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Eat & Beyond Global Holdings: Betting on the Future of Food (And What Happens When the Future Changes)
In June 2025, a press release quietly crossed the newswires that perfectly encapsulated one of the most instructive case studies in thematic investing of the past decade. Eat & Beyond Global Holdings Inc. announced it would change its name to Digital Asset Technologies Inc. and update its stock symbol to "DATT" on the Canadian Securities Exchange, effective June 17, 2025. How does a company go from "investing in the future of food" to blockchain and AI in just five years?
The answer reveals something profound about thematic investing, sector bubbles, and the brutal math of timing markets. Eat & Beyond's journey—from pandemic darling to going-concern risk to complete strategic reinvention—offers a masterclass in what happens when an entire investment thesis collapses, and what a small holding company does when the future it was betting on simply fails to materialize.
Eat & Beyond Global Holdings Inc. is a private equity and venture capital firm specializing in early stage, emerging growth, growth, expansion, buy-ins or buy-out investments. The firm focuses on investments in the plant-based protein and meat alternative food industry. Or at least, it did. Incorporated in 2019 and headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, the company arrived at the perfect moment to catch a wave that looked unstoppable—and then watched that wave crash spectacularly against the rocks of consumer reality.
This is the story of a company that did almost everything right by conventional venture metrics, that built a portfolio of genuinely innovative companies, and that still found itself staring at existential questions within four years of its public listing. It's a story about the gap between investor enthusiasm and consumer behavior, about the perils of concentrated thematic bets, and about what survival looks like when your core thesis implodes.
The Context: The Plant-Based Protein Gold Rush (2018-2020)
The IPO That Launched a Thousand Bets
To understand why Eat & Beyond was created—and why anyone would have thought it was a good idea—you have to transport yourself back to May 2019. The scene: the Nasdaq trading floor on a Thursday morning. The event: what would become one of the most celebrated IPOs of the year.
In the strongest market debut so far that year, Beyond Meat shares surged 163% Thursday, giving the maker of plant-based meat substitutes a market value of $3.77 billion. The company's opening trade of $46 was later than expected, hitting after noon Thursday. Then something extraordinary happened: after shares soared 125%, trading was paused due to volatility. When trading resumed, the stock rocketed even higher.
The numbers were staggering. The shares, which opened at $46, closed their first day of trading Thursday up 163 percent to $65.75 in New York, giving the company a market value of about $3.8 billion. The first-day pop eclipsed the 81 percent gain by Silk Road Medical Inc. in its U.S. debut last month and was the best for a U.S. listing raising at least $200 million since before the 2008 financial crisis.
This wasn't just market froth—or so it seemed. In May 2019, Beyond Meat became a public company via an initial public offering on the Nasdaq, raising $240 million. It was the first plant-based meat alternative company to became a public company. The symbolism was powerful: a new category of food had just been crowned investable by public markets.
Celebrity investors piled in. Company backers included Bill Gates, Leonardo DiCaprio and Jessica Chastain. Even Hollywood royalty became evangelists: Jessica Chastain said she invested in Beyond Meat after being on set in Toronto and being unable to find a Beyond Burger at an A&W restaurant. "I tried for four months in Canada to get one and it sold out everywhere," she said.
The Investment Thesis Everyone Believed
The bull case was elegantly simple and seemingly irrefutable. Consumers are looking for more plant-based meat alternatives because of concerns about health, animal welfare and the environment. Startups like Beyond Meat are tapping into that demand by offering beef-like versions of the veggie burger and other meat products.
The data supported the enthusiasm. Supermarket sales of meat alternatives surged 19.2 percent to $878 million for the year ended Jan. 5, according to data from Nielsen. And the financial trajectory looked like escape velocity: In 2018, Beyond reported revenue of $87.9 million, up 170% from the previous year's net sales of $32.6 million.
By July 2019, just two months after going public, the brand's share price peaked at $235 per share, an incredible 840% gain inside three months, making it one of the most successful IPOs of the year. The company that had lost $30 million the prior year was now valued at nearly $14 billion.
The implications rippled through the investment world. If Beyond Meat could achieve this, what about the dozens of other innovative food companies working on similar technologies? What about cell-based meat? Lab-grown dairy? Precision fermentation? The "alternative protein" sector suddenly looked like the next trillion-dollar opportunity.
The Confluence of Megatrends
The alt-protein thesis sat at the intersection of several powerful trends that seemed to reinforce each other:
ESG Investing's Rise: Institutional capital was flooding into anything with an environmental angle. Plant-based proteins promised to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, water usage, and land requirements compared to traditional animal agriculture.
Millennial Values: Younger consumers, the theory went, cared more about sustainability, animal welfare, and health than their parents. They would trade up to more expensive plant-based options as a form of values expression.
Food Security Anxiety: The world's population was growing, climate change threatened agricultural yields, and traditional protein production looked increasingly unsustainable. Alternative proteins offered a way out.
The Flexitarian Movement: You didn't have to be vegan or vegetarian to eat plant-based products. The "flexitarian" consumer—reducing but not eliminating meat consumption—represented a massive addressable market.
It was into this intoxicating environment that Eat & Beyond was conceived.
Founding & IPO: Building the "ETF for Alt-Protein" (2019-2020)
The Genesis of Retail Alt-Protein Exposure
The Company was incorporated on September 9, 2019 under the laws of the Province of British Columbia, Canada by a Certificate of Incorporation issued pursuant to the provisions of the Business Corporations Act (British Columbia) and changed its name from 1222554 B.C. Ltd. to Eat Beyond Global Holdings Inc. on September 17, 2019.
The timing wasn't coincidental. Beyond Meat's IPO had electrified markets just four months earlier, and the hunger for alternative protein exposure was palpable among retail investors. But there was a problem: most of the exciting companies in the space were private, funded by institutional venture capital inaccessible to ordinary investors.
Enter Patrick Morris, a capital markets veteran with an unusual background. The $5-trillion global food industry was new territory for Morris, an entrepreneur and capital markets executive with experience in mining exploration, tech and cannabis. But what he lacked in food industry pedigree, he made up for with conviction about the opportunity. Eat Beyond's focus on the future of food is "a whole lot more exciting to me than drilling holes in the ground," he said.
His background was in the capital market space—working all the way from mining to the cannabis industry, which he called "a beautiful disruption of big pharma." Morris saw a parallel: "Now we're sort of seeing the same disruption in big food companies that are not necessarily doing great things for the public and their health."
The Democratization Angle
The concept behind Eat Beyond was pretty simple. It had a slate of portfolio companies in the future protein space that receive both funding and expert advice from the fund's board. And those who don't have millions of dollars to invest but want to do more to support the animal alternative industry can buy shares in Eat Beyond.
This was the elevator pitch: if you believed in the alternative protein revolution but couldn't access private deals, Eat & Beyond gave you a way in. "This is clearly a growing sector, and we noticed that there weren't many opportunities for the retail investor to participate - so we created one ourselves. We spent over a year reaching out to over 100 companies worldwide, and the innovation that we saw blew us away," said Patrick Morris.
"I expected to see 100 different types of vegan burger patties - but we found companies creating everything imaginable, and have decided to focus our efforts on alternatives in four key areas: meat, seafood, eggs, and dairy."
Building the Investment Committee
What differentiated Eat & Beyond from a simple venture fund was its commitment to operational value-add. The company assembled an investment committee of genuine food industry veterans, headlined by a particularly credible figure.
Don Robinson, the former CEO and President of Mars Canada, joined its board of directors. Mr. Robinson had spent over three decades in the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry, including roles with Nabisco/Kraft and Mars Incorporated. His work has spanned four continents and three decades.
Robinson's credentials were impeccable. As CEO and President of Mars Canada, he transformed the business from an unprofitable operation losing $20M annually to a business with $25M in profit with sales of over $500M. Most recently, he served as Chairman, CEO and President of CARA Operations Ltd. (2006-2013), where he was responsible for successfully leading a $1.8B business with an EBITDA of $70M.
"Having spent so many years in the CPG and food industries, and having gone vegan myself about a year ago, I am excited by the opportunity that Eat Beyond brings. Seeking out the early ventures that need funding in this emerging area of plant-based and alternative foods is fascinating to me," said Mr. Robinson.
The CSE Listing and Early Euphoria
Eat Beyond received approval to list its common shares on the Canadian Securities Exchange. The common shares commenced trading under the trading symbol "EATS" on November 17, 2020.
The ticker symbol itself was marketing genius—"EATS" perfectly encapsulated the thesis in four letters.
"We created Eat Beyond to make it easy to invest in the future of food, and provide retail investors with access to the very best companies in the sector. The space has seen enormous interest from the market for brands such as Beyond Meat, but that was really just the tip of the iceberg. The diverse range of innovation taking place in this sector is staggering," said Patrick Morris, CEO of Eat Beyond.
The market response validated the thesis. Eat Beyond began trading on November 17, 2020 and its share price jumped over 340 percent in just over three months. Several of Eat Beyond's portfolio companies have also now reached all-time highs for their share prices.
The stock reached its all-time high on January 20, 2021 with the price of 31.920 CAD. In barely two months, investors had made multiples on their money.
The Investment Strategy
The firm identifies and acquires equity in companies operating in the sectors of plant-based proteins, fermented proteins, cultured proteins/agriculture, food tech, and consumer packaged goods, as well as cell agriculture and other experimental projects. The firm prefers to invest in companies based in North America, Europe, Israel, and Asian and Latin American countries.
"Initially it might be considered pretty small – it was around 4 million dollars, Canadian. We invest anywhere from $50,000 up to half a million dollars in each company, and some of those investments so far have been pretty incredible," Morris explained in an early interview.
The positioning was clear: Eat Beyond is the first investment issuer in Canada focused solely on identifying and acquiring equity in diverse global companies in this sector, which includes plant-based proteins, fermented proteins, cultured proteins/agriculture, food tech, and consumer packaged goods as well as cell agriculture and other experimental projects.
The Portfolio: A Tour Through Alt-Protein's Greatest Hits
The Singapore Cell-Ag Bet
Understanding Eat & Beyond's portfolio requires understanding why Singapore mattered so much to the alternative protein story. In December 2020, something happened that seemed to vindicate every bull case for the sector.
Singapore Food Agency approved Eat Just's cell-cultured chicken, making the country the first in the world to give its go-ahead to selling meat created in a lab. Singapore Food Agency approved Eat Just's cell-cultured chicken, making the country the first in the world to give its go-ahead to selling meat created in a lab.
This was a watershed moment. On Wednesday, alternative protein company Eat Just announced a major development: Its cultured chicken product had been approved for sale in Singapore. It was apparently the first time anywhere in the world that a commercial meat product made from cultured animal cells had been approved for human consumption, no slaughter required.
The country's leaders see cell-cultured protein as a potentially important piece of Singapore's "30 by 30" initiative—a plan to produce 30 percent of the nation's food domestically by 2030.
Eat & Beyond had positioned itself perfectly. "SingCell is focused on improving the feasibility of the cultured meat industry by focusing purely on the cost and scalability of the technology," said Eat Beyond CEO Patrick Morris. "The company is also located in Singapore, which is truly the epicenter of this industry and was the first jurisdiction globally to approve cell-based meat for consumption."
TurtleTree Labs: The Cell-Based Milk Moonshot
Among Eat & Beyond's most ambitious bets was TurtleTree Labs, a Singapore-based company working on something that sounded like science fiction: cell-based milk without cows.
Founded in January 2019 by Lin Fengru and Max Rye, TurtleTree Labs raced to the forefront of the food tech scene, landing USD 3.2 million in seed funding after making a breakthrough in cell-based milk technology research.
The technology was genuinely revolutionary. The company was one of the first in the world to develop cultivated milk without the need of animals and focused on high-value, nutritionally-matched human breast milk and cow's dairy milk.
Co-founded in 2019 by Fengru Lin and Max Rye, Singaporean startup TurtleTree Labs was the world's first cell-based milk company that utilizes biotechnology to manufacture dairy milk with the exact composition, functionality and taste without any cows needed at a 98% carbon footprint reduction, as well as human breast milk that took aim at the lucrative US$45 billion infant milk formula industry.
The fundraising momentum was impressive. TurtleTree Labs closed an oversubscribed US$6.2 million Pre-A funding round. TurtleTree then raised $30 million in the first tranche of its Series A, bringing its total capital raised to more than $40 million.
The investor roster read like a who's who of alternative protein capital: Along with Green Monday Ventures, participating investors included San Francisco's KBW Ventures, CPT Capital, Sydney-based alternative investment management firm Artesian and impact investor New Luna Ventures.
Nabati Foods: The Canadian Growth Story
Closer to home, Eat & Beyond made a significant bet on Edmonton-based Nabati Foods.
Nabati Foods is a private food technology company that offers consumers selective healthy plant-based food products. Nabati is based in Edmonton, Alberta and serves the North American Market.
Edmonton-based Nabati Foods had been growing rapidly with its diverse product line of meat, dairy, and cheese alternatives, and closed an oversubscribed round of financing. Nabati had plans to go public in 2021.
The fundraising exceeded expectations: Nabati closed an oversubscribed $7.7 million private placement, and restructured with plans to go public. Nabati previously announced its intentions to raise $4 million, but due to tremendous demand, increased this to $7.7 million.
"Once the financing was announced for Nabati, the company received thousands of inquiries from interested parties looking to invest," said Eat Beyond CEO Patrick Morris.
Eat & Beyond's approach to Nabati illustrated its value-add model. Eat Beyond's Don Robinson stepped up as Nabati's Executive Chairman and was joined by Eat Beyond's investment committee members Michael Owen, Diane Jang, and Robert Kang. Together these executives would bring well over 100 combined years of strategic business experience to help guide Nabati.
The Full Portfolio
By early 2021, Eat & Beyond had assembled an impressive roster. Its portfolio included Nabati Foods, Zoglo's Incredible Food, TurtleTree Labs, Above Food, Plant Power Fast Food, Reusables.com, Banana Wave and Beyond Moo.
The founding portfolio at listing included: The Very Good Food Company, a plant-based food technology company that designs, develops, produces, distributes and sells a variety of plant-based meat and other food alternatives; Eat Just Inc, a food technology company and the makers of JUST Egg, with products available in most major grocery chains in the United States; and TurtleTree Pte. Ltd., recreating the full composition, functionality and taste of milk using cutting-edge innovation.
Key Inflection Point #1: The Pandemic Boom (2020-2021)
The COVID Tailwind
The pandemic turned out to be rocket fuel for the plant-based sector—at least initially. Grocery stores saw unprecedented demand as restaurants closed and consumers stockpiled shelf-stable products.
The thesis seemed to be playing out exactly as bulls had predicted. Consumers were trying plant-based products, retail distribution was expanding, and portfolio companies were hitting milestones.
The Good Natured Success
Among the portfolio's early wins, one stood out as validation of the entire approach. "Our investment in Good Natured has already realized approximately 10x our initial investment. We are constantly assessing the macro and micro trends in the food tech, plant-based, and alternative protein space, which includes auxiliary industries with companies like Good Natured," said Patrick Morris, CEO of Eat Beyond.
A 10x return in just months—this was venture-scale performance in a public equity wrapper.
Eat Beyond purchased a stake in good natured® in November 2020 at $0.14 per share with each share receiving one-half warrant at $0.21. On Wednesday, February 24, 2021 the stock price closed at $1.50.
The investment thesis for Good Natured showed Eat & Beyond's broader thinking about the food ecosystem. Eat Beyond's portfolio spanned a wide range of industries, enabling it to capitalize on the growth of a wholistic cross-section of the evolving food space including cell agriculture, plant-based protein, plant-based dairy, infant food, natural food brands, eco-friendly packaging and more.
Portfolio Companies Hit Milestones
The momentum extended across the portfolio. Eat Beyond began trading on November 17, 2020 and its share price jumped over 340 percent in just over three months. Several of Eat Beyond's portfolio companies also reached all-time highs for their share prices.
"Eat Beyond's objective is to provide liquidity and earn a return for our shareholders, while also continuously identifying and developing new opportunities in our target sector," said Patrick Morris, CEO of Eat Beyond. "While we do provide capital to our portfolio companies, that capital is just the start of our real investment. Eat Beyond's investment committee offers guidance and growth strategy to help companies accelerate their success and profitability more rapidly."
Leadership Transition
By mid-2021, with the company seeming to be on track, Eat Beyond announced the appointment of Michael Aucoin as the Company's new CEO, taking the place of Patrick Morris, who had served as Eat Beyond's CEO since its inception in the Fall of 2019. Aucoin would pilot Eat Beyond in a new direction, with a vision to establish the Company as a recognized leader in the $50 billion plant-based protein market.
Aucoin had over 25 years of experience in food sales management and the consumer packaged goods industry. He came to Eat Beyond having worked most recently as the Principal for MJA Consulting. Prior roles included leadership roles at Advantage Solutions, Agropur, Hershey's, and Smuckers.
The plant-based food market was projected to reach nearly $75 billion by 2027, with double digit annual growth forecasted, according to Meticulous Research.
Everything seemed to be going according to plan.
Key Inflection Point #2: The Plant-Based Bust (2022-2024)
The Sector-Wide Collapse
And then the thesis collapsed.
The numbers told a devastating story. While there was a surge in sales of plant-based meat products during the pandemic (2019-2020), plant-based meat and seafood sales fell significantly in 2023. Sales dropped 12% since 2022 and by 13% since 2021, standing at $1.2 billion in 2023. Unit sales growth of plant-based meat and seafood were down 19% on 2022 and 26% on 2021.
The decline wasn't a one-year blip—it was a sustained collapse. Against this backdrop of long-term progress, recent years have been characterized by a more challenging market environment. Following the rapid expansion of the U.S. plant-based retail market from 2019 to 2021, sales moderated in 2022 and declined in 2023 and 2024.
In 2024, the bleeding continued: According to the GFI, sales of plant-based meat and seafood sales dropped 7% to $1.2 billion in 2024 (units -11%).
What Went Wrong?
The post-mortems pointed to multiple overlapping failures. First, price remained a stubborn barrier. Average plant-based meat and seafood prices were up 13 percent over the past two years, while average conventional meat and seafood prices were up only four percent.
The premium was simply too large for most consumers. Research by Kroger, the Plant Based Foods Institute, and 84.51° found that 28 percent of Kroger shoppers who cut back on plant-based foods between 2023 and 2024 said the products no longer fit their budgets.
Second, taste and quality disappointed. When it comes to purchasing plant-based meats, consumers prioritize taste, availability, quality, and health benefits. Familiarity, awareness, and trials of plant-based foods have grown dramatically over the last decade. But in recent years, the number of households purchasing has leveled off or declined for some plant-based categories.
"It remains an uphill battle for the plant-based industry, as consumers are still tightening their belts and are less likely to try new premium grocery brands," said Blake Droesch, analyst from eMarketer.
Third, inflation destroyed the category's growth trajectory. Plant-based price increases coincided with elevated inflation and tight consumer budgets, and purchase dynamics indicated weakening consumer engagement in plant-based categories.
The Beyond Meat Bellwether
Nowhere was the sector's collapse more visible than in Beyond Meat, the company whose IPO had launched the entire investment thesis.
Beyond Meat, once a leader in the sector, saw its stock fall from a high of $239 in 2019 to hovering just above $3 today.
Beyond Meat stock is still down more than 70% thus far in 2025, and over a five-year period, it has crashed 99%.
The fundamentals told the story: In 2024, Beyond Meat's revenue was $326.45 million, a decrease of -4.93% compared to the previous year's $343.38 million. Looking back over the first nine months of 2025, every segment of the business saw volume declines. The total decline through that span was 13.8%. That comes on top of a decline of 10.3% in 2024, with all business segments falling.
In 2024, on an operating basis Beyond Meat lost 45 cents from every dollar of sales. The company's current target is to reach EBITDA breakeven by the end of next year.
"This was made to be a major disruption of the food supply and a major threat to the beef industry," said Marion Nestle, professor emerita of nutrition, food studies and public health at New York University. "And it didn't work out that way."
Industry Consolidation
The carnage extended across the sector. Funding for startups making plant-based meat, dairy, and eggs plummeted by 64% in 2024 from $854 million to just $309 million, according to the GFI.
"It seems that on average, investments going forward will be distributed to fewer companies and in smaller quantities than during the low-interest-rate environment of 2020 to 2022. The sharp drop-off in funding, paired with ongoing sales declines in many regions, means some manufacturers will be unable to secure funding and will downsize, close operations, or merge with other organizations."
The Going Concern Warning
For Eat & Beyond, the implications were existential. The company's financial statements included the stark language: "The above material uncertainties cast significant doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern."
The Company's continuation as a going concern was dependent upon successful results from its investments, its ability to attain profitable operations to generate funds and/or its ability to raise equity capital or borrowings sufficient to meet its current and future obligations. Although the Company has been successful in the past in raising funds to continue operations, there was no assurance it would be able to do so in the future.
The company that had seemed poised to ride the alternative protein wave to massive returns was now fighting for survival.
Key Inflection Point #3: The Strategic Pivot (2024-2025)
When the Future Changes, You Change Too
By late 2024, Eat & Beyond's management faced a fundamental question: what do you do when your entire investment thesis has been invalidated by consumer reality?
The answer, it turned out, was to find a new future to invest in.
In May 2025, Eat & Beyond announced it was proposing a name change and an expansion of its Investment Policy to reflect a change in strategic focus. Subject to shareholder approval, the Company intended to change its name from "Eat & Beyond Global Holdings Inc." to "Digital Asset Technologies Inc."
The proposed name change was intended to represent the Company's forward-looking focus on emerging digital and blockchain technologies, while maintaining its core mission of investing in innovative and impactful businesses.
"The proposed name change marks a meaningful step in the Company's continued evolution," said Young Bann, CEO of Eat & Beyond. "The proposed transition to Digital Asset Technologies Inc. reflects our expanded focus on digital innovation, including blockchain technologies and responsible AI solutions. We believe this new identity better represents the direction of the Company and our broader investment objectives."
The Liquidlink AI Play
The pivot wasn't just cosmetic—it was built around a concrete new asset. Through its wholly owned subsidiary, Liquidlink AI Corp., the Company entered the blockchain technology sector with a focus on real-world asset tokenization, decentralized infrastructure, and advanced trading analytics.
LiquidLink AI Corp., a Web3 analytics and infrastructure company, announced its availability for meetings during XRP Las Vegas in May 2025. The company invited developers, partners, and investors to explore collaboration opportunities around its flagship product suite, Xrpfy.
Xrpfy is a next-generation discovery and analytics platform purpose-built for the XRP Ledger (XRPL). Designed to empower users through self-custody tools, Xrpfy operates fully client-side and does not take custody of assets or facilitate trades.
The Company also recently acquired LiquidLink AI Corp., a cutting-edge platform that enables scalable and cost-efficient issuance and trading of digital assets, including real-world assets (RWAs) on the XRP Ledger.
The New Investment Policy
The Company amended and updated its Investment Policy to include a focus on blockchain and related technologies. This includes investments in: Real-World Asset Tokenization—projects that use blockchain to digitally represent physical or traditional assets; Decentralized Infrastructure—technologies supporting open, distributed systems; and Advanced Trading Analytics—tools and platforms that support improved data analysis and decision-making in financial markets.
The Company's updated investment strategy focuses on supporting ventures that advance innovation in AI, Blockchain, Web3, Fintech, and the broader Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sectors. It aims to invest in technologies that demonstrate solid technical foundations, adhere to ethical practices, incorporate user-focused design, and offer potential long-term societal benefits.
Legacy Investments Maintained
Importantly, the pivot didn't involve a fire sale of existing food tech investments. The Company has historically focused on investments in the food technology and sustainability sectors. These investments form a key part of the Company's foundation and will remain in place going forward.
The Company believes that the new name aligns with its updated Investment Policy and long-term strategy to build a diversified portfolio of companies operating at the forefront of emerging technologies. While the Company will continue to support its legacy investments in the food tech and sustainability sectors, it is now placing increased emphasis on opportunities in blockchain infrastructure, asset tokenization, and ethically grounded AI applications.
The Name Change Takes Effect
Eat & Beyond Global Holdings Inc. announced a name and symbol change to Digital Asset Technologies Inc. (DATT). Shares began trading under the new name and symbol and with a new CUSIP number on June 17, 2025.
This change, approved by the company's directors and shareholders, aligned with its updated investment policy and reflected its strategic focus on blockchain technology and advanced trading analytics.
Porter's Five Forces Analysis
Understanding why Eat & Beyond struggled—and why its pivot may or may not succeed—requires examining the structural dynamics of its industry position.
1. Threat of New Entrants: HIGH
Creating an investment holding company has minimal barriers to entry. Capital requirements are relatively modest, regulatory hurdles are manageable, and the "first mover advantage" Eat & Beyond claimed proved fleeting. Any fund manager with food industry connections could replicate the basic model.
The company's positioning as "the first issuer of its kind in Canada" provided temporary differentiation but no sustainable moat. Within months of Eat & Beyond's listing, other vehicles emerged offering similar thematic exposure.
2. Bargaining Power of Suppliers (Portfolio Companies): HIGH
During the 2019-2021 boom, hot alternative protein startups could choose between numerous eager investors. Alongside Green Monday Ventures, TurtleTree's investors included KBW Ventures, CPT Capital, Artesian and New Luna Ventures. Eat & Beyond was one option among many.
Portfolio companies had leverage to demand favorable terms, board representation, and valuation premiums. The power asymmetry meant Eat & Beyond often paid up for access, compressing potential returns.
3. Bargaining Power of Buyers (Retail Investors): MODERATE
Retail investors seeking ESG/alternative protein exposure had multiple alternatives: direct stock purchases in Beyond Meat, thematic ETFs, or simply waiting for more companies to go public. The value proposition of portfolio construction and due diligence was real but not unique.
As portfolio performance deteriorated, investor exodus accelerated. The stock reached its all-time low of 0.015 CAD on November 8, 2024—a decline of over 99% from peak.
4. Threat of Substitutes: VERY HIGH
This was perhaps the most critical vulnerability. Investors seeking alternative protein exposure could: - Buy Beyond Meat directly on public markets - Access thematic ETFs with diversified alt-protein holdings - Invest in ESG funds with partial alt-protein allocation - Make direct venture investments (for accredited investors) - Simply wait for more sector IPOs
The holding company structure provided diversification but also complexity and management fees that direct investments avoided.
5. Competitive Rivalry: HIGH
Funding for startups making plant-based meat, dairy, and eggs plummeted by 64% in 2024. When sector-wide capital contracted, every player faced existential pressure simultaneously.
The competitive environment turned from growth-mode to survival-mode. Portfolio company valuations collapsed, exit opportunities vanished, and the entire alternative protein thesis came under question.
Hamilton's 7 Powers Analysis
Examining Eat & Beyond through Hamilton Helmer's strategic framework reveals the structural weaknesses that made the company vulnerable when its sector thesis failed.
1. Scale Economies: WEAK
As a micro-cap holding company, Eat & Beyond commanded no meaningful scale advantages. Larger private equity firms could negotiate better terms, access better deal flow, and absorb sector downturns more easily. With a market cap that eventually fell below CAD $5 million, the company couldn't attract institutional attention or benefit from the lower cost of capital that scale provides.
2. Network Effects: NONE
The holding company structure created no network dynamics. Each portfolio company operated independently. Success at Nabati didn't make TurtleTree more valuable, and neither's performance affected consumer adoption of plant-based products broadly. There was no flywheel, no compounding network value.
3. Counter-Positioning: ATTEMPTED BUT FAILED
"Eat Beyond seizes smart investment opportunities in early seed rounds for global companies that are not typically available to retail investors. We are the first Canadian company to focus exclusively in this area," Morris said.
The counter-positioning as "democratized alt-protein investing" was genuinely novel at launch. But it proved easily replicable. Within the first year, competitors emerged, and the differentiation eroded. Incumbents (larger PE firms, ETF issuers) eventually addressed the same opportunity with more resources.
4. Switching Costs: VERY LOW
Shareholders could sell at any time with minimal friction. Unlike private equity commitments with multi-year lockups, public market investors could exit in minutes. When performance disappointed, there was nothing to keep capital sticky. The holding company structure that enabled retail access also enabled retail flight.
5. Branding: WEAK TO MODERATE
The "EATS" ticker was clever and memorable. But the brand never achieved true consumer recognition or loyalty. On March 29, 2022, the Company changed its name to Eat & Beyond Global Holdings Inc.—even the corporate name kept shifting. Brand equity in investment management typically accrues to individuals (star fund managers) rather than corporate entities, and Eat & Beyond never developed that kind of marquee talent recognition.
6. Cornered Resource: NONE
The company had no proprietary deal flow, no exclusive relationships, and no technology or patents. Eat Beyond chose portfolio companies after doing a deep dive into different players in the space, and looking at branding, marketing and product taste, Morris said. This was standard due diligence anyone could replicate—not a proprietary capability or exclusive access.
7. Process Power: NONE
"We're not just writing cheques into these companies, we're helping to provide them with not only guidance to help them grow and help them build up their facilities and get their products on the shelf."
The advisory capability was real but not systematized or proprietary. Any experienced CPG team could offer similar operational support. There was no documented, defensible process that competitors couldn't replicate.
Bull Case, Bear Case, and Key Risks
The Bull Case (Such as It Is)
Survival Through Reinvention: By pivoting to blockchain/digital assets, management demonstrated adaptability. Rather than riding a failed thesis into bankruptcy, they found a new direction with potential upside.
Legacy Food Tech Options: The remaining portfolio investments, though impaired, could theoretically recover if the alternative protein sector stabilizes. Any successful exits would be pure upside from current expectations.
Optionality on Multiple Themes: The company now straddles both food tech legacy assets and digital asset growth potential. If either thesis works, shareholders benefit.
Low Base Effect: With market cap below CAD $5 million, even modest success in the new strategy could generate meaningful percentage returns.
The Bear Case
Serial Thesis-Chasing: Pivoting from alt-protein to blockchain/AI looks like chasing the next hot theme rather than building durable competitive advantage. The same structural vulnerabilities (no scale, no moat, no defensibility) apply to the new strategy.
Execution Track Record: The food tech thesis was arguably sound—the timing and execution proved problematic. Why should the blockchain pivot execute better?
Going Concern Questions Persist: The fundamental capital constraints that generated going-concern warnings haven't been resolved by a name change. Cash burn continues, and access to capital remains challenging.
Retail Investor Skepticism: Having destroyed significant shareholder value in the alt-protein era, convincing new investors to fund blockchain ambitions will be difficult.
Key Risks and Regulatory Considerations
Liquidity Risk: With minimal trading volume and market cap, any significant selling pressure could crater the stock. Position sizing becomes critical.
Dilution Risk: Continued operations likely require additional equity issuances, diluting existing shareholders.
Portfolio Company Risk: Remaining food tech investments may require additional write-downs or prove completely worthless.
New Venture Risk: The Liquidlink AI venture is unproven. Blockchain/Web3 has seen its own bubble dynamics and could face regulatory headwinds.
Regulatory Risk: Both food tech (novel food approvals) and digital assets (securities regulations, crypto rules) face significant regulatory uncertainty across jurisdictions.
Key Metrics to Watch
For investors willing to follow this story, three KPIs matter most:
1. Net Asset Value (NAV) per Share
The fundamental question for any holding company is whether the sum of its parts exceeds its market value. Quarterly disclosure of portfolio valuations—particularly any remaining food tech assets and the Liquidlink subsidiary valuation—drives intrinsic value assessment.
2. Cash Burn Rate / Months of Runway
With going-concern language in prior filings, cash position and burn rate determine survival. Watch for any capital raises, their terms, and resulting dilution.
3. Portfolio Company Milestones
Any meaningful exit, IPO, or acquisition involving portfolio companies (particularly legacy food tech investments) would provide validation and potential liquidity events.
The Broader Lessons
Eat & Beyond's journey illuminates several truths about thematic investing:
Thesis quality ≠timing quality. The alternative protein thesis wasn't wrong—plant-based foods remain a real category with real sales. But the market got dramatically ahead of consumer adoption, and investors who bought at the peak paid for a future that's arriving much more slowly than expected.
Small holding companies are structurally vulnerable. Without scale economies, network effects, or proprietary advantages, micro-cap investment issuers depend entirely on thesis selection and timing. When the thesis fails, there's no structural buffer.
Consumer behavior matters more than investor enthusiasm. The gap between what investors believed consumers would do (embrace plant-based at premium prices) and what consumers actually did (prioritize taste and value) proved fatal to the thesis.
Survival requires adaptation. By pivoting rather than liquidating, Eat & Beyond's management preserved optionality. Whether the blockchain pivot works is uncertain, but the alternative was certain failure.
For the alternative protein sector broadly, the Eat & Beyond story suggests that the category's long-term potential remains intact, but the path to that potential runs through years of grinding execution on taste, price, and distribution—not the hockey-stick growth that justified 2019-2021 valuations.
The company that was incorporated as "1222554 B.C. Ltd." in September 2019, became "Eat Beyond Global Holdings" days later, and now operates as "Digital Asset Technologies Inc." offers a perfect illustration of how quickly investment narratives can shift—and how little certainty exists in thematic investing, no matter how compelling the original story appears.
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