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OPAP: The Greek Gambling Monopoly That Survived the Debt Crisis
I. Introduction & Episode Roadmap
Walk into any corner store in Athens today—past the newspapers, the cigarettes, the lottery scratch cards stacked by the register—and you'll find something that has remained constant for nearly seven decades: the green and white glow of an OPAP terminal. These terminals aren't just gambling machines. They're cultural artifacts, woven into the fabric of Greek daily life as deeply as the corner kafeneio or the Sunday football match.
Over 60 years of history alongside Greek sports. As of October 2013, OPAP is 100% private. More than 70% of the total Greek gaming market. The largest retail network in Greece, 3,025 points of sale in Greece and Cyprus.
The numbers tell a story of remarkable resilience. With a market capitalization of $8.12 billion and trailing 12-month revenue of $1.7 billion, OPAP stands as one of Europe's largest gaming companies—a distinction that seemed impossible during the dark days of Greece's sovereign debt crisis.
The central question that makes OPAP worth examining: How did a state-owned football betting monopoly, born in the Cold War era to fund sports infrastructure, survive Greece's worst economic catastrophe in modern history, get privatized for €652 million, and emerge as one of Europe's most profitable gaming companies? And perhaps more importantly: what does its future look like as it now merges into the Allwyn empire, creating a €16 billion gambling giant?
The company, founded in 1958 as the country's national lottery and listed in the Athens Exchange in 2001, is the exclusive licensed operator of all numerical lotteries (7 games), sports betting (4 games) and horse racing. Its core games exclusive license expires in 2030, the Scratch tickets and Passives license in 2026, and the Horse Racing license in 2036. Additionally, the exclusive license to operate 25,000 video lottery terminals (VLTs) in Greece expires in 2035.
This episode traces OPAP's journey from Cold War-era sports funding vehicle to modern omnichannel gaming champion—a story of state monopoly dynamics, privatization as transformation, and a digital pivot executed under extraordinary economic pressure. We'll explore how regulatory protection can be both a company's greatest moat and its most dangerous dependency, and what happens when a protected business finally has to compete.
II. The Birth of Greek Sports Betting (1950s-1958)
Picture post-war Greece in the mid-1950s: a nation still bearing the scars of occupation and civil war, struggling to rebuild its infrastructure while watching its neighbors transform their sporting cultures into sources of national pride. Italian stadiums were filling with passionate tifosi, British football pools were generating millions for athletic development, and Greek sports administrators looked on with a mixture of admiration and frustration.
In the 1950s, an effort to upgrade Greek sport and improve its infrastructure began. In this framework, the General Secretariat for Sports was established in 1957. In order to secure funding, the idea to utilize revenue from football prognostics—following the example of other European countries—came to fruition.
The European model was elegantly simple: channel the gambling that would happen anyway into a state-controlled mechanism that could fund public goods. Italy's Totocalcio had been running since 1946, creating a template that other nations eagerly copied. The UK's football pools had turned weekend punting into a national institution. Why should Greece be any different?
In order to secure funding, the idea to utilize revenue from football prognostics—following the example of other European countries—came to fruition. With this aim, OPAP was established in 1958 as a private legal entity under the umbrella of the General Secretariat for Sport.
The vehicle chosen was PRO-PO, an acronym for "Football Prognostics" in Greek. At the same time of its establishment, a Royal Decree institutionalized the first game OPAP introduced named PRO-PO (the Greek Acronym for Football Prognostics) which was organised along the lines of Italy's Toto Calcio.
PRO-PO was launched in March 1959, a few months before the introduction of the Football League First Division and part of its revenues contributed to funding the newly created division. Initially there were no exclusive agencies and games players at partner corner-shops/kiosks, dairies, etc., while geographically the game was limited to Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus.
The timing was elegant: the betting game launched just months before Greece inaugurated its modern football league system. From day one, OPAP's fortunes would be intertwined with Greek football—the success of one feeding the other in a symbiotic relationship that persists to this day.
What made OPAP's birth significant wasn't just its existence but its structure. By placing gambling under state control with revenues earmarked for sports development, Greece created an institutional dependency that would prove remarkably durable. Every new stadium, every renovated gymnasium, every athletic scholarship could be traced back, at least partially, to Greeks filling out their PRO-PO slips each weekend.
This wasn't capitalism as much as it was social engineering—using the irresistible pull of gambling to fund the public good. The question that would take decades to answer: what happens when the state decides it no longer wants to be in the gambling business?
III. Growth Under State Control (1960s-1990s)
The Early Years & First Experiments
PRO-PO enjoyed success from the start. This was due, in part, to strong advertising campaigns. In the 1960s the game saw various improvements such as the paying out winnings for slips with 11 correct predictions. OPAP was present in 70 cities and in 1966 it had reached 795 agencies.
The 1960s saw OPAP experiment with product diversification—a pattern that would repeat throughout its history. In March 1965, OPAP launched its second game, named "6 from 36", an adaptation of a similar German game. There were 36 games on each slip and players had to predict 6 that would result in a draw with the most goals scored. The game was initially met with approval but its slips dropped quickly resulting in the game being stopped in April 1966.
The failure of "6 from 36" taught OPAP an early lesson about product-market fit that would inform its later decisions: Greeks weren't looking for complexity in their betting. They wanted something simple, social, and connected to the sports they followed obsessively. PRO-PO delivered all three; the German-style game delivered none.
The Military Junta Period (1967-1974)
History rarely unfolds according to neat narratives, and OPAP's growth during Greece's military dictatorship complicates any simple telling of the company's story.
During the military junta period, OPAP experienced impressive growth, helped by the promotion of sport by the dictatorial regime. Agencies shot up to 2,000 from 900 and in 1974 revenues amounted to 1.3 billion drachma, up from 176 million drachma in 1966. The increase in agency profit margins, from 5% to 10%, contributed to this expansion.
The numbers are striking: a more than sevenfold increase in revenues over eight years, with agency counts more than doubling. The junta understood something about mass entertainment as a tool of social control—bread and circuses, updated for the 20th century. By promoting sports and making betting easier, the regime could keep the population entertained while maintaining its grip on power.
The doubling of agent profit margins from 5% to 10% was particularly clever. By making OPAP agency ownership more lucrative, the regime created a class of small business owners with a financial stake in the system's continuation. These weren't just distribution points; they were political constituencies.
Post-Dictatorship Expansion
What's remarkable about OPAP's trajectory is the seamless transition that followed the junta's collapse. While many state enterprises associated with the dictatorship were reformed or dismantled, OPAP emerged strengthened.
After the end of the dictatorship, the impressive growth of OPAP continued. In 1981 agencies amounted to 2,952 and revenue stood at 7.3 billion drachma. At the same time, the management of its sponsorship became more transparent and was subject to parliamentary scrutiny. OPAP funds contributed to the creation of hundreds of stadiums, closed gymnasiums and other sporting cites throughout the country.
The political genius of OPAP's structure became apparent: it didn't matter whether Greece was democratic or authoritarian, socialist-leaning or conservative. Sports infrastructure needed funding, Greeks wanted to bet on football, and OPAP sat at the intersection of both needs. Parliamentary scrutiny actually strengthened the company's legitimacy, allowing citizens to see exactly where their betting losses were going.
Product Diversification (Late 1980s-1990s)
By the late 1980s, OPAP's leadership recognized the limits of sports-dependent revenue. What happens during the off-season? What about bettors who didn't follow football?
At the end of the decade, agencies had reached 4,000 in number and two more games were introduced, LOTTO and PROTO, the conduct of which led to the significant upgrading of the Organization's computerization. LOTTO and TZOKER was launched in 1990 and PROTO in 1992; and followed by PROPOGOAL in 1996.
This diversification was critical. Numerical lotteries like LOTTO and TZOKER decoupled OPAP from exclusive reliance on variable sports results, creating more predictable revenue streams. A football match can produce upsets; number-drawing produces reliable mathematics. For a company planning its future, predictability matters.
The computerization effort deserves more attention than it typically receives. As OPAP moved from paper-and-pencil slip processing to electronic systems, it was building the technological infrastructure that would eventually enable its digital transformation decades later. The investments made in the 1990s created capabilities that competitors couldn't easily replicate.
By the end of the century, OPAP had transformed from a simple football betting operation into a diversified gaming company with nationwide distribution. The question now was whether state ownership was helping or hindering its continued growth.
IV. INFLECTION POINT #1: Corporatization & IPO (1999-2005)
The Transformation to Société Anonyme
As Greece prepared to host the 2004 Olympics, modernization fever gripped the nation's institutions. The state railway needed upgrading, airports required expansion, and antiquated state enterprises needed to demonstrate they could compete on a European stage. OPAP's transformation into a public company fit perfectly into this narrative.
In 1999, OPAP turned into a Societe Anonyme, under the name OPAP S.A. and the duration of this legal entity form was set at 100 years. In 2001 OPAP got listed in the Athens Stock Exchange through a law, according to which, the State could dispense up to 49% of the company's share capital to investors.
The 100-year corporate lifespan wasn't arbitrary—it sent a signal to potential investors about the permanence of OPAP's exclusive rights. This wasn't a state enterprise that might be wound down after a change in government; this was an institution built to last generations.
Why corporatize? Three factors converged: pre-Olympics modernization pressure, EU competition law concerns, and the state's need for revenue. Greece's entry into the eurozone in 2001 brought increased scrutiny of state aid and monopoly arrangements. Converting OPAP into a publicly traded company—while maintaining state control—allowed Greece to claim it was modernizing while preserving the monopoly's benefits.
Initially 5% of the total stock was dispensed and the State proceeded with more stock pack sales in 2002, 2003 and 2005, with its stake being reduced to 33.6%. In 2003, following a bilateral agreement between the Greek State and the Republic of Cyprus, OPAP S.A. established OPAP Cyprus Ltd, which is primarily responsible for the organization, conduct and marketing of the company's games in Cyprus.
The gradual stake reduction was textbook privatization strategy: test the market with small offerings, establish trading liquidity, build institutional investor interest, then sell larger blocks at higher valuations. By 2005, the Greek state had reduced its holding to 33.6% while retaining effective control—enough to influence but not enough to suggest political manipulation.
The Launch of Pame Stoixima: The Game-Changer
While the IPO garnered headlines, the real strategic transformation came from a product launch that changed OPAP's business model fundamentally.
2000 was an important year in OPAP's history as Pame Stoixima, the first legal sports betting game, was launched in Greece. This game would quickly turn into OPAP's most profitable product.
Understanding why Pame Stoixima mattered requires understanding the difference between pools betting and fixed-odds betting. PRO-PO was a pools game: all bets went into a pot, and winners shared the pool based on how many others had also won. Fixed-odds betting like Pame Stoixima offered specific odds on specific outcomes—a fundamentally different proposition.
Fixed-odds betting created several advantages: bettors knew exactly what they could win before placing bets; OPAP could offer betting on a much wider variety of events; and margins could be managed more precisely. Perhaps most importantly, fixed-odds betting enabled real-time betting, transforming OPAP agencies from places you visited before matches into destinations where you could watch and bet simultaneously.
The shift from pools to fixed-odds was as significant as the shift from physical to online would later be. It modernized OPAP's customer experience while significantly improving its revenue potential.
Cyprus Expansion
In 2003, following a bilateral agreement between the Greek State and the Republic of Cyprus, OPAP S.A. established OPAP Cyprus Ltd, which is primarily responsible for the organization, conduct and marketing of the company's games in Cyprus.
Cyprus represented OPAP's first international expansion, and it happened through diplomatic rather than commercial channels. The bilateral agreement between the Greek and Cypriot governments gave OPAP something money couldn't buy: exclusive access to a neighboring market with cultural and linguistic ties to Greece.
This model—exclusive rights secured through government relationships rather than competitive bids—would prove both OPAP's greatest strength and its most significant vulnerability. It created barriers to entry that commercial competitors couldn't overcome, but it also created dependencies on political relationships that could shift.
For investors watching OPAP in 2005, the company looked remarkably well-positioned: diversified product portfolio, modern technology infrastructure, international expansion, and monopoly protection with no expiration date in sight. What could possibly go wrong?
V. INFLECTION POINT #2: The Greek Debt Crisis & Monopoly Defense (2008-2012)
The Perfect Storm
To understand what happened to OPAP between 2008 and 2012, you first have to understand what happened to Greece. The numbers remain staggering even years later.
In April, following publication of GDP data which showed an intermittent period of recession starting in 2007, credit rating agencies then downgraded Greek bonds to junk status in late April 2010. This froze private capital markets, and put Greece in danger of sovereign default without a bailout.
On 2 May, the European Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (the Troika) launched a €110 billion bailout loan to rescue Greece from sovereign default and cover its financial needs through June 2013, conditional on implementation of austerity measures, structural reforms and privatization of government assets. The bailout loans were mainly used to pay for the maturing bonds, but also to finance the continued yearly budget deficits.
The government enacted 12 rounds of tax increases, spending cuts, and reforms from 2010 to 2016, which at times triggered local riots and nationwide protests. Despite these efforts, the country required bailout loans in 2010, 2012, and 2015 from the International Monetary Fund, Eurogroup, and the European Central Bank.
The second bailout programme was ratified in February 2012. A total of €240 billion was to be transferred in regular tranches through December 2014.
For OPAP, the crisis meant two things: its largest shareholder (the Greek state) desperately needed cash, and international creditors were demanding privatization as a condition of continued support. The gambling monopoly that had seemed like a permanent fixture of Greek life was suddenly on the auction block.
The sale of a significant chunk of shares in OPAP to Emma Delta was brought about as a condition of Greece's asset sales program that was put into motion as part of its multi-billion international bailout. With the country under intense scrutiny from lenders to privatize state assets as part of bailout conditions, the onus was on Greek authorities to push through with the sale.
The Monopoly Under Attack
But the Greek state's financial troubles weren't OPAP's only problem. The company's monopoly position was facing simultaneous legal assault from European competitors who saw the crisis as an opportunity.
In November 2008, the government of Greece shut down the Greek operations of Liverpool-based Stanleybet International. Stanleybet had recently opened two offices in Greece and was to be a major competitor to OPAP. The government acted on OPAP's public complaints and raided Stanleybet offices on 7 November 2008, confiscating their assets. One of the complaints during the 2008 Greek riots was the government's fast action on behalf of OPAP to remove competition.
The Stanleybet raid became a flashpoint for broader concerns about Greek governance. Here was a government in financial collapse, facing massive street protests, yet finding time and resources to protect a state-owned gambling monopoly from British competition. The optics were devastating.
In 2011, Stanleybet and two other UK-based companies, William Hill and Sportingbet, brought a legal action before the Council of State after their applications to OPAP for permission to provide sport betting services in Greece were rejected. The Council of State referred the matter to the European Court of Justice. The preliminary ruling confirmed that the Greek legislation which granted a gambling monopoly to OPAP was incompatible with EU law.
This was the nightmare scenario: just as Greece was trying to sell OPAP to raise bailout funds, European courts were ruling that its monopoly might be illegal under EU law. Who would pay top dollar for an exclusive license that might be invalidated?
Regulatory Framework Solidified
Greece's response demonstrated that even cash-strapped governments can be creative when protecting valuable assets. Law 4002/2011 (the "Regulating the Gaming Market" law) formed the cornerstone of a new regulatory framework that affirmed OPAP's exclusivity for land-based retail sports betting and other terrestrial gaming activities while introducing oversight by the Hellenic Gaming Commission.
The law was elegant in its construction. Rather than defending the monopoly as a commercial privilege, Greece framed it as a public health measure—a controlled approach to gambling that protected citizens from the dangers of unregulated betting. The EU permits monopolies that genuinely serve public policy objectives; Greece argued its OPAP monopoly fit this exception.
OPAP's monopoly was ruled legal again at the end of 2014 by a Greek court, which said EU rules prohibiting monopolies did not apply when the controls are "genuinely reducing access to gambling and controlling expansion of the sector to combat criminality". However, OPAP never got the monopoly on online gaming that it wanted.
The key phrase: "genuinely reducing access to gambling." Greece had found a legal formula that allowed it to maintain OPAP's exclusive land-based position while opening online gambling to competition. It was a compromise that preserved the most valuable parts of OPAP's franchise while making concessions to EU law.
The license extension negotiations that followed were equally creative. Opap will also pay the state 5 percent of gross profit for the 10 years through October 2030. The license to operate 35,000 terminals will cost 560 million euros. Opap SA, Europe's biggest listed gambling company, will pay the Greek government 935 million euros ($1.3 billion) for an extension of its betting monopoly and a video lottery terminal license.
By extracting €935 million from OPAP for license extensions, Greece accomplished something remarkable: it generated immediate cash for the bailout while simultaneously increasing OPAP's value by extending its monopoly through 2030. The company that would be privatized was now worth more than before the crisis began.
VI. INFLECTION POINT #3: The Emma Delta Privatization (2013)
The Buyers: A Greek-Czech Consortium
In the annals of Greek privatization, no deal generated more controversy—or ultimately proved more transformative—than the sale of the state's remaining OPAP stake to Emma Delta.
Emma Delta is a regulated variable equity fund, controlled by Mr. Jiri Smejc and Mr. George Melissanidis. The investors to the fund are: Emma Group of the Czech Republic; Czech-based KKCG; ICT Group of Russia; J&T Finance Group from Slovakia; the Greek businessman George Melissanidis; and the Greek businessman Christos Copelouzos.
The consortium's composition was unusual by Greek standards: Eastern European private equity firms joining with well-connected Greek businessmen. In 2012, Jiřà Šmejc founded his own investment group, EMMA, which he wholly owned from the beginning. In the first year of its existence, EMMA Group managed to put together an international consortium of investors that won a tender for the privatization of a 33% stake in the Greek state monopoly gaming corporation OPAP. Jiřà Šmejc then led the strategic decision-making during the major restructuring that OPAP has since gone through.
Jiri Smejc's background was telling. The Czech billionaire had made his fortune in financial services across Central and Eastern Europe and understood how to navigate complex regulatory environments in transitioning economies. Greece in 2013 shared more characteristics with post-Communist Eastern Europe than with stable Western European economies.
The group initially bid €622 million on April 17. It was the only one of seven bids deemed acceptable by the privatisation agency (Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund, or HRADF).
That Emma Delta was the sole acceptable bidder raised eyebrows, but the competitive dynamics were understandable. Private equity firms willing to invest in crisis-wracked Greece were scarce; those with gambling expertise and tolerance for regulatory complexity were scarcer still.
The Deal Structure
Athens sealed a deal to sell its 33 percent stake in OPAP to Emma Delta for 652 million euros ($870.52 million) in May but rows among opposing investors over the fees OPAP would pay its partners for technology and printing services delayed the deal.
Under the terms of the sale, the fund disbursed an initial EUR622m for the stake and will pay out annually a further EUR3m over the next 10 years. The deal, which Emma Delta secured in May, is the largest privatisation since the beginning of Greece's sell-off scheme. The stake disposal is part of Greece's asset sales programme under a EUR240bn international bailout.
The €30 million increase from initial bid to final price reflected negotiations over investment commitments. The transaction granted OPAP exclusive rights extensions for its games until 2030 in exchange for pledges totaling €1.1 billion in network upgrades, job preservation, and vendor support.
Mr. Smejc added: "We are committed to improving the performance of this underachieving asset. We will invest substantially in OPAP and run it on an open basis." Emma Delta is committed to renew OPAP's systems and platforms, to expand in new sectors and to tighten revenue reporting systems inside OPAP.
The phrase "underachieving asset" was loaded. Smejc was signaling that state ownership had left value on the table—value that private management could unlock. It was a promise that would be tested over the following decade.
Controversies & Scrutiny
No Greek privatization in this era escaped controversy, and OPAP was no exception.
The €652m deal allowed the Greek privatisation agency, Taiped, to meet its reduced 2013 revenue target. An unusual piece of legislation approved by the Greek parliament last April—shortly before Emma Delta and Third Point, the US hedge fund, were named as shortlisted bidders for OPAP—has raised questions about the country's commitment to transparent procedures. A clause inserted into an existing investment law froze until last month the Greek gaming regulator's obligation to carry out a "probity" check on potential buyers of OPAP.
The suspension of probity checks was extraordinary. In most jurisdictions, gaming licenses come with stringent background investigations of owners. Greece's decision to waive these requirements—even temporarily—suggested desperation to complete the sale.
Stavridis was forced to step down when he was shown to have been photographed on a private jet belonging to Dimitris Melissanidis, the principal Greek partner in the consortium that bought OPAP. Mr. Melissanidis, a self-made billionaire, may have been unqualified to own the gambling business because of prior convictions.
The Melissanidis connection proved particularly problematic. The Greek oil tycoon's prior legal troubles would have disqualified him from gaming ownership in many jurisdictions. His presence in the consortium raised questions that would linger for years.
Yet despite the controversies, the privatization accomplished its primary objective: bringing professional gaming operators and fresh capital to a company that needed both. The €652 million helped Greece meet its bailout commitments, and Emma Delta began the transformation that would turn OPAP from a sleepy state monopoly into an aggressive omnichannel competitor.
New Leadership, New Direction
The Greek gaming monopoly OPAP has recently replaced ten members out of the eleven directors. Only three of the new gaming directors are Greek, while eight of them are foreigners. The consortium paid no less than EUR 622 million for 33 percent of OPAP rights. The hedge fund also announced that the position of chairman and chief executive officer will be occupied by the former CEO of Czech national lottery operator SAZKA, Kamil Ziegler.
The near-complete board replacement signaled the magnitude of change. OPAP was no longer a Greek institution with foreign investors; it was becoming an international gaming company headquartered in Greece. The appointment of Kamil Ziegler—who had transformed SAZKA from a struggling Czech lottery into a modern gaming powerhouse—suggested the direction ahead.
VII. INFLECTION POINT #4: The VLT Rollout (2015-2019)
The VLT License: A New Growth Engine
With privatization complete and new management installed, OPAP needed growth engines to justify its valuation. Video Lottery Terminals would provide the answer.
Greek gaming operator OPAP completed the introduction of 25,000 video lottery terminal (VLT) machines in its home country in December 2019. The rollout of machines supplied by Inspired and the Synot Group took just under three years, beginning on 11 January, 2017 after the European Union in 2015 approved the Greek government's decision to award OPAP a VLT monopoly.
VLTs represented OPAP's entry into what might be called "casual casino gaming"—slot-machine-style entertainment accessible without visiting a traditional casino. The machines offered a different experience than lottery or sports betting: faster play cycles, electronic interfaces, and a broader appeal to customers who might not follow football.
OPAP's original exclusive deal was to introduce 35,000 VLTs, but the Greek parliament later passed an act to reduce this to 25,000.
The reduction from 35,000 to 25,000 machines reflected ongoing political sensitivity about gambling expansion. Even with the monopoly secured, OPAP faced continuous negotiation with regulators concerned about problem gambling and social impact.
Implementation Challenges
The VLT rollout wasn't without obstacles. The complexity of deploying 25,000 machines across Greece—from major cities to small villages—required massive logistics coordination.
Inspired is one of four VLT suppliers to OPAP and will commence rollout of 3,960 VLT cabinets across the extensive OPAP retail network in 2017. OPAP holds an exclusive 10 year license to operate in Greece and Inspired will be one of its few suppliers.
OPAP spread its supplier relationships across four providers—Inspired, Scientific Games, IGT, and Synot Group—diversifying risk while maintaining leverage in negotiations. This multi-vendor strategy reflected sophisticated procurement thinking uncommon in state-owned enterprises.
The Revenue Impact
The VLT business justified the complexity and investment.
VLTs were a significant source of revenue for OPAP in the first half of 2019, with revenue rising 56.5% year-on-year from €89.4m to €139.9m. As a result, this boosted its share of group revenue from 12.1% to 17.9%, with OPAP operating 20,035 machines across 365 gaming halls and 1,952 of its stores.
The numbers were remarkable: 56.5% revenue growth in a mature gaming market. VLTs were proving that OPAP could successfully expand beyond its traditional product categories while leveraging its existing retail infrastructure.
Greek gaming operator OPAP has cited a higher contribution from video lottery terminals and an improved performance by its KINO lottery game as the main factors behind a 6.3% year-on-year increase in revenue for 2018. Gross gaming revenue for the 12 months through to December 2018, came in at €1.55bn. OPAP said revenue from VLTs continued their strong performance in the fourth quarter of the year, reaching €68.4m in Q4 and €208.7m for 2018, representing an increase of 262.6% on the 2017 total.
A 262.6% year-over-year increase in VLT revenue during 2018 demonstrated the growth potential of the new product line. By the time the rollout completed in December 2019, OPAP had successfully diversified its revenue base and created a moat that would prove valuable when the pandemic hit months later.
VIII. INFLECTION POINT #5: Digital Transformation & Stoiximan Acquisition (2018-2024)
The Online Threat
For all OPAP's success in VLTs and retail modernization, a fundamental challenge remained: the company's monopoly was land-based, but gambling was moving online. And online was open to competition.
The math was concerning. Total Sports Betting GGR reduced from €456m in FY14 to €396m in FY19 due to the general industry move from land-based towards online gambling. OPAP's core business was shrinking while online competitors—operating with Curacao licenses or through regulatory gray areas—were growing rapidly.
The existential question: could a company built on retail monopoly transform itself into a digital competitor before its cash cow became irrelevant?
The Stoiximan Play: Buy the Disruptor
OPAP's answer was acquisitive rather than organic: if you can't beat them, buy them.
OPAP initially invested in Stoiximan in 2018, prompted by its high-growth potential, and gradually increased its stake through two subsequent transactions in 2020.
Stoiximan, founded in 2012, had become the leading online gaming company in Greece and Cyprus, with market share approaching 50%. It was exactly the competitor that posed the greatest threat to OPAP's future—and exactly the company OPAP needed to own.
OPAP S.A., ("OPAP"), SAZKA Group's Greek and Cypriot subsidiary, has today announced (i) the receipt of regulatory approvals for its previously announced acquisition of 51% of Stoiximan Group's Greek and Cypriot business ("SMGC"). In 2019, Stoiximan Group (under the parent company TCB) generated revenues (GGR) of €245 million and EBITDA of €38 million. SMGC generated revenues (GGR) of €197 million, corresponding to 80% of Stoiximan Group's total revenues, and EBITDA of 44 million.
The acquisition timeline reflected both regulatory complexity and strategic patience. OPAP's initial 36.75% stake (2018) gave it board representation and insight; the 51% acquisition (completed August 2020) provided control; subsequent purchases consolidated ownership further.
OPAP has announced the acquisition of the remaining 15.51% stake in Stoiximan for a consideration of €191.6 million on a cash-free debt-free basis. The investment further strengthens OPAP's leading position in Greece and Cyprus, while also intensifying its strategic focus on online sports betting and iGaming segments. Jan Karas, OPAP Chairman & CEO commented, "The investment in Stoiximan has greatly contributed to solidifying OPAP's position in the Greek and Cypriot online markets. I am therefore very pleased with the recent transaction, which further expands our footprint in the fast-growing online market."
The Dual-Brand Strategy
Rather than absorb Stoiximan into the OPAP brand, management made a counterintuitive decision: maintain both brands operating independently. OPAP's own Pamestoixima.gr would target customers familiar with the retail brand seeking online convenience; Stoiximan would continue pursuing customers attracted to its edgier, digital-native positioning.
This dual-brand strategy avoided the cannibalization concerns that often plague acquisitions. Each brand could compete aggressively against third-party operators without undermining the other.
Online Gaming Licensing
The regulatory framework evolved in OPAP's favor. Both OPAP and Stoiximan were awarded online gaming licences in FY21 as the Greek online gaming market became fully regulated. Both were awarded Type 1 (Online Betting including virtual games) and Type 2 (Other Online Games, casino-type games, poker) licences in May 2021, which became active in August 2021 with a fixed licence length of seven years. OPAP and Stoiximan were two of the original 15 companies to be awarded online licences.
Being among the first movers in a regulated market created competitive advantages: brand recognition, customer databases, and operational experience that later entrants couldn't easily replicate.
The Results
The Stoiximan acquisition and organic online investment produced exceptional results. From FY18–23, OPAP's online betting and casino revenue grew at a CAGR of approximately 190%, including the gradual consolidation of Stoiximan. The transformation from retail-dependent monopoly to omnichannel gaming company was complete.
The online segment stole the show, posting a 29.2% increase in revenue for 2024. "In addition, our online activities reached new highs, accounting for 32% of the group's GGR. Our ilottery proposition also continued gaining momentum." Breaking down each segment, and starting with igaming, revenue here amounted to €325.3 million in 2024. This is comfortably ahead of the €251.8 million posted in the previous year and amounts to 14.2% of total GGR.
Online now accounts for 32% of OPAP's GGR—a complete transformation from a company that five years earlier had no meaningful digital presence.
IX. Modern Era & Current State (2024-Present)
Financial Performance
The numbers tell the story of a company that has successfully navigated multiple existential threats.
Greek gambling group OPAP reported a record €2.3 billion in gross gaming revenue (GGR) during its 2024 financial year, helped by growth within both its betting and igaming segments. Revenue for the year ending 31 December 2024 surpassed the previous year, and existing record, by 10%. Data published by OPAP yesterday (19 March) also revealed a 9.4% uplift in net gaming revenue to €1.57 billion.
OPAP, Greece's gaming operator, reported its highest-ever quarterly gross gaming revenue (GGR) in Q4 2024, reaching €647.8 million, an 11.5% increase year-over-year. This performance contributed to full-year GGR of €2.3 billion, marking a 10% rise compared to 2023. OPAP also improved operational efficiency, as full-year EBITDA rose 14% to €832 million. Net profit for the year stood at €485.8 million, reflecting a 19% year-over-year increase.
These aren't just good numbers; they represent a company operating at peak efficiency. A 19% increase in net profit on 10% revenue growth demonstrates operating leverage and cost discipline.
Sports betting revenue increased 15.6% year-over-year to €746.2 million. The iGaming (online casino) segment also saw significant growth, rising 29.2% year-over-year to €325.3 million. OPAP announced a €1.40 per share dividend for 2024, including an interim dividend of €0.60 already paid in November 2024. The company also completed a €150 million share buyback. OPAP strengthened its financial position by refinancing €390 million in loans, extending maturities to 2031-2032. The company's net debt-to-EBITDA ratio stands at 0.19x.
A net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 0.19x represents extraordinary financial flexibility. OPAP could pursue significant acquisitions, absorb economic shocks, or return additional capital to shareholders without threatening its balance sheet stability.
Leadership: Jan Karas and the Fast Forward Strategy
Jan Karas has been leading OPAP as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Executive Member of the Board of Directors (BoD) since December 2020, after being with the company for nearly seven years, in which he held C-level roles and drove key business activities. In October 2024, he was also appointed Chairman of the BoD, in parallel with his duties as CEO.
Jan was Vice President, O2 Shops for O2 Germany. Jan Karas joined Opap in 2014. Jan served as Chief Commercial Officer and Acting Chief Executive Officer for Opap.
Karas represents a particular type of executive rare in legacy gaming companies: someone with telecommunications experience who understands retail transformation. His background at O2 Germany—managing physical store networks during the smartphone revolution—proved directly applicable to OPAP's challenge of modernizing gambling retail.
Throughout his tenure with OPAP, Jan has led various strategic and transformative initiatives, focused on modernization and digitalization of retail, as well as expansion and promotion of online business. These initiatives have reshaped OPAP's commercial agenda, bringing innovative customer propositions and resulting in significant growth in both the retail and the online channels. He has a proven track record of driving exceptional business results, crafting forward-looking strategies and executing impactful programs that promote positive change.
The Allwyn Merger
The biggest news of 2025 fundamentally reshapes OPAP's future.
Lottery operator Allwyn and Greece's OPAP announced on Monday that they will merge in an all-stock transaction valued at €16 billion, marking one of Europe's largest gaming mergers. The combined company will become the continent's biggest gambling group and the second-largest globally after Flutter Entertainment. Allwyn, founded by Czech billionaire Karel Komarek, already owns 51.78% of Athens-listed OPAP. The deal underscores Allwyn's growing ambitions to consolidate the fragmented European gambling sector.
In October, Allwyn unveiled plans to merge with the Greek gaming operator OPAP in an all-share transaction valuing the combined entity at €16 billion. Allwyn already owned a 51.78% controlling stake in OPAP before the deal. The merger will see Allwyn holding approximately 78.5% of the new group, with OPAP's public shareholders retaining the remaining 21.5%. The combined company will be renamed Allwyn and maintain its listing on the Athens Stock Exchange, with plans for an additional listing in London or New York once the transaction closes in the first half of 2026. KKCG, the investment firm of Czech billionaire Karel Komarek, will control 85% of voting rights. This merger creates the world's second-largest publicly traded gaming entertainment company and the largest listed lottery operator globally.
The merger represents the logical conclusion of a journey that began with Emma Delta's 2013 acquisition. OPAP goes from Greek state enterprise to independent public company to subsidiary of Europe's largest gaming group—all within a decade.
OPAP's current management team, led by Jan Karas as CEO and Pavel Mucha as CFO, will head up OPAP's operations in Greece and Cyprus. Karel Komarek will chair the business with an eight-person board. "This transaction marks a further milestone in Allwyn's successful journey," Chvatal said. "Since being founded 13 years ago, we have grown substantially in terms of business performance, scale and innovation. With this combination, we will be able to grow further, faster as we deploy group-wide know-how, a unified brand and sponsorship strategy, and in-house technology and content."
Product Portfolio Today
Our games are provided through the widest network of points of sale in Greece (more than 4,000), which are dedicated and branded agencies distributing exclusively OPAP's products. These agencies act as commercial representatives and are compensated on a performance commission basis. Additionally to the agencies network, the distribution of Instant and Passive Lotteries is extended further via alternative 3,800 POS (kiosks, street vendors, etc.).
The distribution network remains OPAP's most tangible competitive advantage. More than 4,000 dedicated agencies plus 3,800 alternative points of sale create a retail footprint that no competitor can replicate.
Notably, the introduction of the Eurojackpot in Greece in early 2024 boosted its lottery segment, while the launch of TIPSTERS, a digital sports betting community, further enhanced customer engagement in its sports betting offerings.
Product innovation continues: Eurojackpot connects Greek lottery players to pan-European jackpots, while TIPSTERS creates social engagement around sports betting predictions.
License Runway
Key to OPAP's strategy is that it holds exclusive concessions in all land-based games in Greece apart from casinos. The core games exclusive licence has been extended until 2030, the scratch tickets and passive licence expires in 2026, and the horse racing licence expires in 2036. The exclusive licence to operate 25,000 VLTs in Greece expires in 2035.
The license expiration dates create a clear strategic timeline: Scratch tickets and Passives renewal negotiations in 2026, core games renewal in 2030, VLT renewal in 2035. Each renewal will involve substantial payments and potential renegotiation of terms.
We assume an EBITDA margin of 25% in FY31 to reflect the end of the concessions in October 2030, which boosts the EBITDA margin to c 33% during its term. We assume that OPAP pays €1bn between 2028 and 2029 to renew the Lotteries and Sports Betting licence beyond 2030.
Analyst models expect renewal payments of approximately €1 billion for the post-2030 period. This represents significant cash outflow but also demonstrates the ongoing value of monopoly positions—they're expensive because they're profitable.
X. Investment Thesis: Bull Case, Bear Case, and Competitive Analysis
Porter's Five Forces Analysis
Threat of New Entrants: LOW in retail, MODERATE in online
OPAP's land-based monopoly creates insurmountable barriers for retail competitors. New entrants cannot legally offer lottery, sports betting, or VLTs through physical locations in Greece until at least 2030 (core games) or 2035 (VLTs). Online is more competitive, but regulatory complexity and the Stoiximan acquisition have given OPAP dominant market position there as well.
Bargaining Power of Suppliers: LOW
Technology suppliers (Intralot, Inspired, Scientific Games) depend heavily on OPAP contracts. The company's scale allows it to negotiate favorable terms and maintain multiple vendor relationships for leverage.
Bargaining Power of Buyers: LOW
Individual customers have minimal bargaining power. While customers can choose not to gamble, those who do have limited legal alternatives in Greece. The nature of gambling products—driven by hope and entertainment rather than rational comparison shopping—further reduces buyer power.
Threat of Substitutes: MODERATE
Online casinos, illegal offshore operators, and in-person gambling at Greek casinos represent substitutes. OPAP addresses this through its dual online strategy (Pamestoixima.gr and Stoiximan) and by offering the unique social experience of retail betting that online cannot replicate.
Industry Rivalry: LOW to MODERATE
In retail, OPAP faces no legal competition. Online competition exists but is contained by OPAP's ~50% market share and the regulatory costs that discourage smaller operators.
Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers Framework
Scale Economies: OPAP's 4,000+ retail locations create distribution scale that competitors cannot economically replicate. The fixed costs of regulatory compliance, technology infrastructure, and marketing are spread across massive volume.
Network Effects: Limited but present through the social aspects of retail betting—the cultural experience of visiting an OPAP store with friends to place bets creates switching costs.
Counter-Positioning: OPAP's incumbent position makes it difficult for disruptors to compete without regulatory change that is unlikely in the medium term.
Switching Costs: Customer accounts, accumulated loyalty points (OPAP Rewards), and habitual behaviors create meaningful switching costs.
Branding: OPAP is synonymous with legal gambling in Greece. This brand recognition took decades to build and cannot be quickly replicated.
Cornered Resource: The exclusive licenses themselves represent cornered resources—legal rights that cannot be duplicated or purchased on the open market.
Process Power: Not a primary advantage, though OPAP's retail transformation and digital integration demonstrate operational capabilities that smaller competitors lack.
Bull Case
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Monopoly Protection Until 2030+: The exclusive licenses for core games, VLTs, and horse racing provide near-certain cash flows for years to come. This predictability is rare in gaming and supports premium valuation.
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Digital Transformation Success: The Stoiximan acquisition and organic online growth demonstrate OPAP can compete in markets where it doesn't have monopoly protection. Online now represents 32% of GGR with double-digit growth rates.
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Allwyn Synergies: The merger creates opportunities for technology sharing, content libraries, and operational best practices across Europe's largest gaming group. OPAP gains access to Allwyn's investments in AI and proprietary platforms.
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Dividend Machine: OPAP SA's annualized dividend payout is €1.30. OPAP SA has a 5-year dividend growth rate of +34.08%. The OPAP SA dividend yield is 7.23%. A 7%+ yield from a growing company with monopoly protection is exceptional.
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Greek Economic Recovery: Greece's economy has stabilized and begun growing following the crisis decade. Economic growth typically correlates with gambling spend.
Bear Case
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License Expiration Risk: The 2030 core games expiration creates uncertainty. While renewal seems likely, the terms could be unfavorable, and €1 billion in expected renewal payments represents significant value transfer to the Greek state.
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EU Regulatory Risk: In September 2023, the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) imposed a fine of €24,562,249.05 on OPAP for abusing its dominant position in the Greek gambling market through non-compete and tying practices. The HCC determined that OPAP's 2017 exclusivity agreements with sales agents included clauses prohibiting competition in ancillary markets. Regulatory scrutiny of monopoly practices could intensify, particularly following EU court rulings questioning the monopoly's legality.
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Digital Margin Compression: Online gambling is inherently more competitive than retail. As online grows from 32% to potentially 50%+ of revenue, overall margins may compress.
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Single-Market Concentration: OPAP generates virtually all revenue from Greece and Cyprus—small markets with limited growth potential. The Allwyn merger provides diversification but introduces integration execution risk.
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Allwyn Integration Risk: Mergers of this magnitude frequently disappoint. Technology integration, cultural alignment, and strategic disagreements could undermine promised synergies.
Key Performance Indicators to Track
For investors monitoring OPAP's ongoing performance, three metrics matter most:
1. Online GGR Growth Rate This indicates whether OPAP's digital transformation is sustainable or decelerating. Double-digit online growth validates the Stoiximan acquisition and organic digital investments. Single-digit growth would suggest market maturation and increased competitive pressure.
2. Retail GGR Trends OPAP's monopoly businesses (lottery, sports betting, VLTs) should show stable to modest growth. Significant retail decline would indicate structural challenges that even monopoly protection cannot address—potentially signaling customer migration to illegal alternatives or demographic shifts away from retail gambling.
3. EBITDA Margin The company currently operates at approximately 35% EBITDA margin. Margin compression would suggest increased competitive pressure online, regulatory cost increases, or operational challenges. Margin expansion would indicate successful cost management and operating leverage.
XI. Conclusion: From Football Pools to European Gaming Giant
Walk into an OPAP agency in Athens today, and the transformation from 1959 is remarkable. Where elderly gentlemen once studied paper forms predicting football scores, young professionals now tap smartphones to place live bets while watching matches on wall-mounted screens. Where simple pools betting generated modest returns, sophisticated VLT machines offer immersive gaming experiences.
Yet something essential remains unchanged: OPAP sits at the intersection of Greek social life and entertainment in ways few companies anywhere can claim. The neighborhood agency remains a gathering place. The national lottery generates conversation. The Joker jackpot captures imaginations.
OPAP's story is ultimately one of institutional durability across radical change. The company survived the military junta by being useful to authoritarians. It survived Greece's return to democracy by being useful to democratic governments. It survived the sovereign debt crisis by being valuable enough that even cash-strapped privatizers structured deals to maximize its long-term potential. And it survived the digital revolution by buying the companies disrupting it.
The Allwyn merger opens a new chapter. OPAP will no longer be an independent Greek company but rather the Greek arm of Europe's largest gaming group. Whether this represents the natural evolution of a successful privatization or the loss of Greek control over a national institution depends on your perspective.
For investors, the relevant questions are more concrete: Can OPAP maintain its monopoly advantages while competing effectively in online markets? Can the Allwyn integration deliver promised synergies without destroying OPAP's operational effectiveness? Can Greek economic growth support continued gambling spend increases?
The answers will unfold over the coming years. But the evidence to date suggests that the organization founded to fund Greek football in 1958 has demonstrated remarkable adaptability—surviving every crisis, exploiting every opportunity, and transforming itself repeatedly while maintaining the core franchise that makes it valuable.
In gambling, as in business, the house usually wins. OPAP has been the house for sixty-seven years. The odds suggest it will remain so for decades to come.
Key Risks and Considerations
Regulatory/Legal Overhangs: - €24.6 million competition fine from HCC (2023) regarding exclusivity clauses with agents - Ongoing EU scrutiny of monopoly arrangements under Articles 49 and 56 TFEU - License renewal negotiations in 2026 (Scratch/Passives) and 2030 (core games)
Accounting Considerations: - High dividend payout ratio (approximately 93.8%) leaves limited reinvestment capacity - €1 billion anticipated license renewal payments (2028-2029) not currently on balance sheet - Stoiximan earnout obligations and acquisition accounting
Ownership Structure Changes: - Allwyn merger (expected H1 2026) will significantly change governance - KKCG will control 85% of voting rights - Greek regulatory approval required for merger completion
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