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Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield: The Rise, Fall, and Reinvention of the World's Premier Mall Empire
I. Introduction: A $25 Billion Bet That Changed Everything
In the glass-walled boardroom of Unibail-Rodamco's Paris headquarters, overlooking the manicured gardens of the 16th arrondissement, CEO Christophe Cuvillier faced the cameras in December 2017 with the confidence of a man making history. He had just orchestrated what he believed would be the crowning achievement of his career: the acquisition of Westfield Corporation for $24.8 billion, creating what would become the world's largest listed retail real estate company.
What Cuvillier could not know—what no one could truly foresee—was that he was signing the paperwork for what many analysts would later call one of the worst-timed acquisitions in corporate history.
Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield SE is a multinational commercial real estate company headquartered in Paris, France, and is the owner and operator of Westfield shopping centres in the European Union, United Kingdom and the United States. As of 2024, Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield is the largest commercial real estate company in Europe, and is a component of the Euro Stoxx 50 stock market index.
Today's URW operates at a dramatically different scale than the colossus Cuvillier envisioned. The Group operates 67 shopping centres in 11 countries, including 39 which carry the iconic Westfield brand. These centres attract over 900 million visits annually and provide a unique platform for retailers and brands to connect with consumers. Its €50 Bn portfolio is 87% in retail, 6% in offices, 5% in convention and exhibition venues, and 2% in services.
The central question of URW's story is how the biggest bet in retail real estate history—backed by rigorous financial analysis, top-tier investment banking advice, and decades of operational expertise—turned into a cautionary tale of timing, hubris, and digital disruption. It is also a story of remarkable resilience: of activist shareholder battles, pandemic survival, and a company that has fundamentally reinvented itself.
This narrative weaves together the threads of immigrant entrepreneurship, from a Holocaust survivor who built Australia's greatest retail empire to French and Dutch property moguls who conquered Continental Europe. It examines the economics of premium real estate, the existential threat of e-commerce, the mechanics of mega-M&A at the worst possible moment, and the boardroom revolution that ultimately saved the company.
The key characters in this drama deserve introduction: Frank Lowy, the Czechoslovakian-born Holocaust survivor who arrived in Sydney with nothing and built Westfield into a global retail icon. Xavier Niel, the French telecommunications billionaire who led a shareholder revolt at the darkest hour. LĂ©on Bressler, the former Unibail CEO who became his company's adversary. Christophe Cuvillier, the executive who made "the bet" and paid the price. And Jean-Marie Tritant, the quiet company man who inherited the wreckage and is still piecing it back together today.
II. Origins Part 1: Westfield—The Frank Lowy Story (1930–1987)
The Holocaust Survivor Who Built a Retail Empire
Frank Lowy was born in the industrial town of Fil'akovo, Slovakia, on Oct. 22, 1930, one of a traveling salesman's four children. The world he entered would soon descend into the darkest chapter of human history, and young Frank would witness it firsthand. Lowy's father died at Auschwitz, and he spent World War II living in Budapest until Germany's defeat in 1945.
Czechoslovakian-born Lowy spent World War II in Nazi-occupied Budapest, leaving Europe in 1946 for Israel. In Australia from 1952, he joined family members in a smallgoods business. The journey from war-torn Europe to the shores of Australia was not direct. A Jew from Czechoslovakia, Lowy migrated to Australia from Hungary via Israel, having fought in the Arab-Israeli war.
In 2013, to honour the memory of his father, who was beaten to death by Nazis, he funded the restoration of a railway wagon used to transport Jews to Auschwitz and presided over its installation at the former camp. This act—decades after his success—speaks to the weight Lowy carried throughout his extraordinary business career.
The seeds of the Westfield empire were planted in the most unlikely circumstances. In 1952, Lowy left Israel and joined his family, who had left Europe for Australia and started a business delivering small goods. In 1953, he met fellow immigrant John Saunders. The pair became business partners.
The partners became property developers when they borrowed from a local bank manager and used profits from the deli and a coffee shop they owned to buy farmland. They created Westfield Investments, taking the name from its location in Sydney and the field they were subdividing.
The Westfield brand was founded in Sydney's western suburbs in 1959 by Sir Frank Lowy AC and John Saunders AO in what has become one of the most iconic success stories of Australian immigration and entrepreneurialism.
The pair eventually created Westfield Development Corporation through the development of a shopping centre at Blacktown in Sydney's western suburbs. Over the next 30 years, Lowy and Saunders developed shopping centres across Australia and the United States (from 1977); and listed the company on the Australian Stock Exchange in 1960 as Westfield Development Corporation.
The Blacktown shopping centre that opened in July 1959 was modest by later Westfield standards—just 12 shops, two department stores, and a supermarket—but it marked the start of Australia's modern shopping centre era. Lowy and Saunders had identified a fundamental shift: Australians, like Americans, were moving to suburbs and needed places to shop that matched their new lifestyle.
The billionaire developed retail real estate throughout Australia and expanded to the U.S. in 1977 when he paid $21 million for a Trumbull, Connecticut shopping mall. This first American acquisition would prove prescient, establishing a beachhead that would eventually grow into a dominant position in some of America's wealthiest markets.
Lowy made a rare departure from the retail property sector in 1981 when he paid Rupert Murdoch A$842 million for Australia's smallest national TV network and some other media assets. When he sold out three years later, investors lost A$450 million and Lowy was down A$100 million. This media misadventure reinforced a crucial lesson: stick to what you know. Lowy never deviated from retail real estate again.
Saunders sold his interests and left the company in 1987. The departure marked the end of the founding partnership and the beginning of the Lowy family's complete control over Westfield's destiny—a control that would last for three more decades.
The Lowy Playbook
What distinguished Lowy from other shopping centre developers was his relentless focus on premium locations and constant reinvestment. While competitors settled for adequate properties, Lowy demanded the best sites in the best markets. He understood that in retail real estate, location was everything—and that the best locations could command premium rents year after year.
His approach to tenant management was equally aggressive. Lowy believed landlords should be active partners in their tenants' success, monitoring sales performance and constantly curating the tenant mix. Underperforming retailers were replaced; successful concepts were encouraged to expand. This philosophy made Westfield centres among the most productive retail assets in the world.
III. Origins Part 2: Unibail & Rodamco—The European Foundation (1968–2006)
The French and Dutch Real Estate Giants
While Frank Lowy was building his retail empire in Australia, a parallel story was unfolding in Europe. Unibail was founded in 1968 as a finance-leasing unit by a company called Worms & Cie. In 1991, Unibail started focusing on the property investment sector, and phased out involvement in lease financing. It built a property portfolio of close to 30 shopping centres across France – including the Forum des Halles and the arcade within CNIT – and substantial office properties in Paris and La Défense – including the Tour Ariane and the Paris Expo group of convention centres.
The transformation of Unibail from a finance-leasing operation into a property powerhouse illustrates a common theme in European real estate: the gradual consolidation of fragmented assets into professionally managed portfolios. The Forum des Halles, sitting at the heart of Paris above one of Europe's busiest transit hubs, would become emblematic of Unibail's strategy—flagship assets in irreplaceable locations.
Rodamco Europe formed in 1999 when Rodamco, a property investment fund set up by the Dutch asset management group Robeco in 1979, broke up into various independent listed companies covering different parts of the world.
The Dutch approach differed subtly from the French model. Rodamco Europe emphasized diversification across European markets, collecting shopping centres and retail spaces across 14 countries while maintaining some office exposure in France and the Netherlands. Where Unibail concentrated on Parisian flagships, Rodamco spread its bets across the continent's major cities.
The Logic of European Consolidation
By the mid-2000s, the strategic logic of combining these two European champions had become irresistible. Both companies focused on premium retail real estate. Both understood that scale brought negotiating power with tenants and access to cheaper capital. Both recognized that the fragmented European market offered consolidation opportunities unavailable in more mature markets like the United States.
On April 10, 2007, Rodamco Europe announced an agreement to conduct a merger of equals with Unibail to create the largest publicly traded property company in Europe. The merger was confirmed on June 21, 2007, after Unibail announced the acquisition of 80% of Rodamco's shares, making its offer for the remainder unconditional. The merged entity took effect as a société anonyme under the new name Unibail-Rodamco on June 25, 2007.
The timing proved fortuitous. The merger closed just as credit markets began their descent into chaos, and the combined entity's stronger balance sheet helped it weather the global financial crisis better than many competitors.
The Unibail-Rodamco strategy that emerged focused on premium flagship shopping destinations and mixed-use development. Rather than owning scores of average properties, the company would concentrate on a smaller number of dominant assets that attracted the best tenants and commanded the highest rents. This concentration strategy would define the company's approach for the next decade—and inform the logic behind its later American adventure.
IV. Westfield Goes Global (1990s–2017)
From Australia to World Domination
With John Saunders departed and his family firmly in control, Frank Lowy embarked on an aggressive international expansion that would transform Westfield from an Australian success story into a global retail real estate empire.
For the first 50 years of its lifetime, Westfield grew rapidly in Australia and then internationally, pioneering the world-class and contemporary retail shopping experience for which our destinations are renown.
In the 1990s Lowy took the company to New Zealand, then the United Kingdom in the 2000s. The UK expansion proved particularly transformative.
Westfield London opened on 30 October 2008 and became the largest covered shopping development in the capital; originally a retail floor area of 1,600,000 sq ft (150,000 m2). Westfield London is a large shopping centre in White City, West London, England, developed by the Westfield Group at a cost of ÂŁ1.6bn, on a brownfield site formerly the home of the 1908 Franco-British Exhibition.
The centre was opened to the public on 30 October 2008 by Frank Lowy, CEO of Westfield Group, in an event also attended by Mayor Boris Johnson. Amid great hype, two million shoppers visited the centre in its first three weeks, despite the 2008 financial crisis in the UK. However the 2008 financial crisis did cause a swift fall in shoppers and some shops forcing to close in 2009.
The London opening illustrated both Lowy's ambition and his risk tolerance. Opening a ÂŁ1.6 billion shopping centre at the height of the global financial crisis seemed reckless to many observers. While some commentators suspected Westfield London to fail during the economic gloom, the centre reported increased sales in 2010 following an unexpectedly large number of tourist shoppers.
The success vindicated Lowy's conviction that truly premium assets could withstand economic turbulence. This lesson—that quality locations with quality tenants could survive almost anything—would later inform the strategic rationale behind the Unibail-Rodamco acquisition.
In America, Westfield's growth trajectory was equally impressive. The expansion into the United States began with the purchase of the Trumbull Shopping Park in Connecticut in 1977, and was followed by three centres in California, Michigan, and Connecticut in 1980 and three centres in California, New Jersey, and Long Island, New York, in 1986. In 1994, Westfield collaborated with General Growth and Whitehall Real Estate to purchase 19 centres for US$1 billion. By 2005, the company owned centres in 15 US states.
The 2014 Demerger: Splitting the Empire
In 2014 Westfield split its operations into Australian and New Zealand businesses (the SCentre group of more than 40 shopping malls), and US, British and European businesses (the Westfield Corporation, also with some 40 shopping centres).
In 2014, the Westfield Group was restructured in the pursuit of growth and value for investors. The Australian and New Zealand businesses became Scentre Group, and we retained the right to use the Westfield brand for our destinations in Australia and New Zealand. The international business with an initial focus on the US, the UK and Europe became Westfield Corporation.
The split made strategic sense. Australian investors valued the stable, fully developed domestic portfolio differently from the growth-oriented international assets. By separating the businesses, each could pursue its optimal strategy with appropriate capital structures and investor bases.
For the Lowy family, the demerger also represented succession planning. After turning 80 in October 2010, Lowy officially stood down as executive chairman of the Westfield Group effective May 2011, taking on the role of non-executive chairman. Sons, Steven and Peter, became joint chief executives. In October 2015, Lowy stepped down as the chairman of the Scentre Group, a role that he had held for 55 years.
He co-founded global shopping centre company Westfield in 1960 and served as its Executive Chairman for 50 years and then as Non-Executive Chairman between 2011 and 2018 when the company was acquired by Unibail-Rodamco.
The empire Frank Lowy built was extraordinary by any measure. In 2010, the BRW magazine assessed Lowy's net worth at A$5.04 billion, making him Australia's richest person at that time. In 2016 his net worth was assessed as A$8.26 billion. As of May 2025, his net worth was assessed at A$10.28 billion in the 2025 Rich List published in the Australian Financial Review.
V. The Merger of Equals: Unibail-Rodamco (2007–2017)
Building Europe's Retail Real Estate Champion
The decade following the Unibail-Rodamco merger saw the combined company emerge as Europe's dominant retail landlord. The strategy was clear: concentrate on flagship assets, constantly reinvest, and maintain the financial discipline to weather economic storms.
On June 1, 2011, Unibail-Rodamco hired former Fnac CEO Christophe Cuvillier as the new COO. In collaboration with CEO and chairman of the board Guillaume Poitrinal, he led the company to five years of growth in spite of tough economic conditions.
Cuvillier brought an unusual background to commercial real estate. Cullivier began his business career as a sales trainee at the luxury cosmetics brand LancĂ´me, part of L'Oreal, in 1986. At LancĂ´me, he rose through the ranks to managing director of the company's United Kingdom branch in 1992, before moving to Sydney as director of L'Oreal's Australian Luxury Products division in 1993. In 1995, Cuvillier returned to LancĂ´me as the managing director of its operations in France.
After eighteen years at Unibail-Rodamco, including eight years as CEO, Guillaume POITRINAL indicated he had suggested that the Supervisory Board appoint Christophe CUVILLIER, the company's current Chief Operating Officer, to succeed him as CEO and Chairman of the Management Board. "The time is right to hand over the reins" remarked Guillaume POITRINAL. "I recruited Christophe CUVILLIER two years ago with the idea that someday he would succeed me. His outstanding performance as COO gave me the time to pave the way for his appointment."
Mr Cuvillier became member of the Management Board and Chief Operating Officer of Unibail-Rodamco on June 1, 2011. He held this position until April 25, 2013 when he became Chairman of the Management Board and CEO.
The Cuvillier era at Unibail-Rodamco was marked by continued expansion and ambitious development projects. The company's strategy emphasized what executives called "concentration, differentiation, and innovation"—focusing resources on flagship assets that could deliver experiences impossible to replicate online.
By 2017, Unibail-Rodamco had established itself as the undisputed leader in European retail real estate. But Cuvillier wanted more. Looking across the Atlantic at Westfield Corporation's portfolio of premium US and UK assets, he saw an opportunity to create something unprecedented: a truly global platform of flagship shopping destinations.
VI. The $25 Billion Gamble: The Westfield Acquisition (2017–2018)
The Deal That Changed Everything
In December 2017, the Westfield Board announced that it was recommending a takeover of the company by Unibail-Rodamco, one of the largest real estate companies in Europe headquartered in Paris, for a reported $24.8 billion USD. The takeover was completed, and the parent company was renamed Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield, in June 2018.
Unibail-Rodamco SE and Westfield Corporation announced that Unibail-Rodamco had entered into an agreement to acquire Westfield to create the world's premier developer and operator of flagship shopping destinations. The proposed transaction has been unanimously recommended by Westfield's Board of Directors and Unibail-Rodamco's Supervisory Board. Under the terms of the agreement, Westfield securityholders received a combination of cash and shares in Unibail-Rodamco, valuing each Westfield security at a price of US$7.55, representing a premium of 17.8% to Westfield's closing security price on December 11, 2017.
"This deal is a natural extension of Unibail-Rodamco's strategy of concentration, differentiation and innovation," said Christophe Cuvillier, chairman of the management board and chief executive of Unibail-Rodamco.
"This transaction is the culmination of the strategic journey Westfield has been on since its 2014 restructure," said Sir Frank Lowy, chairman of the Westfield board of directors. "We see this transaction as highly compelling for Westfield's securityholders and Unibail-Rodamco's shareholders alike."
Unibail-Rodamco announced that it had completed the acquisition of Westfield, to create Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield, the premier global developer and operator of flagship shopping destinations. Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield combines two of the strongest and most respected names in the real estate industry. With a portfolio valued at €62 Bn, of which 88% in retail, 7% in offices and 6% in convention & exhibition venues, Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield owns and operates 102 shopping centres in 13 countries, of which 56 are flagships in the most dynamic cities in Europe and in the United States. Its centres welcome 1.2 billion visits per year.
The Strategic Rationale—And Its Critics
The deal logic was compelling on paper. Unibail-Rodamco identified a total of €100 million of expected run-rate synergies, reflecting a unique opportunity to create value for both sets of securityholders. Approximately €40 million of synergies were anticipated to be driven by incremental rental income expected from implementation of leasing efforts, leveraging the Westfield brand and specialty leasing expertise across Unibail-Rodamco's platform. An additional €60 million was expected to come from corporate overheads.
Once the deal was complete, both parties would benefit from: the creation of a global property leader with $72.2bn of gross market value strategically positioned in 27 of the world's most attractive retail markets and cities; strong organic long-term growth prospects through the world's largest development pipeline focused on flagship assets in key markets; an attractive dividend distribution policy; and the progressive roll-out of the world famous Westfield brand in flagship shopping destinations.
But the deal left URW with a mountain of debt. It has around 24 billion euros in debt. This leverage ratio, manageable in a favorable economic environment, would prove catastrophic when conditions turned.
The Lowy family held a 9.5% stake in Westfield prior to the merger. Lowy is credited with more than $500 million in cash proceeds and about 3% of Unibail's stock. His stake isn't reported in the 2019 annual report and it's assumed that he sold the shares in 2019.
The Lowy family exit, completed within a year of the merger, would later be seen as extraordinarily well-timed. The founders had sold at the top.
VII. The E-Commerce Disruption & "The Retail Apocalypse"
The Structural Shift Threatening the Business Model
Even as Cuvillier was negotiating the Westfield acquisition, powerful forces were reshaping the retail landscape. A 2017 Business Insider report dubbed this phenomenon the "Amazon effect" and calculated that Amazon.com was generating more than half of retail-sales growth.
The disruptive effect of e-commerce on the global retail industry has been referred to as the Amazon Effect: the term refers to Amazon.com's dominant role in the e-commerce market place and its leading role in driving the disruptive impact on the retail market and its supply chain. The effect has been heavily researched by numerous studies.
The main factor cited in the closing of retail stores in the retail apocalypse is the shift in consumer habits towards online shopping. Holiday sales for e-commerce increased by an estimated 11% to 20% from 2015 to 2016. The same year, brick-and-mortar stores saw an overall increase of only 1.6%, with physical department stores experiencing a 4.8% decline.
Another factor is an over-supply of malls as the growth rate of malls in North America between 1970 and 2015 was over twice the growth rate of the population. In 2004, Malcolm Gladwell wrote that investment in malls was artificially accelerated when the United States Congress introduced accelerated depreciation into the tax code in 1954. Despite the construction of new malls, mall visits declined by 50% between 2010 and 2013 with further declines reported in each successive year.
The "A-Mall vs. B-Mall" Thesis
URW's defense against the retail apocalypse rested on a simple but powerful argument: not all malls are created equal. The company focused exclusively on what the industry calls "A-malls"—the premier shopping destinations in wealthy metropolitan areas that attract the best tenants and command the highest rents.
The Atlantic described the phenomenon as "The Great Retail Apocalypse of 2017", reporting nine retail bankruptcies and several apparel companies having their stock hit new lows. Credit Suisse predicted that 25% of U.S. malls remaining in 2017 could close by 2022.
The theory was that while lower-quality malls would die, premium destinations like those in URW's portfolio would thrive. Shoppers might browse online, but they would still crave the experience of visiting a world-class retail destination. The challenge was proving this thesis while carrying €24 billion in debt.
Not everyone agrees that a "retail apocalypse" exists. Dissenting economists and experts asserted that recent retail closures are a market correction, suggesting that the phrase is misleading. Research published by global retail analyst IHL Group in 2019 suggests that the so-called retail apocalypse narrative was an exaggeration.
VIII. COVID-19: The Perfect Storm (2020)
When the World's Malls Went Dark
If e-commerce represented a structural threat, the COVID-19 pandemic delivered an existential crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a sharp economic toll on the retail industry worldwide as many retailers and shopping centers were forced to shut down for months due to mandated stay-at-home orders. As a result of these closures, online retailers received a major boost in sales as customers looked for alternative ways to shop and the effects of the retail apocalypse were exacerbated.
Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield and Taubman Centers temporarily closed their malls, including Westfield Garden State Plaza in Paramus, New Jersey, and Beverly Center in Los Angeles.
The biggest U.S. mall owner, Simon Property Group, turned its lights out on March 18. Taubman Centers, Washington Prime Group, Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield and others quickly followed. Simon Property CEO David Simon said it lost roughly 10,500 shopping days, across all its properties on a combined basis, during its fiscal second quarter because of the crisis.
U.S. retailers could announce between 20,000 and 25,000 closures in 2020, according to Coresight Research, with 55% to 60% of those situated in America's malls. That would mark a record — which was previously the more than 9,300 locations in 2019.
A number of notable retailers filed for bankruptcy including Ascena Retail Group, Debenhams, Arcadia Group, Brooks Brothers, GNC, J. C. Penney, Lord & Taylor and Neiman Marcus. Major retailers that closed since the pandemic began include Century 21, Lord & Taylor, and Fry's Electronics.
The RESET Plan and Management's Response
Facing the most severe crisis in commercial real estate history, URW's management launched what they called the "RESET" plan—a €9 billion turnaround effort that included a €3.5 billion rights issue. The goal was to reduce leverage and provide financial flexibility to weather the storm.
The rights issue proved deeply controversial. Critics argued that it represented a massive dilution of existing shareholders at precisely the wrong moment. The company's share price had already collapsed; raising new equity would lock in those losses permanently.
Into this breach stepped an unlikely duo: Xavier Niel, the French telecoms billionaire, and LĂ©on Bressler, Unibail's own former CEO.
IX. The Activist Battle: Niel, Bressler & the Boardroom Revolution (2020)
When Shareholders Revolt
After a heated battle, French billionaire Xavier Niel and real estate investor Léon Bressler won the support of shareholders, who voted to stop a €3.5bn rights issue by property company Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield at its combined general meeting.
"URW's RESET plan, underpinned by a severely dilutive rights issue, is a misguided act by a management team that remains prisoner of its failed strategy that started with the acquisition of Westfield," commented LĂ©on Bressler. "This acquisition polluted URW's dominant position in Europe with a more marginal position in the US, a less attractive market. Moreover, it burdened the company with debt, distracted management and was a gross misallocation of resources."
"The high level of debt generated by the Westfield transaction must be addressed, but does not present a near-term liquidity issue. While we support the other debt reduction initiatives in the plan, the situation does not warrant a capital raise with devastating consequences for shareholders. It is time to re-establish URW as Europe's leading pure-play prime shopping centre business by selling the US portfolio and using proceeds to solve the company's debt issues."
Aermont Capital head LĂ©on Bressler was in a unique position to critique the actions of URW's leadership, given that he himself was CEO of then-Unibail for fourteen years between 1992 and 2006. Bressler oversaw one of the most prolific periods in the company's history, turning it into a global real estate leader and setting it up to join France's CAC40 in the year after his departure.
The consortium, led by Niel and Bressler, received approval for three seats on the supervisory board. Niel and Bressler took their board seats as representatives of NJJ Holding and Aermont Capital, respectively; and the third seat went to Catalan businesswoman Susana Gallardo.
Former Chief Executive Officer Leon Bressler and telecoms billionaire Xavier Niel wanted to stop the mall operator's 3.5 billion-euro capital increase, take two board seats and add another independent director. They got it all, plus the chairman role for Bressler, the agreed departure of the current CEO and the immediate exit of four non-executives.
The Leadership Change
In November 2020, Colin Dyer resigned as supervisory-board chairman after a shareholder meeting rejected the board's proposal to raise 3.5 billion euros. Dyer remained on the board but was replaced as chairman by former Unibail CEO Leon Bressler, one of a consortium of shareholders and investors who had opposed the capital increase and other proposed strategies. In January 2021, Jean-Marie Tritant was appointed chairman of the management board and chief executive officer of the group.
The November 2020 shareholder meeting represented a remarkable moment in European corporate governance. A consortium holding just 5% of shares had defeated management on a critical strategic question, toppled the CEO, and installed their own leadership.
Jean-Marie Tritant joined Unibail in 1997 in the Offices Division, initially as Project Manager, then as Asset Manager and Head of Asset Management. He later became General Manager of the Offices Division and then Managing Director Retail France in 2007. In 2012, he was appointed Managing Director Retail and Offices France. He became Chief Operating Officer in April 2013. Since June 2018, he was President U.S. of Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield.
Tritant represented continuity and change simultaneously. A 23-year company veteran, he understood URW's operations intimately. But his mandate was unmistakable: execute the Niel-Bressler vision by selling US assets and refocusing on Europe.
X. The Deleveraging Journey (2021–Present)
Selling America to Save Europe
The strategic pivot following the activist victory was dramatic. URW committed to what it called a "radical reduction" of its US exposure, launching an aggressive asset disposal program designed to reduce debt and return the company to its European roots.
It's a far cry from the picture painted in late 2020 when URW staved off a shareholder coup in part by pledging an asset disposal program to reduce leverage and shed unwanted malls. Front and center were the 24 mall assets in its U.S. portfolio, which it bought for $16B through the acquisition of the U.S. assets of Westfield. URW declared that it wanted to exit North America by the end of 2023.
The disposal process proved more complex than anticipated. "When they announced they were exiting the U.S., their intention was to do just that, but the business changed over the last few years," one analyst observed. "The market for malls became a lot less attractive because of rising interest rates, and strategically, they have continued to invest in their flagships. They are doing very well. So my guess is that they've decided to hold their better assets."
Officially, the song remains the same. But with the date to close out its U.S. business already gone, URW remains a major player in the U.S. mall market, with 16 schemes across the country. Some assets have been sold as planned. But much of the remaining portfolio doesn't look like the costly burden it appeared to be in 2020 and 2021. The question now is whether it still makes sense to dispose of a collection of malls that, as the market recovers, appear to be on the up.
The Recovery Story
The financial results tell a story of remarkable turnaround. Tenant sales were up +4.5% and footfall up +2.6% vs. 2023. €465 Mn of Minimum Guaranteed Rent was signed, with +6.5% uplift on top of indexed passing rents. Shopping Centre vacancy reached 4.8%, 60 bps improvement vs. 2023, reaching its lowest level since 2017.
€0.6 Bn of assets were acquired at attractive terms, including the remaining 50% stake in both Westfield Montgomery and CH Ursynów shopping centres. CEO Jean-Marie Tritant said: "In 2024, we delivered strong operating performance across all activities. Our Flagship shopping centres demonstrated their strength, with higher tenant sales and footfall in all regions, while our proactive leasing strategy delivered the highest occupancy level since 2017. Our Convention & Exhibition business delivered record results supported by the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games. We achieved €1.6 Bn of disposals at book value, leading to a 100 basis point improvement in our loan to value ratio, which is now at its lowest level since 2019."
The Westfield owner has reduced its financial debt to €19.5 billion, and generated €1.6 billion through asset disposals since January 2024. In a conference call, URW CEO Jean-Marie Tritant hailed the group's "excellent financial results" in 2024, with rents up 5.8% in shopping malls, 14.4% in office properties, and 21.3% in convention and exhibition facilities. In shopping malls, the vacancy rate fell to 4.8%, its lowest level since 2017.
New Growth Vectors: Westfield Rise
Perhaps the most innovative element of URW's recovery strategy has been the development of Westfield Rise, the company's in-house retail media business.
Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield announced the launch of Westfield Rise, an in-house media, brand experience and data partnerships agency.
The agency serves as a one-stop-shop for brands and media-buyers to create innovative and measurable campaigns across URW's platform of best-in-class retail media assets at its 57 shopping malls in Europe – including its network of 1,700 digital billboards, one of the largest on the continent, 170 brand experience locations, and its range of online advertising capabilities.
In 2022, URW created Westfield Rise to capture the growing opportunity in retail media across its digital screens, experiential activities and brand partnerships. Flagship destinations represent a highly effective media channel given the massive footfall, audience's strong purchasing mindset and greater efficacy versus online advertising.
The Group is targeting Westfield Rise net revenue of €180 Mn by 2028, up from €115 Mn in 2024.
Westfield Rise achieved the €75 Mn net margin target we set when this business was launched in 2022.
The retail media business represents URW's attempt to monetize what it has always possessed: massive, affluent audiences in premium locations. By selling advertising, brand experiences, and data partnerships, URW can generate revenues beyond traditional rent—a potentially transformative diversification for a company that spent years fighting the narrative that physical retail is dying.
H1 2025 and the Path Forward
Jean-Marie Tritant, CEO, remarked, "Our H1 results demonstrate our strong start to the year." He expressed confidence in capturing further reversionary potential, while CFO Fabrice noted, "This is the first positive revaluation of the whole portfolio since 2018," indicating a favorable market position.
Vacancy stands at 4.9% at group level. This is down from 5.5% last year and 6.3% the year before, showing the positive reduction trend in vacancy since COVID. It is in line with the level achieved at year-end 2024 of 4.8%, which was the lowest level since the Westfield acquisition.
In H1, we made significant progress in our disposal program, with €1.6 billion of disposals completed or secured, leading to a further net debt reduction. This disposal progress is in line with our Platform for Growth Business Plan presented in May, with another €0.9 billion of disposals under active discussions.
At a meeting held on October 23, 2025, the Supervisory Board of Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield SE made the decision to accelerate the implementation of the Group's succession plan with the appointment of Vincent Rouget as Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Management Board, effective January 1, 2026. The decision reflects the full recovery of the business, its strong operational performance and the visibility provided by the 'A Platform for Growth' 2025-28 business plan.
He has a successful track record as CEO, appointed at a very critical moment, in reshaping the Group and returning it to growth while navigating an extremely challenging external environment.
XI. Investment Analysis: Bull and Bear Cases
The Bull Case
The optimistic thesis for URW rests on several pillars:
Irreplaceable Asset Quality: URW's flagship destinations occupy positions that cannot be replicated. Forum des Halles sits atop Paris's busiest transit hub. Westfield London anchors a regenerating West London. Westfield Century City captures Los Angeles's wealthiest shoppers. These locations have demonstrated their resilience through the worst retail downturn in history.
Operational Turnaround Complete: Vacancy rates have returned to pre-pandemic levels. Tenant sales exceed 2019. Rents are rising. The operational metrics all point in the right direction.
Deleveraging Progress: From €24 billion in debt at the merger's peak, URW has reduced leverage significantly through asset sales and operational cash flow. The company has reduced its financial debt to €19.5 billion.
New Revenue Streams: Westfield Rise represents a genuine innovation in mall monetization. The retail media business offers a growth vector independent of traditional rental income.
Valuation Discount: The stock trades at a substantial discount to net asset value, reflecting skepticism that may prove unwarranted as the recovery continues.
The Bear Case
The pessimistic thesis remains formidable:
E-Commerce Structural Threat: While premium malls have proven resilient, the long-term trajectory of e-commerce continues upward. Each percentage point of retail share captured by online competitors represents lost foot traffic.
Interest Rate Sensitivity: Real estate is fundamentally a leveraged asset class. Higher interest rates compress valuations and increase financing costs. While rates have stabilized, any return to a higher-for-longer environment would pressure valuations.
US Exposure Complications: The inability to execute a complete US exit at acceptable prices leaves URW with significant dollar exposure and assets in a market where the competitive dynamics differ from Europe.
Tenant Quality Concerns: Department store anchors—long the backbone of mall traffic—continue to struggle. The loss of a major anchor can devastate surrounding tenants.
Porter's Five Forces Analysis
Threat of New Entrants (Low): Building flagship retail destinations requires massive capital, years of development time, and regulatory approvals that are increasingly difficult to obtain. Urban land constraints make replication of URW's asset quality nearly impossible.
Bargaining Power of Suppliers (Low): Construction costs and labor are commoditized. URW's scale provides negotiating leverage.
Bargaining Power of Buyers/Tenants (Medium): Retailers have alternatives, and e-commerce has reduced their dependence on physical stores. However, premium locations with high foot traffic remain essential for brand building and customer acquisition.
Threat of Substitutes (High): E-commerce is the existential substitute. Every purchase made online is a purchase not made in a URW mall. The company's response—focusing on experiences, dining, entertainment, and brand experiences—represents a strategic pivot toward categories less susceptible to online displacement.
Industry Rivalry (Medium): In Europe, URW faces competition from Klepierre, Mercialys, and local developers. In the US, Simon Property Group and Brookfield remain formidable. However, the A-mall segment where URW competes has fewer players than the broader mall market.
Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers Framework
Scale Economies: URW's size provides modest advantages in tenant negotiation and capital costs, though not a dominant moat.
Network Effects: Limited. More tenants don't necessarily attract more tenants in retail real estate.
Counter-Positioning: URW's focus on flagship destinations while disposing of marginal assets represents a form of counter-positioning. Competitors who own broader portfolios may struggle to replicate this concentration.
Switching Costs: Medium. Tenants face relocation costs and risk losing established customer relationships, but leases do expire.
Branding: The Westfield brand carries significant consumer recognition and associate's with premium shopping experiences. This brand equity represents genuine value.
Cornered Resource: URW's irreplaceable locations constitute a form of cornered resource. No competitor can build another Forum des Halles or Westfield London.
Process Power: URW's operational expertise in mall management, tenant curation, and development represents accumulated knowledge that competitors cannot easily replicate.
XII. Key Metrics and What to Watch
For investors tracking URW's ongoing performance, three metrics deserve particular attention:
1. Like-for-Like Net Rental Income Growth: This metric strips out the effects of acquisitions, disposals, and development completions to reveal the organic growth of the existing portfolio. Consistent growth above indexation demonstrates that management is capturing reversionary potential and improving tenant quality.
2. Vacancy Rate: At 4.8% as of year-end 2024, vacancy has returned to historical norms. Any sustained increase would signal weakening tenant demand; continued improvement would validate the recovery thesis.
3. Loan-to-Value Ratio: This leverage metric captures the relationship between debt and asset values. Continued improvement through asset sales and rising valuations would reduce financial risk and potentially trigger credit rating upgrades.
XIII. Conclusion: Lessons and Legacy
The URW story offers lessons for every major stakeholder in corporate life.
For boards and management teams, it demonstrates the dangers of transformational M&A at cycle peaks. The Westfield acquisition made strategic sense in isolation—premium assets, proven management, clear synergies—but its timing amplified every downside risk. The €24 billion in debt that seemed manageable in 2018 became an existential threat by 2020.
For investors, the saga validates the importance of balance sheet strength. URW's near-death experience was a direct consequence of leverage. The company survived not because its assets were bad—they were world-class—but because its capital structure left no margin for error.
For activists, the Niel-Bressler campaign represents a template for European shareholder engagement. By articulating a clear alternative strategy, assembling a credible coalition, and winning board seats, they achieved comprehensive strategic change without formal control.
For the retail industry, URW's survival challenges the simplistic "retail apocalypse" narrative. Premium malls with irreplaceable locations can thrive even as e-commerce grows. The key is quality: the best assets in the best locations with the best tenants.
The company that emerges from this crucible bears little resemblance to the 2018 vision of global retail real estate dominance. Today's URW is smaller, more focused, less leveraged, and more innovative. Whether this transformed entity can deliver sustainable value remains to be seen. But the remarkable fact is that it exists at all.
Frank Lowy, now 95 years old, sold at the top and preserved his family's fortune. The Holocaust survivor who built a shopping centre empire from nothing demonstrated, in his final act, the same survival instincts that had defined his remarkable life.
For URW, survival was merely the first chapter. The next—whether it leads to renewed growth or continued struggle—is still being written.
Regulatory and Accounting Considerations:
URW reports under IFRS, with proportionate consolidation of joint ventures representing a non-standard presentation that management believes better reflects the business. The company benefits from BBB+ ratings from Standard & Poor's. Key accounting judgments involve property valuations, which are inherently subjective and significantly impact reported metrics.
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