NO96: Two Solutions to the Same Problem
Envelopes, known as membranes, contain the LNG at a temperature of -163°C, sealing it with a totally impermeable layer between the liquid cargo and the vessel's hull, while also limiting cargo loss through evaporation. GTT has two main techniques for creating membrane tanks, its Mark and NO systems. These systems, which have been approved by the international classification societies responsible for maritime transport, are continuously improved in response to shipowners' operational and financial requirements and changes in regulations.
The Mark III system uses a primary membrane of corrugated stainless steel, backed by prefabricated insulation panels containing a secondary membrane. The corrugations allow the metal to flex with temperature changes, absorbing thermal stress through mechanical design.
The NO96 system uses Invar for its primary membrane—a material with near-zero thermal expansion. Where Mark III handles temperature stress through structural flexibility, NO96 handles it through material properties. Both approaches work; customer preference often depends on manufacturing traditions at specific shipyards.
This dual-technology portfolio gives GTT a unique advantage. Shipyards trained on Mark systems naturally prefer Mark specifications. Shipyards trained on NO systems prefer NO specifications. Either way, they're paying GTT.
The Boil-Off Rate Revolution
Over the past decade, GTT has reduced the boil-off rate (BOR) from 0.15% of volume per day to 0.07% in its new Mark III Flex+. The reduced BOR has been achieved through increased insulation thickness and the lower fuel requirements of more efficient propulsion systems.
This technical improvement has enormous economic implications. LNG carriers constantly lose cargo through evaporation—the "boil-off" that occurs as ambient heat penetrates the insulation. Lower boil-off rates mean more cargo delivered, lower emissions (boil-off was historically vented or burned), and greater operational flexibility.
GTT technical director Karim Chapot said: "The thermal performance of LNG cargo containment systems is one of the chief concerns in the LNG sector. It has a direct impact on transport costs and CO2 emissions. "Technological advances have made it possible to continuously improve this performance over recent years, halving LNG emissions in the space of a decade."
This contrasts with a rate of 0.12% of the cargo volume per day on Kogas' KC-1 system. GTT's systems achieve nearly half the boil-off rate of competing Korean technology—a competitive advantage that compounds over the 25+ year lifespan of each vessel.
The Patent Fortress
GTT's intellectual property portfolio consists of over 300 patents covering its membrane technologies, manufacturing processes, and insulation systems. In 2024, GTT filed 62 new patents, maintaining its innovation pipeline.
Classification society approvals—essential for any maritime technology—take years to obtain and require extensive testing and documentation. GTT's systems have accumulated approvals from every major classification society (Lloyd's Register, Bureau Veritas, DNV, etc.), creating a regulatory moat that competitors must spend years and millions of dollars to replicate.
For investors, the technology story reinforces the moat narrative: GTT doesn't just have patents; it has a six-decade head start in accumulated engineering knowledge, classification approvals, and shipyard relationships.
Key Inflection Point #1: The Hellman & Friedman Investment (2008)
What a PE Firm Saw That Others Missed
Hellman & Friedman acquired its stake in GTT in 2008 and became a shareholder alongside Total S.A. and GDF Suez S.A. In February 2014, GTT completed its successful initial public offering ("IPO"), representing a market capitalization of EUR 1.7 billion.
GTT, based in Saint-Remy-les-Chevreuses outside Paris, is 40 percent-owned by GDF Suez while Total and Hellman & Friedman LLC each have 30 percent. The company was formed in 1994 through the merger of Gaztransport and SN Technigaz, its website shows.
Bouygues Offshore 30% (which is acquired by Saipem in 2002 and sells its stake to H&F Luxembourg in 2008).
Why would a leading private equity firm focused on software, media, and financial services acquire a stake in a French LNG engineering company? The answer reveals what made GTT attractive to sophisticated capital allocators.
Hellman & Friedman, founded in 1984 and headquartered in San Francisco, specializes in investing in "superior business franchises"—companies with durable competitive advantages. Hellman & Friedman ("H&F") is a leading private equity investment firm with offices in San Francisco, New York, and London. Since its founding in 1984, H&F has raised over $35 billion of committed capital. H&F recently closed on Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners VIII, L.P., the largest fund in the firm's history, with $10.9 billion of committed capital. The firm focuses on investing in superior business franchises and serving as a value-added partner to management in select industries including software, internet, digital & traditional media, financial services, business, marketing & information services, energy & industrials and healthcare.
H&F recognized in GTT the characteristics it seeks: an asset-light business model with enormous operating leverage, high recurring revenues, and barriers to entry that keep competitors at bay. GTT may not look like a software company, but its economic profile is remarkably similar—high gross margins, low capex, and powerful network effects.
The PE Playbook Applied
Under H&F's influence, GTT professionalized its governance, refined its strategy, and prepared for public market scrutiny. The private equity period served as a proving ground for management discipline and operational excellence.
Patrick Healy, Managing Director and Deputy CEO of Hellman & Friedman, says: "The sale of our remaining stake in GTT brings a conclusion to H&F's partnership with GTT starting with our investment in 2008 and the highly successful IPO in February 2014. The excellence of the GTT business and financial profile generated a strong return for all investors without the use of financial leverage. Our investment could not have succeeded without the superb contribution of Philippe Berterottière, his management team and GTT's engineers and employees. We are extremely grateful to them and believe that GTT has a strong future under their stewardship.
The phrase "without the use of financial leverage" is notable. Many PE returns depend on debt-fueled financial engineering. GTT's returns came purely from operational excellence and industry growth—testament to the underlying business quality.
For investors, H&F's involvement provides third-party validation of GTT's competitive position from one of the world's most sophisticated private equity firms.
Key Inflection Point #2: The 2014 IPO
Going Public at Peak Opportunity
On the 27 February 2014 the GTT Group was listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange.
Offering Price: € 46 per share, representing a market capitalization for GTT of approximately € 1.7 billion.
After the IPO, GDF is expected to retain around 40 percent of the capital of GTT, while Total and Hellman & Friedman's stakes will be cut to 8.8 percent each. The number of shares in free float will represent 41.8 percent of the capital.
Philippe Berterottière, President and Chief Executive Officer of GTT commented: "The success of GTT's IPO reflects investors' confidence in our business model and our unique positioning at the core of the LNG industry. With this listing, GTT benefits from all of the strengths necessary to consolidate its world leading position and capture LNG sector growth. With the strong support of our shareholders, we will continue to invest in research and development and in our teams to offer increasingly innovative and competitive technologies to our customers in the LNG shipping industry as well as in related sectors".
The Leadership Driving Value
The man steering GTT through its transformation, Philippe Berterottière, brought an unusual background to the LNG industry. In 1982, Berterottière started his career with Airbus as a contract negotiator and after 3 years was promoted to director of business development, aftermarket, in 1986. In 1988, he joined the Matra Group as Sales Director for Asia in the Defense Division.
Previously, he held various leadership positions in aerospace companies: with Airbus as a contract negotiator, then Business Development Director, with Matra as Sales Director within the Defence Division and with Arianespace, where he held several commercial roles before becoming Commercial Director and a member of the Executive Committee. He is a graduate of HEC Paris (Hautes Études Commerciales) and IEP (Institut d'Études Politiques).
In April 2009, Berterottière joined Gaztransport & Technigaz as director of business development. In September 2009, Berterottière was appointed as chief executive officer of Gaztransport & Technigaz. and on 11 December 2013, he was appointed as Chairman
Berterottière's aerospace pedigree proved invaluable. Like LNG shipping, aerospace involves complex engineering sold through long-term contracts to sophisticated buyers. His experience navigating government relations, managing classification processes, and structuring technology licensing translated directly to GTT's business.
Après plus de 25 ans de carrière dans des activités commerciales au sein des grands acteurs de la Défense, Philippe Berterottière devient, en 2009, le PDG de GTT, société d'ingénierie spécialisée dans le confinement, le transport et le stockage du GNL. Très soucieux de développer la mixité au sein de l'entreprise, Philippe Berterottière a réussi en quelques années à augmenter la féminisation de son Comex.
H&F's Exit: The Perfect Trade
Hellman & Friedman acquired its stake in GTT in 2008 and became a shareholder alongside Total and GDF Suez. In February 2014, GTT completed its successful initial public offering (IPO), representing a market capitalisation of EUR1.7 billion.
H&F fully exited its investment in January 2015, having invested in 2008 and exited after the highly successful IPO—a textbook private equity transaction that demonstrated both H&F's judgment and GTT's business quality.
For investors, the IPO marks the beginning of GTT's public market track record and provides the transparency essential for fundamental analysis.
Key Inflection Point #3: Qatar's LNG Expansion & Global Supercycle (2021-Present)
The Geopolitics That Transformed GTT's Order Book
The LNG industry operates on geological timescales—projects take decades from discovery to first shipment. But geopolitical shocks can rapidly reshape demand, as Europe learned painfully after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
On Feb. 25, 2024, the Qatari minister of energy and CEO of QatarEnergy (QE), Saad al-Kaabi, announced plans to increase Qatar's liquefied natural gas (LNG) production capacity by a further 16 million tons per annum (mtpa) in 2029-30, bringing the total to 142 mtpa. This would be the third such large-scale expansion of the country's LNG production within the next six years. The so-called North Field West (NFW) expansion will be preceded by two other previously announced expansion projects: the North Field East (NFE) expansion (totaling 32 mtpa) in 2026-27 and the North Field South (NFS) expansion (totaling 16 mtpa) in 2027-28.
The government plans to increase Qatar's LNG production capacity to 126mn tonnes per year (Mtpa) by 2027 from 77 Mtpa currently and further to 142 Mtpa before 2030, an almost 85% increase above the current capacity," it said.
This 85% expansion in Qatari LNG capacity requires a commensurate expansion in shipping capacity. And ships require containment systems.
A big part of these orders are related to QatarEnergy's massive shipbuilding program. Including QC-Max LNG carriers, QatarEnergy's shipbuilding program entails the construction of 128 vessels. In September, QatarEnergy ordered six additional 271,000-cbm LNG carriers from CSSC's Hudong-Zhonghua for about $2 billion, boosting the total to 24 QC-Max LNG carriers.
In March, QatarEnergy said it had completed the conventional-size vessels portion of the shipbuilding program, bringing the total number of ships for which it signed time charter parties to 104. These 104 vessels will be constructed by South Korean yards and Hudong-Zhonghua. All of them will feature GTT's containment tech.
US LNG Expansion Adds to the Wave
In the United States, the lifting of the moratorium on new LNG projects has spectacularly reignited investment decisions. Ten new liquefaction projects have been approved, including six in the United States, for a record capacity of 84 Mtpa. This momentum is driving a very significant increase in the need for new LNG carriers.
The November 2024 US election and subsequent policy changes accelerated American LNG project approvals. Furthermore, new liquefaction projects are anticipated in the United States by the end of 2025, and the replacement market is set to gain momentum, driven by an ageing fleet and tightening environmental regulations.
Europe's Energy Security Pivot
After Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the company continued to provide services to Russian clients, even as many major companies were pulling out of Russia. In January 2023 Gaztransport & Technigaz suspended all work with Russia on building fifteen Arc 7 LNG tankers.
The Russia-Ukraine war fundamentally transformed European energy policy. Nations that once relied on Russian pipeline gas now compete for LNG supplies from Qatar, the United States, and Australia. This structural shift from pipeline to LNG creates sustained demand for carriers—and for GTT's containment systems.
For investors, this geopolitical context explains why GTT's order book extends years into the future: major LNG projects generate carrier demand for decades, and multiple massive projects are now underway simultaneously.
The Business Model & Financial Genius
The Royalty Model Explained
Gaztransport & Technigaz (GTT) of France is the technology company that earns royalties from every LNG carrier built in South Korea and elsewhere in the world when its designs are used. One South Korean shipbuilding executive estimated that GTT had earned 2.5 trillion won (US$2.1 billion) in royalties from South Korean shipbuilders over the last 10 years for the rights to use its membrane-type LNG tanks. GTT's average royalties are generally kept confidential, though are estimated to be around $10 million per vessel with carriers costing between $180M and $200M in the current market.
At present, the big three Korean shipyards – Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), Hyundai Heavy Industries and Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) – have to pay GTT royalties on each vessel that uses the French company's technology. However, DSME's Solidus technology is now the third Korean LNG containment system to be developed, following Samsung Heavy Industries' KCS and Kogas' KC-1.
Consider the math: $10 million per ship Ă— 70+ ships per year = $700+ million in annual revenue. But GTT doesn't build ships, doesn't employ shipyard workers, doesn't finance steel purchases. It designs systems, supervises construction, and collects royalties.
Record Financial Performance
Commenting on the results, Philippe Berterottière, Chairman and CEO of GTT, said: "Last year GTT's core business delivered its second-best commercial performance on its core business, with a total of 72 LNG carrier orders, 12 ethane carrier orders, two regasification unit orders and one floating LNG unit order. The growing demand for LNG is driving additional LNG carrier requirements, supported by ongoing investments in liquefaction plants and increased shipyard construction capacity. Furthermore, new liquefaction projects are anticipated in the United States by the end of 2025, and the replacement market is set to gain momentum, driven by an ageing fleet and tightening environmental regulations.
This is mainly explained by the increase of revenue of GTT's main activity, explained by the absence of significant delays in ship construction schedule as well and explained by a good cost control management. As a consequence, the EBITDA margin amounts to 61% in 2024 compared to 55% last year.
GTT benefits from high visibility on its core business over the coming years, with an order book of nearly two billion euros.
The Dividend Commitment
The company proposed an 80% dividend payout of consolidated net income.
GTT's commitment to distribute at least 80% of net income as dividends reflects both management's confidence in cash flow stability and the limited capital requirements of the business. Unlike capital-intensive manufacturers, GTT generates excess cash that flows directly to shareholders.
Regarding our outlook for the current year, given the order book schedule, we estimate that consolidated revenues for 2025 should be in the range of 750 to 800 million euros, with consolidated EBITDA expected to be between 490 and 540 million euros. We also reaffirm our commitment to distributing at least 80% of the Group's net income for the 2025 financial year."
Negative Working Capital and Near-Zero Capex
GTT collects royalties as ships progress through construction, often receiving payments before incurring corresponding costs. This creates negative working capital—GTT's customers effectively finance its operations. Combined with minimal capex requirements (engineering software and office buildings rather than factories), GTT converts nearly all EBITDA to free cash flow.
One or two additional comments on the CapEx investments and our free cash flow. Our CapEx investments increased linked to the rehabilitation of some of our headquarters buildings, linked to the acquisition of VPS, mentioned by Anwar earlier and linked to new minority stakes in the framework of our GTG venture capital mentioned by Jean Baptiste in the innovation part. Regarding our free cash flow at million, which significantly increased by 54% compared to last year. So thanks to our strong activity and these robust financial figures, the dividend distributed will represent 80% of the consolidated net income as announced in our guidance last year.
For investors, these financial characteristics—high margins, high cash conversion, minimal reinvestment requirements—represent the hallmarks of a durable competitive advantage.
Key Inflection Point #4: Diversification Strategy (2020-Present)
Digital & Smart Shipping Acquisitions
2020 was a dynamic year in terms of external growth for GTT, with the acquisition of Marorka, an Icelandic company specialising in Smart Shipping and OSE Engineering in the field of artificial intelligence. These acquisitions are part of our digital strategy, which also aims to make maritime transport cleaner.
Paris – February 20th, 2020. GTT announces the acquisition of 100% of the share capital of Marorka from its owners and management team. Based in Iceland and specialized in Smart Shipping, the company designs maritime energy monitoring and optimization systems for vessels, allowing them to reduce their environmental footprint. The company's systems have been installed on more than 600 vessels.
Ascenz: The company became a subsidiary of the GTT Group following its acquisition in early 2018. Based in Singapore, Ascenz offers solutions to the maritime industry about monitoring and improving the energy efficiency of ships.
In the digital field, the acquisition of the Danish company Danelec, completed on 31 July 2025, positions GTT as a global leader in vessel performance management and Voyage Data Recorders.
These acquisitions expand GTT's revenue base beyond pure containment systems. As LNG carriers increasingly rely on digital systems for route optimization, emissions monitoring, and regulatory compliance, GTT can capture additional value from each vessel.
The Hydrogen Bet: Elogen
Areva H2Gen, renamed Elogen, in October 2020. This company, French leader in PEM electrolysis, specialises in the design and assembly of electrolysers for the production of green hydrogen. Elogen uses Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) technology. It is the only company to manufacture electrolysis units in France.
The green-hydrogen market today is expanding fast, notably driven by major energy companies who seek to provide to consumers carbon-free solutions, and by numerous national government development plans, as well as a European plan announced in July 2020. This acquisition enables GTT to enrich its technological portfolio with an expertise in green hydrogen, a crucial component of the energy mix for the next decades. The Elogen acquisition confirms GTT's commitment to continue to develop advanced technologies for better energy efficiency.
The strategic logic was sound: as the energy transition accelerates, hydrogen could become a major fuel source requiring containment and transport infrastructure similar to LNG. GTT's engineering capabilities could theoretically extend to hydrogen transport.
The Elogen Reality Check
Finally, Elogen, our subsidiary specialising in electrolysers for green hydrogen production, reported an EBITDA loss of -33 million euros, in a particularly challenging market environment, leading to a lack of significant orders in 2024. The initial conclusions of the strategic review of Elogen's activities, announced on February 10, 2025, highlight the need to reposition the company's business model to leverage its technological strengths. Among the measures under consideration, a reorganisation and workforce adjustment plan has been announced and initiated, subject to information and consultation procedures with employee representative bodies.
GTT acquired Elogen in 2020, and construction of the gigafactory began in January 2024 with €86m in support from the French Government. However, Elogen did not receive any "significant orders" in 2024, contributing to the EBITDA loss.
The hydrogen diversification has disappointed thus far. Green hydrogen projects globally have faced delays, cancellations, and intense competition. Elogen's €33 million EBITDA loss in 2024 represents a significant drag on consolidated results.
For investors, Elogen represents both a cautionary tale about diversification and management's willingness to recognize and address problems. The restructuring announcement suggests discipline in capital allocation rather than doubling down on failing strategies.
The Competitive Landscape & Threats
Korean Shipyards: The Perpetual Challengers
French firm GTT has long provided most of the containment systems used in LNG vessels, but now faces new competition from South Korea. The main rivals to GTT's membrane technology have traditionally been the self-supporting tanks produced by its Norwegian and Japanese rivals that are structurally independent of the vessel hull. However, South Korean shipyards have now developed their own containment systems and are starting to use them for the first time.
Samsung Heavy Industries Co. developed its KCS LNG cargo containment system in 2011, and Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. created its own LNG cargo containment system in 2013. Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. introduced its Solidus LNG tank in 2017.
Daewoo's Solidus system offers a daily LNG boil-off rate (BOR) of 0.049 percent, far lower than the GTT Mark III Flex Plus system's 0.07 BOR. Samsung's KCS is known to also have a 0.07 BOR.
The Korean threat appears formidable on paper. Korean shipyards build most of the world's LNG carriers and have strong incentives to reduce royalty payments. Their containment systems have received classification society approvals.
Why Korean Competition Hasn't Materialized
However, none of them have yet been used in vessels in service. "The shipping industry is a very conservative industry," said a spokesman at Samsung Heavy. "Safety always comes first before looking into new technology and functions. Shipowners or shippers don't want their vessels to become a test bed for new products."
"We believe the technology is there, but what we need is a track record," said Kang Joong-kyoo, head of Daewoo Shipbuilding's research and development center. "We'll obviously try to gain credibility with global customers, but I think South Korean-owned LNG ships should use local LNG containment systems first and show they are safe."
Despite the emerging Korean competition, French engineering firm GTT's membrane technology is used on about three-quarters of the 520 conventional LNG carriers currently in use and it seems to be maintaining market share, in part because it has improved the thermal performance of its cargo containment systems to cut carbon emissions and transport costs.
All of them have struggled to make a dent in GTT's lucrative market share. In fact, Kogas reportedly lost US$150M with the KC-1 LNG tanks, and now has evolved them into the KC-2 system.
The conservatism of the shipping industry—where a containment failure could cause catastrophic explosions—creates enormous switching costs. Shipowners specify GTT systems because GTT has sixty years of accident-free operation. Insurers prefer GTT because GTT systems have known risk profiles. Classification societies approve GTT quickly because GTT's documentation is comprehensive.
Korean systems may technically work, but "may work" isn't good enough for a $200 million asset carrying explosive cargo across oceans for 25+ years.
The Chinese Question
The company generated almost all its revenue from South Korea and China.
China's LNG imports are expected to reach above 131 million metric tons by 2030 as policies from the government continue to focus on transitioning away from cleaner fuel alternatives. Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding Group and COSCO Shipping have become the leading producers of LNG vessels in the world. China's dual-carbon objectives are being added by expanding coastal terminals to utility fleet acquisition strategies.
Chinese yards are more recently closing the technology gap with South Korea, thereby adding value-added solutions for both domestic and international LNG shipping.
Chinese shipyards are expanding LNG carrier production, and China could theoretically develop indigenous containment systems. But to date, Chinese carriers use GTT technology, and the pattern suggests technology transfer would take decades even with state support.
For investors, the competitive analysis reveals why GTT's moat persists: technical capability isn't sufficient; customers require proven safety records that can only be built through years of incident-free operation.
Strategic Framework Analysis
Porter's Five Forces
1. Threat of New Entrants: VERY LOW GTT's intellectual property portfolio exceeds 300 patents. Classification society approvals require years of testing. Shipyards already trained on GTT systems face enormous switching costs in retraining workers and retooling facilities. New entrants would need to accept zero revenue for a decade while building track records.
2. Bargaining Power of Suppliers: LOW GTT doesn't manufacture—it licenses designs. Raw materials for membrane systems (Invar, stainless steel, plywood, insulation) are globally available commodities. GTT faces no supplier concentration risk because shipyards source materials directly.
3. Bargaining Power of Buyers: MODERATE GTT's customer base concentrates in Korean and Chinese shipyards. However, shipyards need GTT technology to win LNG carrier orders—shipowners specify GTT systems. This creates a push-pull dynamic where apparent customer concentration masks downstream demand that shipyards cannot ignore.
4. Threat of Substitutes: LOW-MODERATE Moss tanks (spherical designs) exist but are less space-efficient, more expensive, and declining in market share. Pipelines substitute for some LNG routes but cannot serve transoceanic trade. Korean alternatives exist but lack operational track records.
5. Industry Rivalry: LOW The limited number of technology licensors, including GTT, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and IHI, creates dependencies that can constrain production capacity. These technological complexities require extensive workforce training and specialized expertise, creating additional operational challenges.
Membrane technology has become the industry standard. GTT's effective duopoly (with Norwegian Moss systems) faces declining Moss market share rather than competitive membrane alternatives.
Hamilton's 7 Powers
1. Scale Economies: MODERATE Engineering costs spread across large order books. R&D investments amortized across hundreds of vessels. In 2024, GTT filed 62 patents—an expense no smaller competitor could sustain.
2. Network Effects: MODERATE-HIGH More ships using GTT creates more shipyard expertise, which creates more GTT orders. Training ecosystems create virtuous cycles. New shipyards learn GTT systems from experienced workers, perpetuating the standard.
3. Counter-Positioning: HIGH Korean shipyards cannot easily develop competing technology while paying GTT royalties—investing in alternatives cannibalizes current production while GTT systems remain required for near-term orders. Existing players have sunk costs in GTT training and equipment.
4. Switching Costs: VERY HIGH Shipyards invest years training workers on GTT systems. Changing containment technology requires retraining, retooling, new classification approvals, and accepting unknown operational risks. The installed base of GTT-trained workers creates structural lock-in.
5. Branding: MODERATE GTT's brand matters primarily as a proxy for safety and reliability. Sixty years without major incidents creates brand value that competitors cannot replicate through marketing.
6. Cornered Resource: HIGH The accumulated know-how from six decades of development, combined with relationships spanning the global shipping industry, represents knowledge assets that cannot be purchased or quickly replicated.
7. Process Power: MODERATE GTT's engineering methodologies, testing protocols, and quality systems have been refined over decades. These processes deliver consistent results that newer competitors cannot match without equivalent experience.
For investors, the strategic frameworks reveal GTT's competitive position across multiple dimensions—a rare combination of moat sources that reinforce each other.
Bull Case & Bear Case
The Bull Case
Structural LNG Demand Growth We expect trade volumes to grow 60% by the end of the decade. On a macro level, natural gas will be 23% of global energy supply by 2030 and should do well in the energy transition.
The energy transition paradoxically benefits LNG. As coal plants close but renewable capacity remains insufficient, gas provides reliable baseload power with lower emissions than coal. Asian industrialization, European energy security concerns, and US export capacity all drive LNG demand growth.
Order Book Visibility GTT benefits from high visibility on its core business over the coming years, with an order book of nearly two billion euros.
Unlike most industrial companies, GTT can see years into the future through its order book. Ships ordered today deliver in 2027-2031, with royalties following construction progress. This visibility reduces execution risk dramatically.
Aging Fleet Creates Replacement Demand The replacement market is set to gain momentum, driven by an ageing fleet and tightening environmental regulations.
Even if new LNG projects slow, the existing fleet requires replacement. Ships built in the 1990s and 2000s approach the end of their economic lives, creating sustained demand independent of industry growth.
Margin Expansion Potential If Elogen restructuring reduces losses, consolidated margins could expand further. Digital acquisitions provide higher-margin recurring revenue. Operating leverage remains favorable as revenue grows.
The Bear Case
LNG Demand Overshoot A Climate Analytics report said that by 2030, LNG carrier surplus is expected to grow to 40% beyond what is required of the industry's operating capacity — the equivalent of 275 modern carriers.
There would be nothing unusual about this decision by the Qatari authorities were it not for one fact: These new production volumes are set to come online at a time of significant oversupply in the LNG market. It is estimated that global LNG production will grow by at least 40% in 2025-30 compared to 2022-24.
If LNG supply exceeds demand significantly, project cancellations could reduce carrier orders. While GTT's order book provides near-term protection, a sustained downturn would eventually impact results.
Korean Technology Breakthrough The Korean containment systems (KC-1, KCS, Solidus) have received classification approvals. If Korean shipowners begin using domestic systems and build track records, the floodgates could open. This remains the most significant long-term competitive risk.
Chinese Self-Sufficiency As China builds more LNG carriers domestically, state pressure for indigenous technology could accelerate. If Chinese classification societies approve domestic containment systems, GTT could lose access to a major market.
Energy Transition Acceleration If renewable energy costs fall faster than expected and battery storage improves, LNG's role as a "bridge fuel" could shorten. Long-term LNG demand depends on assumptions about renewable deployment that may prove optimistic for gas.
Elogen Drag Hydrogen diversification has destroyed value thus far. If restructuring fails and losses continue, Elogen could consume resources better deployed elsewhere.
For investors, the risk-reward calculation depends heavily on views about long-term LNG demand and Korean competitive dynamics.
Key Performance Indicators for Investors
Order Intake (LNG Carriers + Ethane Carriers + FSRUs/FLNGs)
This is GTT's most important leading indicator. Today's orders become tomorrow's revenue over 3-5 year construction periods. Tracking quarterly order intake reveals demand trends before they appear in financial statements.
In the 2024 financial year, GTT booked 72 LNG carrier orders, including 18 very large-capacity LNG carriers (271,000 m3).
Look for: 60+ LNG carrier orders annually to sustain growth; order mix shifting toward larger vessels (higher royalties per unit); geographic diversification across Korean and Chinese yards.
Order Book Coverage Ratio
The ratio of order book to trailing twelve-month revenue indicates visibility and runway. GTT's €2 billion order book against ~€640 million in 2024 revenue provides approximately three years of visibility.
Monitor for: declining coverage ratio as a warning sign; order book extending further into future years (positive signal).
Boil-Off Rate Performance vs. Competitors
GTT's technical advantage manifests in boil-off rate comparisons. If Korean systems achieve comparable performance, the competitive moat weakens.
Track: classification society approvals for competing systems; any commercial orders using non-GTT containment; GTT's own technology improvements maintaining the gap.
Conclusion: The Quiet Compounder
Gaztransport & Technigaz represents a rare species in public markets: a company with a genuine monopoly on critical infrastructure technology, trading at a reasonable valuation, with a multi-year demand runway supported by geopolitical megatrends.
The company's origin in Cold War-era French engineering, its survival through a decade-long order drought, its transformation under private equity ownership, and its current position at the center of the global LNG supercycle create a narrative arc that rivals the best business stories.
But narrative isn't enough for investment decisions. The fundamental question is whether GTT's competitive moats will persist. The evidence suggests they will—sixty years of accumulated know-how, 300+ patents, universal classification approvals, and an industry where safety conservatism creates enormous switching costs.
The risks are real: Korean technology development could eventually crack the moat, Chinese self-sufficiency efforts could restrict market access, and energy transition uncertainty clouds long-term demand. The Elogen hydrogen bet has disappointed, requiring capital and management attention.
Yet the core business remains extraordinary: an asset-light licensing model generating 60%+ EBITDA margins, with visible multi-year order books and customers who have no practical alternatives. For investors seeking businesses with genuine competitive advantages, GTT merits serious consideration.
As the world navigates the energy transition, LNG will remain essential for decades—and GTT will likely remain the tollbooth operator on the shipping lanes that carry it.
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