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Jerónimo Martins: How a 230-Year-Old Portuguese Grocery Store Became Eastern Europe's Retail Giant
The Unlikely European Champion
Picture a small, dimly-lit grocery shop in Lisbon's fashionable Chiado district circa 1792. A young Galician immigrant named Jerónimo Martins stands behind a wooden counter, arranging sausages, sacks of wheat, bundles of tallow candles, and jugs of local wine. The Portuguese aristocracy occasionally stops in for specialty olive oil—produced, as it happens, by the famous writer and historian Alexandre Herculano himself. This humble establishment, tucked among the cobblestone streets that would one day be devastated by fire and rebuilt into one of Europe's most elegant shopping districts, would eventually become the foundation for a retail empire that most Americans have never heard of.
Fast forward 233 years. In 2024, Jerónimo Martins recorded €33.5 billion in sales, with the Group's EBITDA totalling €2.2 billion. With a market capitalisation of €11.6 billion at year-end 2024, Jerónimo Martins held the second-largest representation on Portugal's PSI index. The company that began with one shopkeeper selling olive oil and brooms now operates more than 6,100 stores across Portugal, Poland, Slovakia and Colombia.
The hook here isn't just scale—it's improbability. How does a family-controlled grocery business from one of Europe's smallest economies become the undisputed retail king of Poland? Biedronka, the Group's Polish discount supermarket chain, is the largest chain of discount shops in Poland with 3,730 stores and 84,000 employees at the end of 2024. The brand accounts for roughly 70% of the Group's total sales and approximately 80% of its EBITDA. That's not a subsidiary—that's the engine.
Chairman and CEO Pedro Soares dos Santos has stated publicly: "Our ambition is to reach 50 billion euros in sales by 2030." For context, that would represent roughly 50% growth from current levels in just five years—a staggering target for a company in the notoriously low-margin grocery business. "Our profit margin is no more than 2%," the CFO Ana Luísa Virgínia reminded analysts at the 2024 results presentation.
This is the story of four generations of a Portuguese family that rescued a failing Lisbon shop, built partnerships with consumer giants like Unilever, then bet everything on a post-communist market that global retailers either ignored or abandoned. Along the way, they learned from a catastrophic failure in Brazil that shaped their disciplined approach to international expansion. And now, having conquered Poland, they're executing the same playbook in Colombia and Slovakia.
Part I: The Chiado Origins (1792-1920)
A Young Galician's Gamble
A young Galician named Jerónimo Martins went to Lisbon in search of better times, opening his small store in Chiado. He would never have imagined that his own name would live more than two hundred years as the corporate brand of an ever-growing Group of businesses.
The Lisbon of 1792 was still recovering from the devastating earthquake of 1755 that had destroyed much of the city and killed tens of thousands. The rebuilt Baixa and Chiado districts were emerging as commercial centers catering to Portugal's landed gentry and the growing bourgeoisie. Martins positioned his shop to serve this clientele, but with a distinctly practical Portuguese sensibility.
The original small shop used to sell a bit of everything: sausages, sacks of wheat and corn, bundles of tallow candles, jugs of wine, brooms. This wasn't a luxury emporium—it was a general store serving daily needs. But Martins had an eye for quality, and his shop gradually gained a reputation that would outlive him.
A new product was to enhance the store's shelves: olive oil produced in Vale de Lobos by the writer, historian and politician Alexandre Herculano. Signed in his small and neat hand, Herculano defended his "fine olive oil," stating that "any samples that bear my name, whether alone or associated with another, are completely false." In the 19th century, the store enjoyed increasing prestige.
By the late 1800s, the store was a supplier of the Portuguese Royal House and was recognised with a Royal Warrant of appointment. This was Portugal's original premium grocery positioning—a 19th century Whole Foods, if you will, serving those who valued provenance and quality over price.
The World War I Crisis
But prestigious clientele couldn't insulate the business from macroeconomic reality. In the last year of World War I, the cost of living in Portugal rose, the food supply was disrupted and unemployment increased. These factors triggered violent social events, including strikes and assaults, in a reaction against Portuguese intervention in the armed conflict. Although apparently flourishing, the company was unable to withstand the veritable economic revolution caused by the war. The company faced almost bankruptcy.
This is a critical juncture that shapes everything that follows. The original Jerónimo Martins enterprise, despite its prestigious history and royal connections, had failed to build the financial resilience necessary to survive wartime disruption. At the time of the acquisition, Estabelecimentos Jerónimo Martins & Filho was faced with serious financial problems due to management issues and the devastating consequences of the war.
The stage was set for a rescue that would transform a failing Lisbon grocery into a dynasty.
Part II: The Santos Family Rescue (1921-1949)
From the North, Salvation Came
The solution came from the north by the hands of Francisco Manuel dos Santos—Alexandre Soares dos Santos' grandfather—and Elysio Pereira do Vale, who had already established another company called Grandes Armazéns Reunidos. In 1921 they arrived in Lisbon to open the Estabelecimento Jerónimo Martins & Filho, with a wide variety of products: genuine Gruyère, London and Parmesan cheese, little barrels of superior olives from Marseille.
Francisco Manuel dos Santos represents the archetype of the Portuguese merchant-entrepreneur. Born in a remote village in the district of Guarda, in the heart of a modest family, he was intelligent and good at arithmetic. At the age of 15 he was sent to Porto to work in the store of Domingos Veloso Barreto, the Vice-Chairman of the ShopOwners Commercial Association in that city.
The man had no pedigree, no formal education, and no capital. What he had was commercial instinct honed through decades of retail experience in Portugal's second city. He was a partner of Júlio Bacelar in a fine grocery called Flor do Carmo. He married Alzira Vieira dos Santos in 1906 and had eight children. Alzira was the daughter of a prominent merchant in the Porto marketplace. Elísio Pereira do Vale was the best man at his wedding. In 1920, together with Elísio Pereira do Vale and other partners, Francisco Manuel dos Santos set up Grandes Armazéns Reunidos. This company aimed to expand to Lisbon, which led it to acquire Estabelecimentos Jerónimo Martins in that city.
It was a challenging time: Francisco Manuel dos Santos took a loan of five thousand escudos offering as a guarantee "his work and his honesty."
Think about that for a moment. A businessman from the provinces walks into a Lisbon bank and secures a loan with nothing but his reputation as collateral. In an era before credit scores, before standardized risk assessment, before private equity, the entire future of what would become a €12 billion company rested on a banker's judgment of one man's character.
The Manufacturing Pivot: Margarine and Unilever
The strategy adopted provided for a slow and steady recovery; a chain of retail stores was set up, storage was reorganised and activities related to non-food products were eliminated. Steadily, Estabelecimentos Jerónimo Martins & Filho recovered its financial security and became one of the first companies in the country to pay its workers a 13th-month salary, as well as building a staff canteen in the headquarters in Chiado.
The progressive labor practices weren't mere philanthropy—they were strategic. Portugal in the 1920s and 1930s was politically volatile, with labor unrest a constant threat. By treating workers well, Santos built loyalty that would prove crucial in the turbulent decades to come.
In the mid-1930s, there was expansion into industry, which meant investment in a margarine factory, a product that was both scarce and essential. Elísio Alexandre dos Santos, nephew and son-in-law of Francisco Manuel dos Santos, who was in the business since 1935, took the initiative to build FIMA – Fábrica Imperial de Margarina. FIMA was incorporated in association with Silva Torrado, although the operation in Sacavém was only inaugurated in 1944, given that World War II prevented the arrival of the equipment. A devastating fire not long after put an end to its troubled existence, and construction then began on a new factory in Santa Iria da Azóia, which is still operating to this day.
The survival of the firm was due to Unilever, whose brands Jerónimo Martins had been selling since 1926 and with which it went into a joint venture in 1949. Having acquired the Silva Torrado share, 60% of FIMA went to Jerónimo Martins; the remainder was reinstated through the setup of Lever, a company producing cleaning and personal hygiene products, in which Unilever had an equivalent share.
This 1949 partnership with Unilever is foundational. It transformed Jerónimo Martins from a regional grocery chain into a manufacturer—producing margarines, detergents, and consumer goods. More importantly, it created a connection to international best practices in marketing, distribution, and corporate management that would shape the next generation of leadership.
Francisco Manuel dos Santos died in 1953, but not before having set up Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos (SFMS) with his seven children in 1941, with the aim of formalising his holdings in several companies. His heirs assured the continuity of the company and reorganised the Group. Elísio Alexandre dos Santos succeeded him. His management style favoured the group's manufacturing side. It was under his leadership that Olá Ice Cream factory was acquired and that the family businesses expanded to Angola.
Part III: Alexandre's Revolution (1968-1997)
The Son Who Didn't Want the Job
Every great family business succession story has an element of reluctance, and Alexandre Soares dos Santos' ascent is no exception.
Alexandre Soares dos Santos was born to a family of entrepreneurs from Oporto, at the same time as his father was taking over the helm of his father-in-law's business. Mr. Soares dos Santos interchanged his studies between Lisbon and Oporto, eventually going on to study Law, following his father's wishes. However, to his father's disappointment, Alexandre Soares dos Santos soon dropped out, which led their relationship to quickly sour. As a result, Mr. Soares dos Santos joined Unilever in Germany, the consumer goods giant, where he'd go on to build a career for himself.
He attended the Lisbon Law Faculty and began working as a trainee manager at Unilever N.V. in 1957, having had internships in Germany and Ireland. This was the beginning of an international career at Unilever, which included working as Marketing Director for Unilever Brasil between 1964 and 1968.
The Unilever years were formative. Alexandre learned consumer goods marketing and management at one of the world's most sophisticated packaged goods companies. He saw how large-scale distribution worked in emerging markets. And perhaps most importantly, he witnessed firsthand the gap between Jerónimo Martins' manufacturing-focused strategy and the modern retail revolution transforming Europe.
At the time that he was in charge of the marketing department in Brazil, Alexandre Soares dos Santos' father passed away, forcing him to move back to Portugal in order to take over the firm's leadership. Elísio Alexandre dos Santos died suddenly in 1967, in Brazil, where he had gone to visit his son, Alexandre. He was 59 at that time.
After the death of Elísio Alexandre dos Santos, the friendly intervention of the then vice-president of Unilever, who had been following the international career of Alexandre Soares dos Santos closely from the start, played a decisive role in influencing his return. After his demands for clear executive powers were made plain and agreed to, Alexandre Soares dos Santos finally entered the family business.
The Strategic Shift to Distribution
Upon his arrival from Brazil, Soares dos Santos brought a clear vision that a counterpoint to Unilever was needed, an alternative source of revenue for the Group, which would culminate in entering the business of modern distribution.
This insight seems obvious in retrospect, but at the time it was radical. Jerónimo Martins was a successful manufacturing company with a powerful partner in Unilever. Why risk that stable, profitable business by entering the cutthroat world of retail?
However, given the political, economic and social uncertainty he found on his return to Portugal, it was not the right time. "I was too young to understand what kind of people I needed, and I didn't know the country very well either," explained Soares dos Santos on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the retail chain he founded in 1978: Pingo Doce. It took just two years to go from superettes—smaller, discount-type stores—to supermarkets.
In charge of the Jerónimo Martins Group's businesses since his father's death in 1967, he chose the opposite path from the one carved out by his father, by investing in the distribution sector. It was a way of freeing the Group from the excessive dependence on Unilever. It was within this context that in 1978 he set up Companhia Pingo Doce, a supermarket chain, whose first store was inaugurated in 1980.
Navigating Revolution
As the CEO of Jerónimo Martins, Alexandre Soares dos Santos navigated the economic turmoil that followed the Carnation Revolution in 1974. Portugal's peaceful overthrow of its authoritarian Estado Novo regime brought uncertainty to the business community—nationalizations, strikes, and social upheaval were the order of the day.
Alexandre Soares dos Santos was leading the company at the time of the Revolution of the 25th of April 1974, at a time in which social uprising and the occupation of companies and land were gradually compromising a number of major domestic businesses. On the contrary, the Group's robust finances, the exponential increase in consumption, the above-average wages and other social benefits offered to the workers—which kept them away from the unions dominated by left-wing and far left-wing organisations—made the company prosper.
This is vintage Alexandre Soares dos Santos: pragmatic, unsentimental, focused on results. Rather than fighting the political tide or fleeing Portugal like many business owners, he doubled down on the company's historical commitment to employee welfare—and it paid dividends in stability and loyalty.
Building Pingo Doce and the Belgian Connection
Jerónimo Martins established a strategic partnership with the Delhaize Group "Le Lion"—the second largest Belgian retailer—for the development of Pingo Doce. The traditional nearly 200-year-old company became a holding company.
Since 1992, Pingo Doce has been operated as a joint venture by Jerónimo Martins, in which it holds 51% and the Dutch retail chain Ahold Delhaize 49%. This partnership structure—majority control retained by the founding family, with a sophisticated international partner bringing capital and expertise—would become a template for Jerónimo Martins' approach to growth.
The Group acquired from Delhaize "Le Lion" its stake in the retail business and set up a joint venture with the Dutch company Royal Ahold, one of the largest Food Retail companies in the world, which still has a 49% stake in Jerónimo Martins Retail (JMR), the holding company that controls Pingo Doce. 1992 was also the year of the introduction of Private Brands. This was the start of a multi-format strategy in retail and of accelerated growth.
Consolidation Through Acquisition
In 1988, the group Jerónimo Martins acquired 60% of Recheio while buying the remaining 40% in 1989. Recheio is the biggest cash-and-carry chain of stores operating in Portugal. The company was born in Figueira da Foz in 1972, with the concept of auto-service for owners of small and medium commercial stores.
One year later, the Jerónimo Martins Group bought 15 Pão de Açúcar supermarkets from the Brazilian retailers Supa.
In 1989, Alexandre Soares dos Santos managed to buy the Vale Family's share in Jerónimo Martins, so that Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos gained complete control of the company, and put it on the Lisbon Stock Exchange that same year.
This 1989 IPO is significant. By listing on the Lisbon exchange while maintaining majority family control through SFMS, Alexandre created a capital structure that would fund aggressive expansion while preserving the strategic autonomy that comes with family ownership. The Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos is the main shareholder, holding more than 56% of the Jerónimo Martins Share Capital.
By the mid-1990s, Alexandre had transformed a manufacturing-focused family company into Portugal's leading food distributor. But the Portuguese market was inherently limited—a population of 10 million, mature retail penetration, and increasing competition from international players. The real question was: what next?
Part IV: The Poland Bet (1995-2005)
The Post-Communist Retail Desert
When the Iron Curtain fell in 1989, Western retailers rushed to claim the emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe. The logic was compelling: populations of hundreds of millions, suppressed consumer demand, and retail infrastructure frozen in the 1960s. Tesco expanded into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Carrefour followed. Metro entered aggressively. These were the global giants, armed with billions in capital and decades of Western retail expertise.
And yet, as of 2024, the largest supermarket chain in Poland isn't Tesco (which sold its Polish operations in 2020). It isn't Carrefour (whose Polish business has struggled). It's a discount chain called Biedronka—"little ladybug" in Polish—owned by a Portuguese company that most Americans have never heard of.
The founder of Biedronka was entrepreneur Mariusz Świtalski, owner of Elektromis. The first Biedronka store opened its doors on April 6, 1995, on Newtona Street in Poznań. In 1997, Jerónimo Martins acquired 210 stores from Elektromis, marking the beginning of a significant expansion phase for the chain.
Let's pause on the timing. In 1997, Poland was just eight years removed from communism. The economy was still stabilizing. Consumer habits were undeveloped. Modern retail infrastructure barely existed. This was, by any conventional measure, a risky bet.
The Failed Brazil Venture: A Crucial Lesson
But before we celebrate the Poland success, we need to understand the failure that preceded it. In the early 1990s, Jerónimo Martins made an aggressive push into Brazil—a Portuguese-speaking market with apparent cultural synergies and enormous growth potential.
The company lacked financial resources to withstand investing in these two growing economies, leading to debt accumulation, eventually forcing the sale of the Brazilian assets.
The supermarket mogul oversaw the group's international expansion in Brazil and Poland but admitted the experience had not always gone as planned. He sold up in Brazil in 2002 while admitting that operations in the Polish market had not been easy.
Despite being mostly deemed as a bad bet, Mr. Soares dos Santos took personal responsibility, blaming his own arrogance for the company's failure in Brazil, as well as the lack of market knowledge, planning and overconfidence. He believed that the lesson learnt was a major turning point for the firm, which defined the success in Poland.
This is worth dwelling on. Most corporate leaders, when facing a strategic failure, blame market conditions, local partners, or unexpected challenges. Alexandre Soares dos Santos blamed himself—his arrogance, his overconfidence. And then he applied those lessons systematically to Poland.
Why Poland Worked
The name "Biedronka" means "ladybird," and a cartoon ladybird is the company's logo. Biedronka sells mainly local products, many of which are manufactured under the company's own label. It also sells some Portugal-made products, mostly wine. Initially targeted at lower-income customers, it is now one of the most popular supermarket chains in Poland.
Several factors explain Biedronka's success where other Western retailers struggled:
1. The Discount Model Matched the Market
Post-communist Poland had modest average incomes but sophisticated consumer aspirations. Polish shoppers wanted quality food at accessible prices—not the hypermarket experience of Carrefour or the premium positioning of traditional supermarkets. Biedronka's discount format, emphasizing everyday low prices on essential products, fit the market perfectly.
2. Maniacal Focus on Price Leadership
Over 90% of the products sold are of Polish origin. By sourcing locally and building strong private label programs, Biedronka created a cost structure that allowed it to consistently undercut competitors on price.
3. Operational Discipline
Unlike competitors who tried to transplant Western retail formats directly into Poland, Biedronka adapted obsessively to local conditions. Small-format stores in both urban and rural areas. Simple store layouts that minimized operating costs. Efficient supply chains that reduced waste.
4. Patient Capital
As a family-controlled company, Jerónimo Martins could take a long-term view that public market pressure often prevents. They could invest through unprofitable years, building scale before demanding returns.
The Turnaround Years: Pedro's Poland Mission
In 1999, Pedro Soares dos Santos became head of Operations in Poland and Brazil and in 2001 he also took over the Group's Distribution in Portugal. He was a member of the Executive Board of Jerónimo Martins and responsible for Distribution until 2009. He has been CEO since April 2010 and also Chairman of the Board of Directors since December 18th 2013.
Pedro Soares dos Santos, Alexandre's third child, essentially grew up in the business. He began his professional career at the Jerónimo Martins Group in 1983, as a purchasing assistant in the Perishables area of Pingo Doce, later joining the Operations Department as Store Manager. In 1985, he worked in the Sales and Marketing areas of Iglo/Olá (currently Unilever Fima) and in 1990 he joined Recheio/Arminho, where he took on various roles including that of Operations Director. In 1995, he was appointed Managing Director of Recheio and elected as Director of Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, S.A.
Just like Alexandre Soares dos Santos, Pedro also attended a Law Course, but didn't finish it. He has various Management courses from the most prestigious universities in the world, such as Kellogg, Harvard, IMD and Darden. He started working for the Group in 1983, at the age of 23. He worked as an apprentice, a salesman with Gelados Olá, as purchasing assistant in the Perishables area of Pingo Doce and store manager, Operations Director and Managing Director at Recheio.
The decision to send Pedro—the heir apparent—to Poland from 2000 to 2002 signals how seriously the family took the Polish operation. This wasn't a far-flung subsidiary to be managed remotely; it was the company's future, and it required the family's best.
It was thanks to Alexandre Soares dos Santos that the company endured the 2009 financial crisis, this time, in his own words, due to the success of the business in Poland, where the Group owns the Biedronka chain of discount stores.
The Plus Acquisition: Doubling Down
At the end of 2007, Jerónimo Martins acquired the Plus operations in Portugal and Poland. In 2008, 75 former Plus stores were integrated in the Pingo Doce chain in Portugal and 210 in the Biedronka network in Poland.
The acquisition of Plus—Germany's Tengelmann Group's discount chain—exemplifies Jerónimo Martins' opportunistic discipline. When the 2008 financial crisis forced Tengelmann to exit non-core markets, Jerónimo Martins pounced, adding 200+ Polish locations at a presumably attractive valuation and gaining critical mass in Eastern Poland where Biedronka had been underrepresented.
With sales growing to more than €5.3 billion, the Group proved the success of its strategies and of a balanced management of its resources. The main drivers of this growth came from Poland, where the excellent results were accompanied by the opening of the 1,000th Biedronka store, as well as from Portugal, with Pingo Doce consolidating its leading position. Both Pingo Doce and Recheio certified their Private Brands. At this time, Jerónimo Martins was already one of the largest employers in Portugal, reaching the end of the year with 41,300 employees.
Part V: The Leadership Transition (2013)
Passing the Torch
Alexandre Soares dos Santos led the Portuguese retailer Jerónimo Martins until November 2013, 45 years after taking over the company from his father.
At the end of 2013, Jerónimo Martins ranked 76th in the biggest retailers list in the worldwide distribution ranking and Alexandre Soares dos Santos handed over his position to his son, Pedro.
Pedro Soares dos Santos has therefore been Chairman and CEO of Jerónimo Martins since the 18th December 2013. He is Alexandre Soares dos Santos' third child. His liking for the family business and his commitment to it can be clearly seen in the fact that he tries everything that is sold by the Pingo Doce and Recheio private brands, thereby personally guaranteeing the quality of the products offered by Jerónimo Martins.
That detail—the CEO personally tasting private label products—encapsulates the hands-on management culture that distinguishes Jerónimo Martins from many publicly-traded peers. In an era of professional managers and distant holding company structures, the Santos family maintains an almost artisanal attention to the core product.
Alexandre Soares dos Santos died on August 16, 2019. He left behind a transformed company: a regional grocery store when he assumed control, an international retail powerhouse when he stepped down. But perhaps more importantly, he left a culture and a playbook that his successors would apply to the next frontier.
Part VI: The Colombia Bet - Ara (2013-Present)
Designing from Scratch
Jerónimo Martins entered Colombia in 2013, and ten years later, Ara has become a trusted partner for Colombian families.
The Colombia expansion represents a new chapter in Jerónimo Martins' international strategy. Unlike Poland, where they acquired an existing chain and scaled it, Ara was designed from scratch specifically for the Colombian market.
Ara is a neighbourhood store chain, perfectly tailored to the Colombian consumer in terms of product range and store environment. Its main pillars are competitive prices, proximity, and an assortment of quality products that meet the basic needs of the average Colombian family. Ara collaborates with over 500 Colombian suppliers and fosters long-term relationships with its partners. More than 95% of food product purchases at Ara are sourced from local suppliers.
The Early Struggles
The company saw sales increasing to €1.8 billion in 2022, from €21 million in 2013, while the number of employees rose from 466 to 12,460 in the same period.
That growth trajectory—from €21 million to €1.8 billion in under a decade—sounds impressive until you consider the investment required. Colombia, unlike Poland, involved building a retail format and distribution infrastructure from zero in a market where traditional retail (small family-owned shops called "tiendas de barrio") still dominated.
The early years were challenging. As one senior executive recalled, "When we started up, there was no such thing as palletised products. We even had people delivering our crates jumbled up with mattresses! It was a huge challenge to modernise procedures."
Scale-Up and Profitability
This expansion builds upon Ara's significant sales growth in the previous financial year. It accounted for 8.4% of Jerónimo Martins' total revenue, contributing €2.8 billion in 2024, a 17% year-over-year increase.
Jerónimo Martins hopes that the supermarket chain will account for 20% of its total sales within the next ten years. To achieve this goal, it plans to have between 3,000 and 4,000 Ara stores, including franchise outlets.
Recent Acceleration: The Colsubsidio Acquisition
Jerónimo Martins has received approval from Colombia's antitrust authority to acquire 75 Colsubsidio supermarkets across Colombia. After 60 years in the supermarket business, Colsubsidio announced in November 2024 that it would close all 104 stores by December of the same year. The retailer attributed this closure to declining performance and increased competition from larger, well-funded rivals. The acquisition will help Portugal-based Jerónimo Martins to boost its presence in Colombia to more than 1,500 outlets. This acquisition, along with 150 planned new stores and a €1-billion investment plan, will consolidate Ara's position as the third-largest retailer in Colombia, after Éxito and D1.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) announced a sustainability-linked loan of up to US$120 million to Tiendas Ara in November 2024, to support the construction of two EDGE-Advanced certified distribution centers in the Bogota and Cali regions. The loan will enable Tiendas Ara to expand its logistics network and with it new stores in medium and small cities, thereby increasing access to affordable and high-quality retail services for a wider consumer base. The new distribution centers in Bogota and Cali will enhance the company's logistics capabilities, inventory management systems, and overall operational efficiency. Tiendas Ara has positioned itself as relevant food retail player in Colombia, serving middle and low-income families.
Pedro Soares dos Santos has stated: "We have no intention of abandoning the business in Colombia. We continue to believe in the project. There is something very important in management and in everything in life: stability, a well-defined path and reducing risk. We have had that capacity, therefore that problem does not affect us." Colombia will be one of the engines to reach €50 billion in sales by 2030.
Part VII: Slovakia and the Next Chapter (2025)
Biedronka Goes International
Biedronka is set to open its first store in the Slovakian city of Miloslavov and a distribution centre in Voderady on 5 March 2025. Portuguese retail group Jerónimo Martins has confirmed the opening of the first Biedronka store in Slovakia—in the city of Miloslavov—and a distribution centre in Voderady, on 5 March 2025.
The launch marks the first time that Jerónimo Martins has expanded an existing brand internationally, rather than creating a new one, as was previously the case—for example, in Colombia. The CEO of Biedronka Slovakia, Maciej Lukowski, told local news agency TASR that the expansion will initially focus on small and medium-sized cities, with plans to reach the capital, Bratislava, in the medium term. Lukowski added that the total number of Slovak stores will depend on customer reception.
The food retail operation of the Jerónimo Martins Group has landed in Slovakia. The first Biedronka store and a distribution centre opened their doors on 5 March 2025, marking the beginning of another successful journey. The first store opened its doors in Miloslavov, on the outskirts of Bratislava, on 5 March 2025. The first distribution centre in the country was also inaugurated on the same day, located about 50 km from Bratislava. On the opening day, Biedronka Slovakia employed around 300 people in the distribution centre, stores and offices.
In September 2025, Biedronka had 3,829 stores in Poland, having opened a net 99 stores that year, and was on track to reach its target of 130 to 150 new stores in 2025. After opening its first store in Slovakia in March, it now has eight stores there and expects to reach at least 50 nationwide by the end of the year.
According to the CEO of Biedronka Slovakia, quoted by the press, the aim is to have a network of 50 stores by the end of 2026.
Part VIII: Competitive Landscape and Strategic Position
The Polish Market: Dominance Under Pressure
Biedronka has had a dominant position in Poland's grocery retail market for over a decade, and its main competitor in Poland is Lidl, although competition is rising in the form of Kaufland and Aldi.
In 2023, Biedronka's sales reached a staggering 85 billion zloty, more than two times the sales of Lidl and nearly six times that of the Kaufland chain. With a network of 3,500 stores across Poland, Biedronka has established itself as the most extensive retail brand in the country. In comparison, Lidl had 900 outlets in 2023.
Although Biedronka had an extremely difficult-to-beat record following consecutive years of above-market performance, the teams worked tirelessly and delivered volume growth and increased market share. Against this challenging backdrop, Biedronka consistently offered competitive prices and extra savings opportunities for Polish families. The main banner leveraged its commercial dynamic and increased price investment having operated with basket deflation. Biedronka's deep understanding of consumers and agile response to their needs allowed it to strengthen its customer base, post strong volume growth, and outperform the market, gaining market share.
In February 2025, Lidl offered a standard basket of 50 items for 410 PLN, while Biedronka's was 427 PLN. However, in October 2024, Lidl took the lead with a basket costing only 230.09 PLN, followed by Biedronka at 231.28 PLN.
The price war between Biedronka and Lidl is intense and ongoing. Both chains understand that Polish consumers are extraordinarily price-sensitive—Purchasing power differences are significant. The average annual income of a Pole is 12,561 EUR (54,637 PLN), 33% less than the EU average. With an average salary, a Pole can afford about 22 grocery baskets annually, compared to a German who can afford about 48 baskets. This explains why life in Poland feels more expensive despite similar prices.
Competitive Advantages: Porter's Five Forces Analysis
Threat of New Entrants: LOW The Polish discount market requires massive scale to compete on price. Biedronka's 3,800+ stores and 17 distribution centers create cost advantages that would take years and billions of euros to replicate. The recent struggles of Carrefour in Poland—reportedly exploring exit options—demonstrate how difficult it is for even well-capitalized entrants to compete.
Supplier Power: LOW to MODERATE Over 90% of the products sold at Biedronka are of Polish origin. This local sourcing strategy creates a diverse supplier base with limited individual bargaining power. Strong private label programs (approximately 40% of sales) further reduce dependency on branded goods suppliers.
Buyer Power: MODERATE to HIGH Polish consumers are extremely price-sensitive and increasingly comparison shop. However, Biedronka's everyday low pricing strategy and widespread store network create switching costs through convenience.
Threat of Substitutes: MODERATE Online grocery remains underpenetrated in Poland compared to Western Europe, but is growing. Traditional small-format retailers and convenience stores like Żabka serve different use cases. Biedronka introduced self-checkouts in its stores, closing 2024 with more than 3,200 of its network covered with these equipments. Biedronka's online activities through Biek ended the year with 23 micro-fulfilment centres exclusively dedicated to the ultra-fast delivery service.
Competitive Rivalry: HIGH Lidl, Kaufland, Aldi, and regional chains like Dino compete aggressively. However, Biedronka's scale, brand recognition, and operational efficiency create sustainable advantages.
Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers Analysis
Scale Economies: Biedronka's 3,800+ Polish stores create purchasing power, distribution efficiency, and fixed cost leverage that smaller competitors cannot match. This is arguably the company's strongest competitive moat.
Network Effects: Limited direct network effects in grocery retail, though loyalty programs create some data advantages.
Counter-Positioning: Biedronka's discount format and local sourcing strategy are difficult for traditional supermarkets to replicate without cannibalizing their own higher-margin business models.
Switching Costs: Low at the individual transaction level, but Biedronka's convenient locations and consistent pricing create habitual shopping patterns.
Branding: Strong recognition in Poland—Biedronka stores were visited by 93.5% of discount store customers in the first half of 2022, 2.5 percentage points higher than the year before. Biedronka has by far the strongest customer base. 24% of them—nearly a quarter—do not shop at any other grocery store.
Cornered Resource: The Ahold Delhaize partnership (49% of Portuguese retail JV) brings expertise and capital. Family ownership through SFMS provides patient capital and strategic autonomy.
Process Power: Decades of refinement in discount retail operations in both Portugal and Poland have created institutional knowledge that is difficult to replicate.
Part IX: Financial Performance and Outlook
2024 Results: Navigating Deflation
As expected, the year 2024 was marked by the harsh effects of the combination of a sharp decline in food inflation, a correction of the extraordinary price hikes of the previous two years, and a significant rise in costs. This particularly challenging environment was compounded by a lack of momentum in consumption, especially in the main market, Poland, which saw an intensified competition for volume. Faced with these challenges, the banners continued to invest in price competitiveness and strengthening their value propositions, leading the Group's sales to grow 9.3% (up 4.9% at constant exchange rates) to €33.5 billion, with an LFL of 0.6%. As anticipated, the Group's operating margins were pressured in the year by basket deflation combined with significant cost inflation, mainly related to wages in each country. The Group's EBITDA totalled €2.2 billion, with the respective margin falling 41 basis points.
In local currency, Biedronka's sales grew 4.1%, with a negative LFL of -0.3%. In euros, sales totalled €23.6 billion, up 9.6% on the previous year.
Executing its capex programme, Biedronka opened 186 stores (161 net additions), of which around 50% with a small-format, and refurbished 280 locations, investing €418 million in the year. EBITDA fell 1.3% (-6.3% in local currency), impacted by price investments and by the decision to significantly increase the wages of the operational teams. As anticipated, these actions, together with the operational deleveraging caused by basket deflation, pressured the EBITDA margin, which stood at 7.7% (8.5% in 2023).
Capital Allocation and Investment
Relativamente ao programa de investimento de 1,1 mil milhões de euros, a administração esclareceu que mais de 50% será destinado à Biedronka na Polónia. (The €1.1 billion investment program allocates more than 50% to Biedronka in Poland.)
The company targets 300 store openings in 2025: 130-150 stores in Poland, 30 Hebe stores in Portugal, and over 150 Ara stores (plus integrating around 70 former Colsubsidio stores) in Colombia. Ara in Colombia will receive about 14% of investment, while the remaining investment will be split between other ventures like Recheio, Hebe in Slovakia, and agribusiness.
Sustainability and ESG
The annual assessment carried out by CDP awarded Jerónimo Martins the top score (A) in Climate Change and the leadership level (A-) both in Water Security and in managing the commodities most associated with deforestation risk (Forests): palm oil, paper and timber, cattle and soy. In addition to the actions developed throughout 2024, the distinction recognises transparent reporting.
In 2024, Jerónimo Martins reduced its Scopes 1 and 2 carbon emissions by 15.8% compared to the previous year. During the same period, the Group's global revenue increased by 9.3%. The company ended 2024 with photovoltaic panels installed in approximately 2,000 stores and distribution centres, and reduced specific energy consumption (MWh/million euros) by 9.3%.
By the end of 2024, around 25% of the company's financial debt was already converted to sustainable finance instruments, and Jerónimo Martins was included in over 140 international sustainability indices.
In 2024, and for the first time, the Group was included in the FTSE Diversity & Inclusion Index – Top 100, a benchmark index that identifies the top 100 publicly traded companies with the best performance in promoting inclusive workplaces. The Jerónimo Martins Group is the only Portuguese company to be included in this index.
The Foundation: Social Investment
With the purpose of caring for the Group's employees and their families, as well as the communities in which it operates, the Jerónimo Martins Foundation was created on March 19, 2024. This project represents another significant step in the commitment to ensuring support for employees and communities in moments of their greatest need, mitigating their vulnerabilities. Its activities will primarily focus on three areas: social emergency, health, and education. As part of a profit-sharing logic with stakeholders, beyond shareholders, the General Assembly agreed to establish this Foundation, which will receive an annual allocation of up to €40 million. In September 2024, the Jerónimo Martins Foundation was officially recognized by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
Part X: Bull and Bear Cases
The Bull Case
1. Poland's Continued Growth Poland's GDP per capita remains well below Western European levels, suggesting continued convergence and consumption growth over the long term. As Polish incomes rise, Biedronka's value proposition should remain compelling while allowing gradual mix improvement.
2. Colombia as the Next Poland Ara grew from €21 million in sales in 2013 to €1.8 billion by 2022—and continues accelerating. If Ara can replicate Biedronka's path from scrappy entrant to market leader, the valuation implications are substantial. Colombia's population (52 million) and underpenetrated modern retail sector offer decades of runway.
3. Slovakia and Beyond The Slovakia launch tests whether the Biedronka formula can be exported beyond Poland. Success would open potential expansion into other Central European markets (Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic) with similar consumer profiles.
4. Family Control as a Feature 56.136% of the Group is owned by Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos, B.V., with Sociedade Francisco Manuel dos Santos, S.E. being the ultimate parent company of the Group. Family control allows long-term thinking and willingness to sacrifice near-term margins for market share gains—a structural advantage in the competitive grocery industry.
5. Defensive Characteristics Food retail is among the most recession-resistant businesses. The discount format is particularly resilient—consumers trade down during economic stress, benefiting Biedronka and Ara.
The Bear Case
1. Margin Pressure is Structural "Our business is only relevant as long as it grows. We're not a business with very high margins. Just do the math: our profit margin is no more than 2%." In a 2% margin business, small competitive or cost pressures can have outsized profit impacts.
2. Lidl and Aldi Won't Stop The Schwarz Group (Lidl, Kaufland) and Aldi have deeper pockets and similar operational excellence. The price war in Poland could intensify, particularly if competitors become desperate for volume.
3. Currency Risk With ~70% of earnings from Poland, Jerónimo Martins is heavily exposed to PLN/EUR movements. A strengthening euro against the zloty directly compresses reported profits.
4. Labor Cost Inflation Biedronka's EBITDA fell 1.3% (-6.3% in local currency), impacted by the decision to significantly increase the wages of the operational teams. As Poland's labor market tightens and minimum wages rise, maintaining price leadership while paying competitive wages becomes increasingly challenging.
5. Colombia Execution Risk Ara is currently the third-largest retailer in Colombia, after Éxito and D1. D1, owned by Koba and backed by Santo Domingo family capital, is a formidable local competitor with deep market knowledge. The Colombian expansion requires sustained capital investment with uncertain returns.
6. Succession and Governance Currently, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Pedro Soares dos Santos, is also the CEO. Concentration of leadership in one individual, even a capable one, creates key-person risk. The eventual fourth-generation transition—whenever it occurs—will test whether the family culture can be sustained.
Part XI: Key Metrics for Investors
The KPIs That Matter
For long-term investors tracking Jerónimo Martins, three metrics deserve particular attention:
1. Like-for-Like (LFL) Sales Growth in Biedronka Poland This is the single most important indicator of competitive health in the company's core profit engine. LFL strips out new store openings to reveal whether existing stores are growing. In 2024, Biedronka's LFL was -0.3%—a warning sign that reflected Poland's weak consumption environment and intensified competition. Positive LFL demonstrates pricing power and customer loyalty; negative LFL suggests market share loss or deflation pressure.
2. Biedronka EBITDA Margin The EBITDA margin stood at 7.7% in 2024 (8.5% in 2023). This margin, while low by many standards, is healthy for discount retail and provides operating leverage as sales scale. Sustained margin compression would indicate either competitive pressure or cost inflation that the company cannot offset through volume.
3. Ara Sales Growth (Local Currency) Ara's sales in local currency grew 42.7% in 2023, including an LFL of 10.9%. In euros, sales amounted to €2.4 billion, up 37.7% year-on-year. As the high-growth bet in the portfolio, Ara's trajectory reveals whether the Colombia investment thesis is working. Slowing growth or persistent losses would signal execution challenges.
Conclusion: The Grocer's Mentality
There's a telling anecdote about Francisco Manuel dos Santos, the man who rescued Jerónimo Martins in 1921. When he applied for a loan to acquire the struggling Lisbon grocery, the bank asked what collateral he could offer. His answer: "my work and my honesty."
A century later, that grocer's mentality—pragmatic, patient, obsessive about value—still defines the company his descendants control. Pedro Soares dos Santos personally tastes private label products. The company maintained everyday low pricing through inflationary spikes that competitors used to expand margins. The family structure allows decades-long investment horizons that quarterly-focused public companies cannot match.
"Even in the face of enormous global challenges, we managed to make true progress on our overarching goal of creating meaningful and shared value for all our stakeholders," Pedro Soares dos Santos wrote in the 2024 annual report.
The Jerónimo Martins story isn't one of revolutionary innovation or market disruption. It's the story of patient capital, disciplined execution, and deep market understanding—applied consistently across 230 years and four generations. From a small shop in Lisbon's Chiado to the largest supermarket chain in Poland, the journey reveals what's possible when a family business refuses to chase the trends and instead focuses relentlessly on feeding people well at prices they can afford.
In an era obsessed with technology unicorns and exponential growth curves, Jerónimo Martins offers a different model: the compound returns available to those who get the basics right, year after year, decade after decade. For investors seeking European retail exposure with emerging market growth optionality and family-business governance, this unlikely Portuguese champion deserves serious consideration.
The ladybug flies on.
Risk Factors and Regulatory Considerations: - Currency exposure to PLN and COP - Retail sector labor regulations in Poland - Food safety and product liability across multiple jurisdictions - Competition law considerations regarding market position in Poland - Evolving ESG reporting requirements under EU regulations
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