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Fielmann: The Robin Hood of Eyewear
I. Introduction & Episode Roadmap
In the mid-1970s, wearing eyeglasses in Germany carried an unmistakable social stigma. If you couldn't afford the eye-watering markups that opticians charged—sometimes 200 to 1,000 percent above manufacturing costs—you were relegated to one of six drab, utilitarian frames for adults or just two options for children. These "health service glasses" announced your economic status as clearly as a name tag. They were ugly by design, functional only in the most minimal sense, and every person forced to wear them knew exactly what message they conveyed to the world.
Into this cartel-like market walked a stubborn optician from a small coastal town in northern Germany, armed with a radical idea: that good vision shouldn't be a luxury good, and fashion eyewear shouldn't require a second mortgage.
With 6% of all optical stores, Fielmann has achieved a 24% sales market share and a 56% market share in terms of units sold. Fielmann is the market leader in Germany and Europe's largest optician.
The numbers tell a story of extraordinary market dominance achieved through an equally extraordinary strategy. The small store in Cuxhaven has become the largest optician's group in Central Europe with 27 million customers in 16 countries, 22,000 employees and around two billion euros of turnover. In Germany, one in every two pairs of glasses comes from the Hamburg-based company.
This is the story of how Günther Fielmann built the anti-Luxottica—democratizing eyewear while the rest of the industry consolidated into near-monopoly status. It's a tale of cartel-busting, healthcare arbitrage, generational succession, and a bold bet on the American market that remains very much in progress. And it begins, as all the best business origin stories do, with a reluctant apprentice who wanted to be something else entirely.
II. The German Optical Industry Pre-Fielmann: Setting the Stage
To understand what Fielmann disrupted, you must first understand what existed before him. In the early 1970s, the eyewear industry seemed outdated, almost sterile. Opticians wore white coats, and their shops resembled pharmacies. Hardly anyone wanted to linger here to find the right frames. There wasn't much choice anyway, because the eyewear market in Germany was strictly regulated. Health insurance companies only paid for a limited range, consisting of just six models for adults and two for children.
Picture walking into an optical shop in 1970s Germany. The frames weren't displayed on open racks where you could try them on. Back then, opticians wore white coats and their stores resembled pharmacies. Their glasses were stored in drawers and filing cabinets. This meant that the optician was in charge of narrowing down the customer's choice and decided which frames to show to them.
The pricing structure was even more problematic. Opticians operated according to what amounted to an industry-wide understanding about margins. They weren't competing on price—they were competing only on service and location, with pricing that bore almost no relationship to manufacturing costs. At the US company Bausch & Lomb, where Günther Fielmann worked, he learned about the production of eyeglass lenses and frames in detail. In the process, he came to a crucial realization: the prices that opticians charged for eyeglasses were out of proportion to the actual production costs.
The German statutory health insurance system—Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung—covered basic frames as a benefit, but only the most basic. This created a two-tier market: those who could pay substantial out-of-pocket costs for fashionable frames, and those who wore the evidence of their financial limitations quite literally on their faces every day.
For customers who could not afford any of the "premium spectacles", a small selection of timeless – yet ugly – standard-issue glasses were the only option.
The industry had effectively engineered a system where medical necessity met social stratification. Vision was a health issue, but how you corrected that vision became a status marker. For anyone who has ever felt self-conscious about wearing glasses, imagine knowing that your frames broadcast your income bracket to everyone you met.
This was the market Fielmann would disrupt—not through technology or patents, but through sheer operational efficiency, clever insurance arbitrage, and an unshakeable conviction that the existing order was fundamentally unjust.
III. GĂĽnther Fielmann: The Reluctant Revolutionary
GĂĽnther Klaus Fielmann was born 17 September 1939, the second child of Dr. Wilhelm and Marie-Louise Fielmann. His father was a school principal. Initially, Fielmann wanted to become a photographer, but his father insisted and told him to start an apprenticeship as optometrist, which he did in 1956.
There's something almost archetypal about the reluctant founder—the entrepreneur who didn't set out to build an empire but was pushed by circumstance into a trade they didn't initially choose. Fielmann originally wanted to become a photographer, and he would sell his early photographs to the local newspaper. However, his father, Dr Wilhelm Fielmann, a headmaster, was not fond of this career path. He wanted his son to have "a real job" and advised him to train as an optician, saying: "Opticians are always needed".
The apprenticeship was difficult. The young Fielmann reportedly struggled with the structured demands of working life and an exacting master. From 1956 to 1959, Guenther Fielmann learned his craft at the renowned firm Campbell, in Hamburg. He was ambitious. His journeyman's piece – a self-developed, artisan pair of glasses – was commended by the Hamburg Chamber of Crafts.
In 1963, he made the decision to enroll in a master artisan course at the Berlin Technical Optometry University. He then qualified as a state-approved optician in 1965.
Between completing his qualifications and opening his first store, Fielmann spent time working in lens production—experience that would prove crucial. His time at Bausch & Lomb gave him insight into the actual economics of eyewear manufacturing. He saw the raw materials, understood the production processes, and grasped the true cost structure of the industry.
What he discovered was a yawning gap between what it cost to make a pair of glasses and what consumers paid for them. This wasn't innovation protection or R&D recovery—it was pure margin, protected by industry convention and consumer ignorance.
He displayed his glasses openly so that customers could choose their own pairs. From the very beginning, Guenther Fielmann linked the sales prices of his glasses with the actual production costs.
The personal element matters here too. Because previously only 6 models were available in exchange for the insurance allowance, Fielmann thus removed the social stigma of having to wear glasses. This liberalisation, favourable media coverage ("Robin Hood of spectacle wearers") and aggressive marketing allowed his business to grow rapidly.
Günther Fielmann himself had to wear glasses from age 16. He understood the experience of being a glasses wearer—the self-consciousness, the expense, the limited choices. His solution wasn't born from market analysis or consultant recommendations. It came from personal frustration with a system that seemed designed to extract maximum profit while delivering minimum choice.
IV. The First Store & Industry Resistance (1972-1980)
In 1972, Guenther Fielmann opened his first optical store in Cuxhaven. The start of an incredible success story.
Cuxhaven, at the mouth of the Elbe River, population around 50,000—not exactly the location you'd choose for a retail revolution. But Fielmann wasn't trying to capture Berlin or Munich. He was testing a hypothesis: could an optician succeed by openly displaying frames, letting customers self-select, and pricing based on actual costs rather than industry convention?
Armed with this conviction, GĂĽnther Fielmann opened his first store in Cuxhaven in 1972, then under the name Optic im Centrum. Instead of orienting himself towards the inflated margins of his competitors, he linked his sales prices to manufacturing costs. This enabled him to offer his models at significantly lower prices, giving people with smaller budgets access to a wider selection of eyewear. In addition, Fielmann displayed the glasses openly in the shop window instead of keeping them behind closed cabinet doors as was customary.
Guenther Fielmann opens his first optical store in Cuxhaven. He formulates the guiding principle "You are the customer" and applies it to all aspects of the business: Fielmann is the first optical retailer to openly display the products, provide free services, offer extensive warranties.
The industry reaction was swift and hostile.
If Fielmann's earlier activities were warning signals for Germany's opticians, then this was their wake up call. With a wave of delivery boycotts, advertising campaigns, threats to Fielmann employees, and several dozen lawsuits, the industry tried to stop a man who seemed bent on destroying the basis of their lucrative business. Fielmann was disturbed by this wave of hostility, but refused to give up.
The competition was not amused by Günther Fielmann's business ideas. They considered his pricing dangerous and his open presentation of the models presumptuous. He soon became known colloquially as the "avenger of the bespectacled" – a mixture of ridicule and recognition. Some opticians even wanted to sue him. But Fielmann did not let this deter him. On the contrary, resistance from the industry only strengthened his resolve to press ahead. He himself later said: "If they had left me alone back then, I would have kept my six or seven businesses, and that would have been that."
This is one of those counterintuitive business dynamics that sounds like a parable but actually happens: competitive hostility that galvanizes rather than destroys. The industry's coordinated resistance didn't eliminate Fielmann—it radicalized him. Instead of staying small, he expanded.
By 1980, he had already opened 49 stores. While many in the industry criticized his methods, more and more people found what they had been missing in his stores: choice, style, fair prices, and the feeling of being taken seriously.
By 1980, Fielmann had grown from one store to 49. The model was working. Customers appreciated the transparent pricing and open selection. But Fielmann was still just a regional player—a thorn in the industry's side, but not yet a transformative force. That would require something more audacious: a direct partnership with the health insurance system itself.
V. The 1981 Health Insurance Breakthrough: "The Spark"
If there's a single moment when Fielmann transformed from regional disruptor to national phenomenon, it happened in the small town of Esens in East Frisia, in the presence of Federal Minister of Labor Herbert Ehrenberg.
Standard-issue glasses were a great source of stigma during this time. There were six models for adults and two for children. Guenther Fielmann found this to be a veritable form of discrimination and he wanted to change this. He visited health insurance providers up and down Germany, trying to talk to them about new, fashionable standard-issue glasses. His determination finally paid off when AOK, a small local health insurance provider in Esens, saw the potential of this idea. In 1981, in the presence of the former Federal Minister of Labor Herbert Ehrenberg, Guenther Fielmann signed a historic contract to produce 90 fashionable, high-quality frames in 640 combinations of material and colour. These frames were immediately available to AOK's members. The other health insurance providers soon followed. Just like that, Fielmann made standard-issue glasses beautiful.
Think about the elegance of this move. Fielmann didn't try to undercut the insurance system—he worked with it. He offered health insurers a deal: I'll provide your members with 90 fashionable frames in 640 variations at the standard reimbursement rate. The insurance company pays no more than it was already paying. The customer gets dramatically better options. And Fielmann gets volume.
The mathematics were simple but powerful. If you can manufacture efficiently enough, you can offer a vastly superior product at the same price point the system already expects to pay. The insurance company looks good for offering better coverage. The customer gets fashion instead of stigma. And Fielmann captures market share.
At the beginning of the 1980s, anyone who could not afford expensive glasses has to choose from eight extremely unattractive health insurance glasses. Guenther Fielmann set out to end what he perceived to be social injustice. In 1981, the company signs what becomes known as the seminal agreement with the local AOK health insurance fund in the small town of Esens (East Frisia). Under this agreement, Guenther Fielmann offers the insurance fund's members 640 different models at zero cost ("Nulltarif"). In the subsequent years, all major insurance funds in Germany sign up to this scheme. Media and politics praise the company's founder as "Robin Hood of spectacle wearers".
The "Nulltarif"—zero cost—concept was revolutionary. A customer with statutory health insurance could walk into a Fielmann store and leave with fashionable glasses without paying a single mark out of pocket. Not because the glasses were cheap or inferior, but because Fielmann's cost structure allowed him to profit at price points competitors considered impossible.
Only two years after the first contract with the AOK was signed, Fielmann's business consisted of 76 shops with 800 employees and 177 trainees, each of them with its own profit center. Some of them were managed by independent opticians who decided to run their businesses under the Fielmann brand concept. In 1982 and 1983 Fielmann opened two flagship optical centers in Northern Germany. The first one in Kiel offered a variety of 7,000 brand-name and designer frames, a range unprecedented in Europe.
The media loved it. "Robin Hood of spectacle wearers" was exactly the kind of narrative that captured public imagination: a lone businessman taking on an entrenched industry cartel to help ordinary people. The political dimension—this was, after all, about healthcare access and social equity—only amplified the story.
For Fielmann's competitors, the AOK deal was an existential threat. If insurance companies learned they could get more value for their reimbursements elsewhere, why would they continue paying inflated prices? The industry's margin structure depended on information asymmetry and consumer ignorance. Fielmann was demolishing both.
VI. Building the Brand & Scaling (1981-1994)
With the insurance partnership established, Fielmann entered a period of rapid expansion fueled by brand-building, operational innovation, and an almost obsessive focus on customer experience.
In 1984 the Fielmann money-back guarantee was introduced. Since Fielmann's advertising was mainly based on the unbeatable low prices, Fielmann customers who found a pair of brand-name eyeglasses cheaper in another store could get their money back from Fielmann. Three years later, all non-prescription Fielmann eyeglasses were also automatically insured against breakage, loss, and theft for 12 months. By 1988 Fielmann was the single largest employer in the optical industry, and with over 500 trainees it was also the largest provider of training for professionals in the field.
The money-back guarantee was a stroke of marketing genius. Fielmann wasn't just claiming to be the cheapest—he was guaranteeing it. If a customer found the same brand-name frames cheaper anywhere else, Fielmann would refund the difference. This transferred the risk of price comparison entirely to Fielmann while signaling absolute confidence to customers.
Then came the moment that cemented Fielmann in German popular culture.
Fielmann becomes known throughout Germany thanks to its TV commercial featuring little Julia and her legendary saying "And my daddy didn't pay a penny for it." ("Und mein Vater hat keinen Pfennig dazu bezahlt."). The slogan "Glasses: Fielmann." ("Brille: Fielmann.") quickly becomes a consistent part of German parlance indicating polite suggestions to improve one's vision.
In 1985, Fielmann became even more famous with the release of the TV advertisement featuring little Julia. Her legendary saying became iconic: "…And Daddy didn't have to pay a single extra penny!" Fielmann turned the opening of new stores into a media spectacle – sometimes even bringing an elephant into the mix.
The Julia commercial aired in 1985 and became one of the most memorable advertising moments in German television history. A young girl proudly shows off her new glasses and announces that her father didn't pay a penny for them. Simple, direct, and devastatingly effective.
"Brille: Fielmann" entered the German lexicon as a catchphrase—still used today when someone suggests another person might need glasses. That level of cultural penetration doesn't happen by accident. It reflects a marketing investment and a brand position that resonated deeply with German consumers.
Fielmann also pioneered the "megastore" concept for eyewear retail:
The second Fielmann megastore, which opened in 1993 in Hamburg, was according to company literature the biggest optical center in the world at that time. It included a second holography gallery and a museum for eyeglasses. In the following years Fielmann also introduced new product innovations.
The Hamburg megastore wasn't just retail—it was experiential. A holography gallery, an eyeglasses museum, 7,000+ frames to choose from. Fielmann was transforming eyeglass shopping from a clinical necessity into something approaching entertainment. In an era before Apple Stores redefined retail experience, Fielmann was building destination locations.
VII. German Reunification & East Germany Expansion (1990-1993)
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 presented Fielmann with an opportunity that few businesses are ever offered: an entire market segment, comprising 16 million new potential customers, suddenly opening up overnight.
In 1991, 18 months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Guenther Fielmann opened his first stores in the former GDR. In the former GDR, glasses were a scarce commodity and there were long waiting times for new pairs. Long queues stretched outside of Fielmann stores for many months.
Fielmann opens its first stores in Eastern Germany. In the former GDR, qualitative glasses were highly sought after, yet hard to come by and only available after a long wait. Even months after the first store openings, there were still long queues in front of the new Fielmann stores every day.
The GDR's optical industry had been centralized in Rathenow—a town with two centuries of lens-making history that had become completely overwhelmed. The East German cradle of the optical industry was the town of Rathenow an der Havel. Glasses had been manufactured there for over 200 years, and in the days of GDR, Rathenower Optische Werke (ROW), in partnership with Carl Zeiss Jena, produced all of the glasses for Eastern Europe. Operations had become entirely overwhelmed and there were long waiting periods, with glasses wearers in East Germany often having to wait many months for their glasses. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the "Treuhandanstalt", which was responsible for privatising East German companies, took on the task of privatising the former "publicly owned works". For ROW, this meant the end and thousands of workers were left workless.
Fielmann moved quickly on two fronts. First, he opened stores throughout East Germany to capture the pent-up demand from consumers who had waited months or years for glasses under the old regime. Second, he made a strategic decision that would define Fielmann's vertical integration strategy for decades: he invested in production facilities in the very region that had been the GDR's optical heartland.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Fielmann began to expand into Germany's new federal states. In so doing, the company went from being "one of Germany's large optician's chains" to the largest optician's chain in the now-reunified Federal Republic of Germany – and the industry's largest employer. In 1994, the company was floated on the stock market, enabling it to expand abroad. By the end of the decade, Fielmann had successfully launched in Austria, Poland and Switzerland.
The Rathenow production facility was part of a broader vertical integration strategy. At the start of the 2000s, Fielmann established a production and logistics center in Rathenow an der Havel in Brandenburg, the birthplace of German eyewear. By eliminating the middle man, Fielmann is able to offer significantly lower prices than its competitors. At one of the industry's largest high-tech production sites anywhere in the world, today almost 1,000 employees manufacture millions of lenses and glasses.
By owning production, Fielmann could control costs at every level. Manufacturing margins went directly to the company rather than to suppliers. Quality control became internal. And scale economies compounded—the more frames Fielmann sold, the lower the unit production cost, which enabled even more competitive pricing, which drove more sales.
VIII. The 1994 IPO & European Expansion
In 1994, the time had come for Fielmann to go public. One of the "peoples shares" in the company was priced at 5 German marks and led to the year's most successful new issuance of shares. With this new capital, Fielmann was able to expedite growth, and in the following years the company expanded into Austria, Switzerland, Poland and the Netherlands.
The Hamburg-headquartered company was founded in 1972 and has been listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange since 1994, as well as being a constituent of both the MDAX index, comprised of Germany's 60 largest companies outside of the DAX. Around 70% of the company is still held by the founding Fielmann family.
The IPO served multiple purposes. It provided growth capital for European expansion. It gave employees—many of whom were already shareholders—liquidity for their stakes. And it created a currency for potential acquisitions. The "peoples shares" positioning at 5 German marks echoed the democratization theme that had defined Fielmann's brand: just as affordable eyewear should be available to everyone, so should stock ownership.
Fielmann has been listed on the German stock exchange since 1994. Its stock indexing advanced from a listing in the SDAX (small and medium-sized companies) to MDAX on 6 January 2009, but was relegated to SDAX in December 2019.
International expansion began almost immediately:
Beginning in 1995 Fielmann concentrated on expanding into Southern Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. That year Fielmann acquired Pro-optik AG, Switzerland's third largest optician, headquartered in Basel.
The expansion strategy favored German-speaking markets initially—Austria and Switzerland, where the brand positioning and marketing could transfer with minimal adaptation. Poland came later, followed by other European markets. The approach was methodical rather than aggressive, building market positions through a combination of organic store openings and strategic acquisitions.
IX. Navigating Healthcare Reform: The 1997 Crisis
If the 1981 AOK deal proved that Fielmann could work with the German healthcare system, the 1997 reforms tested whether the business model could survive without it.
While the sales of eyeglasses in Switzerland grew into double digits, German health care reform led to another downturn of the German optical retail business. As of January 1, 1997, federal subsidies for prescription eyeglass frames were abolished. GĂĽnther Fielmann, a strong believer in the welfare state, had presented a proposal to the German government, showing how to save the expected DM 300 million without abolishing the subsidies, through more efficient organization and rationalization. While Fielmann's proposal did meet with some approval, the government eventually decided to stick with its original bill. In the aftermath, sales of the German optical industry dropped again by 15 percent in 1997 and stabilized at that level in the year after.
This was a significant test. Fielmann's competitive advantage had been partly built on arbitraging the insurance reimbursement system—offering superior value at the statutory price point. When frame subsidies disappeared, consumers faced out-of-pocket costs that many hadn't expected.
Fielmann's response revealed the depth of his cost advantage. Because Fielmann manufactured its own frames, the company could continue offering "zero cost" options where competitors could not. The Nulltarif concept survived the reform because Fielmann's cost structure allowed it to. Less efficient competitors, dependent on third-party suppliers and higher margins, faced an impossible choice: absorb losses or pass costs to customers.
When the health insurance companies cut back on co-payments for glasses and then completely stopped them as part of the healthcare reform in 2004, GĂĽnther Fielmann invented what is known as zero-cost insurance.
The 2004 reforms were even more dramatic, completely eliminating insurance coverage for prescription eyeglasses for most adults. In 2004, a second wave of cost-containment measures removed insurance coverage for drugs sold over the counter and prescription eyeglasses, which reduced statutory health insurance expenditures for pharmacies from €22·9 billion in 2003 to €20·5 billion in 2004.
Fielmann adapted again, creating what amounted to its own supplemental insurance product—the zero-cost insurance—that allowed customers to continue accessing affordable frames even without government support. The company's structural advantages proved resilient across multiple regulatory regimes.
X. Building Institutional Capabilities: The Fielmann Academy
In 2002, Günther Fielmann made an unusual acquisition: Plön Castle, a Renaissance-era structure that had served as the summer residence of Danish kings, which the state of Schleswig-Holstein could no longer afford to maintain.
Walls were threatening to collapse and the roof trusses were rotten. Guenther Fielmann needed just a few years to completely renovate this Renaissance castle and in 2006 he opened the Fielmann Academy at Ploen Castle, the company's centre for specialist and apprentice training.
Because this offer included an elaborate argument of the various benefits to the public, Schleswig-Holstein's state parliament approved it in 2002. Consequently, the Fielmann Akademie foundation purchased the castle for 3.6 million Euro. GĂĽnther Fielmann summarised the state of the monument at that time: When we took over the castle in 2002 it was in a deplorable condition. The broad baroque era hallways had been converted to rooms for school children, using light-weight walls. Barely anything of the original floor plan was visible and the structure had been badly damaged everywhere you looked. Over four years the castle has been reconstructed in accordance with preservation and heritage orders. The total costs amounted to more than 35 million Euros. Schleswig-Holstein supported the project with 11.8 million Euros. The reconstruction was completed in 2006. Today the castle is a public site of historical heritage hosting an optician academy.
The economics here are worth noting: €3.6 million purchase price, €35 million in renovation costs. This wasn't a bargain property acquisition—it was a statement about the kind of institution Fielmann wanted to build.
The Fielmann Group acquires the 16th century castle that once served as the summer residence of the Danish king. Today, the Fielmann Academy at Plön Castle is the largest training and research center for the optical industry worldwide.
2006 saw the inauguration of the Fielmann Academy at Plön Castle, the former summer residence of the Danish king, which is now the industry's largest training and research center. In Germany, Fielmann trains more than 40% of all optical apprentices while operating only 5% of the industry's optical stores. The family business is the largest training provider in the industry.
That statistic is remarkable: 40% of Germany's optical apprentices trained at Fielmann facilities, while the company operates just 5% of the stores. Fielmann was training opticians who would go on to work for competitors—and deliberately so. The academy served multiple purposes: it ensured a pipeline of skilled workers for Fielmann's own expansion, it elevated industry standards overall, and it positioned Fielmann as the profession's benefactor rather than merely its dominant competitor.
The first master classes already commenced in 2002 during the reconstruction period. Since the winter semester 2005/06 the academy offers a Bachelor's degree in optometry (BSc Augenoptik / Optometrie) in cooperation with the Fachhochschule LĂĽbeck. It also provides various courses for both skilled workers and executives of the optical industry. 24 lecturers teach at the academy, and over 6,000 opticians are qualified every year.
XI. INFLECTION POINT #1: The Generational Transition (2019)
Family business successions are notoriously difficult. The statistics on successful generational transfers are sobering—most family businesses don't survive to the third generation, and many don't make it past the first transition. Günther Fielmann approached this challenge with characteristic methodical planning.
GĂĽnther Fielmann had planned his succession in the family business for a long time: in 2012, he secured the decisive influence of the Fielmann family for future generations by acquiring the majority shareholding in the Fielmann Group into a family foundation. Over the following eight years, he successively transferred responsibility to his son Marc Fielmann. In 2019, shortly after his 80th birthday, GĂĽnther Fielmann handed over the management of the Fielmann Group and shortly afterwards the management of the family holding company and family foundation to his son, thus completing "the prime example of a successful succession plan in a family business".
Marc David GĂĽnther Fielmann (born 24 July 1989), better known as Marc Fielmann, is a German businessman and optometrist. He is the CEO of Fielmann Group, the leading European eyewear provider which was founded by his father GĂĽnther Fielmann. Fielmann was Germany's youngest CEO when appointed only aged 29.
Marc Fielmann's preparation for the role was extensive:
Following his studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Marc worked in the optical industry at Luxottica and Safilo. In 2012, he joined the Fielmann Group. On January 1, 2016, he became Board Member responsible for Marketing until July 2022. Since April 2018 he led the company in a Co-CEO structure with his father, Guenther Fielmann, before becoming sole CEO in 2019.
The succession strategy had several notable elements. First, Marc gained external experience at Luxottica and Safilo—competitors who operated very differently from Fielmann. This gave him perspective on alternative business models and industry practices. Second, he joined the family business gradually, taking on increasing responsibilities over eight years rather than stepping immediately into the top role. Third, the Co-CEO structure from 2018-2019 provided a transition period where father and son led together before the complete handoff.
The 2010s – succession In 2012, Marc Fielmann's appointment marked the entry of the next generation into the family business. Working alongside his father, he accelerated the company's international expansion and initiated the digital transformation of the company's business model. After eight years of working side by side, Günther Fielmann handed the reins to his son at the end of 2019.
The transition also involved substantial organizational change. Since April 2018, Marc Fielmann is CEO of Fielmann AG with responsibility for marketing, communications and executive leadership. Since February 2019, he is also responsible for corporate strategy. In 2019 Fielmann, aged 29, was the youngest CEO among listed companies in Germany.
Marc reduced the number of direct reports to the CEO dramatically—from approximately 300 managers reporting directly to his father down to under ten. This wasn't just organizational streamlining; it represented a fundamentally different management philosophy. The elder Fielmann had maintained personal oversight of an enormous breadth of operations. The son implemented a more conventional corporate structure with delegation and distributed accountability.
XII. INFLECTION POINT #2: Vision 2025 Strategy & Digital Transformation
Our Vision 2025 growth strategy has brought about a substantial transformation. Over the last few years, we have successfully modernized, digitalized and internationalized our family business.
The Vision 2025 strategy, developed in 2019 as Marc Fielmann took sole leadership, articulated three primary objectives: achieve 30 million active customers, generate more than €2.1 billion in net sales by 2025, and maintain customer satisfaction rates around 90%.
In 2019, we developed our growth strategy "Vision 2025". Staying true to our customer-centric philosophy and our purpose, it was our goal to help 30 million active customers hear and see the beauty in the world.
Vision 2025 goals in reach, Vision 2035 to be presented in July "With our Vision 2025 growth strategy, we have successfully modernized, digitalized and internationalized our family business over the course of the last five years.
The digital transformation component was particularly ambitious for a company built on physical retail. Fielmann invested heavily in omnichannel capabilities:
Remarkably, more than 70% of Fielmann customers using this service had not seen an eye doctor recently, if ever. This underscores the critical role of our service for at-risk populations. The feedback continues to be overwhelmingly positive: An impressive 95% of patients rated our innovative eye health service as good or very good. This encourages us to roll out this medical service into ever more locations across Europe. We are immensely grateful to our partners in ophthalmology and the wider medical community for their collaboration.
The Eye Health Checkup represents an interesting expansion of scope—from selling glasses to providing primary eyecare services that were previously available only through ophthalmologists. This service innovation addresses a real access problem (long wait times for eye doctor appointments) while deepening customer relationships.
Digital sales tripled to over €100 million but remain under 5% of total revenue—reflecting a fundamental truth about eyewear retail: customers still prefer in-person fitting and consultation for prescription glasses. The omnichannel strategy isn't about replacing stores with e-commerce; it's about integrating digital tools into the store experience.
XIII. INFLECTION POINT #3: US Market Entry & Acquisitions (2023-2024)
The most ambitious component of Vision 2025 was geographic expansion, specifically into the United States—the world's largest optical market and a territory where Fielmann had no presence.
The cash and debt-free deal is valued at approximately €105m ($112.8m). Completion of the transaction is subject to customary closing conditions, including receipt of any necessary regulatory approvals.
The Fielmann Group, a leading European eyewear provider, has closed the acquisition of SVS Vision yesterday. The complementary acquisition of online retailer Befitting had already closed in June. These acquisitions constitute an important milestone in the internationalisation that the German family business pursues with its Vision 2025 growth strategy. SVS Vision is consolidated as part of the Fielmann Group from 1 September 2023 onwards, amounting to the addition of four business months in 2023 but also carrying acquisition costs of several million euros. Therefore, the US business contribution to Group EBITDA will be negligible in 2023 but significantly improve in 2024.
SVS Vision is an eye care solutions provider based in Mt. Clemens, Mich and was founded in 1974. The Company operates more than 80 locations across 9 states and is one of the nation's leading optical retailers. SVS leverages the latest technology and industry-leading professionals to manufacture approximately half a million glasses each year at the Company's state of the art, in-house laboratory. In addition, SVS offers fully insured managed care plans. The Company has a long history of retaining its talent, with over half of its 650 employees having been with SVS for more than 15 years.
The US strategy focused on the Upper Midwest—not the glamorous coastal markets but heartland states where SVS Vision already had a dominant position in Michigan. This choice made strategic sense: avoid direct competition with Luxottica's LensCrafters in major metros, build scale in a regional market, then expand.
The Shopko Optical acquisition followed in 2024:
It marks another important milestone in the German family business' plans to expand internationally and execute on its Vision 2025 growth strategy. Shopko Optical is consolidated as part of the Fielmann Group as of 1 July 2024 and will contribute six months of business sales this year. As our existing business performs in line with our prognosis communicated in April, we raise our sales outlook for 2024 proportionally to around € 2.3 billion.
About Shopko Optical: Shopko Optical (Shoptikal Topco, Inc.) is an optical retailer operating more than 140 stores in Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. The company generated US$168 million in sales in 2023. At year-end, 1,087 employees were driving the growth of Shopko Optical.
Upon closing, Fielmann USA intends to integrate Shopko Optical into its omnichannel platform that, following the completion of the transaction, would serve customers via digital sales channels and more than 220 retail practices across 19 US states, predominantly in the Midwest.
Notably, Fielmann appointed Lukas Ruecker—a former Luxottica executive who had led EyeMed Vision Care—as CEO of Fielmann USA. In connection with the transactions, the Fielmann Group announced that it has appointed Lukas Ruecker as CEO of Fielmann USA Inc. Lukas joins the Fielmann Group after spending more than a decade at Luxottica. Over the last 10 years, he served as president of EyeMed Vision Care, which he transformed into the fastest-growing vision benefits provider globally.
The US operations currently run at significantly lower margins than European operations—The Fielmann Group also significantly improved its profitability: The adjusted EBITDA margin rose to circa 21.7% at Group level (+1.5 percentage points vs. last year), and to about 22.8% (+2.1 percentage points vs. last year) in Europe while Fielmann USA improved its adjusted EBITDA margin to 9.9%.
Management targets 19% margins in the US by 2025, planning to apply their European playbook: own manufacturing, dense store networks, and insurance partnerships.
XIV. INFLECTION POINT #4: Death of the Founder (January 2024)
Günther Fielmann died in Lütjensee on 3 January 2024, at the age of 84. Günther Klaus Fielmann (17 September 1939 – 3 January 2024) was a German billionaire businessman, the founder, majority owner and the chief executive officer of Fielmann, a German optics company focusing on retail eyewear. At the time of his death, his net worth was estimated at US$4.6 billion. From 2019, the management of Fielmann Group, was handed over completely to his son Marc Fielmann.
After a long and fulfilled life, the German entrepreneur passed away on January 3, 2024 at the the age of 84 at his home in LĂĽtjensee in Schleswig-Holstein (Germany), peacefully surrounded by his family.
The timing of the founder's death—five years after formal succession, during a period of aggressive international expansion—tested whether the transition had truly been completed. The fact that markets and operations continued without disruption suggests that the preparedness was real.
Marc Fielmann, CEO of the Fielmann Group: "My father repeatedly introduced customer-friendly services that did not exist before. He has revolutionized the entire industry in the service of customers. His work fills us with respect and is an incentive for us to help everyone to hear and see the beauty of the world. As we lead our family business into the future, we will preserve the customer-friendly philosophy, the values and the image of humanity that have made us great."
Beyond the business, GĂĽnther Fielmann left a remarkable legacy of environmental and community engagement. GĂĽnther Fielmann knew that he could only be successful in the long term in an intact and socially balanced environment. That is why Fielmann Group has been taking responsibility for the environment for decades, giving part of its success back to society. The family business is committed to projects in nature and environmental protection, art and the preservation of historical monuments, supports kindergartens and schools, promotes popular sports and has been planting a tree for every employee every year since 1986, to date more than 1.7 million trees and shrubs. The Fielmann family is a long-standing sponsor of cultural events such as the Schleswig-Holstein Music Festival. For his entrepreneurial courage and his social and community GĂĽnther Fielmann has received numerous awards including the Grand Cross of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany.
XV. Current State: 2024-2025 Financial Performance & Vision 2035
In 2024, the Fielmann Group generated consolidated sales of about €2.3 billion, a 15% increase compared to the previous year (€2.0 billion). This was due to strong organic growth (+7%) and the consolidation of our US acquisitions (+8%).
Net profit reached €154m, a +21% increase over last year.
According to preliminary figures, the Fielmann Group increased its FY2024 adjusted EBITDA by about +23% to €491 million (previous year: €399 million). This development was driven by strong organic growth in Europe due to an improved sell-out mix and notable growth in our hearing aids business as well as stringent cost control. The Group's adjusted EBITDA margin increased by about +1.5 percentage points to 21.7%.
The 2025 outlook is even more ambitious:
In the first quarter of 2025, Fielmann's sales grew 13 percent and adjusted EBITDA surged 28 percent to 146 million euros. The adjusted EBITDA margin reached 24.2 percent at Group level and 25.6 percent in Europe in the first quarter - in line with the company's Vision 2025 growth strategy. Looking ahead to the full year 2025, the company said its Management Board has a positive outlook and expects overall sales of about 2.5 billion euros.
Our international sales tripled – nearly €1bn by year-end – and we grew into the third largest vision care provider worldwide. At the end of 2025 our sales will have grown almost twice as much as originally planned, and our Adjusted EBITDA is expected to exceed our original Vision 2025 target by around 50%.
The company has exceeded its Vision 2025 targets and announced Vision 2035:
Vision 2035 With its "Vision 2035" growth strategy, the Fielmann Group is charting its path into the future: While we remain true to our customer-centric philosophy, our family values and our purpose – to help everyone hear and see the beauty in the world –, there are going to be significant changes. Colleagues from all markets, functions, and organizations of the Fielmann Group have jointly developed our vision statement: "As the most trusted partner for hearing and vision, we redefine comprehensive care globally." Over the decade to come, the Fielmann Group is going to evolve from a European optical and audiology retailer into a global provider of comprehensive vision and hearing care.
In the coming years, Fielmann aims to accelerate its global expansion, with the goal of increasing revenue to approximately four billion euros by 2030, up from a projected 2.5 billion euros in 2025.
XVI. The Anti-Luxottica: Strategic Positioning & Industry Context
To understand Fielmann's strategic position, one must understand its opposite: EssilorLuxottica, the behemoth that dominates global eyewear.
In October 2018, Luxottica and Essilor merged into a single company, EssilorLuxottica, which now occupies nearly 30% of the global market share and represents almost a billion pairs of lenses and frames sold annually. Despite not owning most of the market, the company has considerable price-setting power. It uses "spiff money", financial incentives to reward other industry players who co-operate with it, and has repeatedly driven companies that competed with it on price out of business.
EssilorLuxottica operates (the only) vertically integrated business model in the eyewear industry, controlling every step from product development to retail, including ownership of 600+ factories and 128 distribution centers around the world. The average retail price of a simple eyeglass frame is around $230, with production costs as low as $4-$15 per frame, leading to mark-ups that can exceed 1000%. This is what Leonardo Del Vecchio said when he was younger: "You get rich by selling $2 sunglasses for $150 bucks and aggressively running out/buying your competition." The merger between Essilor and Luxottica, valued at $32 billion, has made it almost impossible for competitors to operate at the same scale, raising concerns about monopolistic practices.
This merger gives birth to a giant of the optical industry, generating a turnover of more than €16 billion and a market capitalization of €57 billion. Essilor and Luxottica were respectively the world's leading manufacturers of ophthalmic lenses and of eyeglasses; upon the merger, EssilorLuxottica thus became the juggernaut of the eyewear industry, which some critics have characterized as a near-monopoly.
Fielmann's strategy represents the inverse of the Luxottica model in several crucial respects:
Pricing Philosophy: Where Luxottica maximizes price through brand premiums and vertical control, Fielmann competes on transparent, cost-based pricing.
Geographic Focus: Where EssilorLuxottica is globally distributed, Fielmann remains concentrated in Europe with a nascent US presence.
Customer Base: Where Luxottica serves premium and mid-market segments primarily, Fielmann explicitly targets value-conscious customers, including those relying on insurance coverage.
Brand Strategy: Where Luxottica licenses and owns dozens of luxury brands (Prada, Chanel, Ray-Ban, Oakley), Fielmann sells primarily under its own name with a selection of third-party brands.
The interesting question is whether these represent sustainable competitive positioning or simply different stages of industry evolution. Luxottica grew from a small Italian workshop to global dominance through aggressive acquisition and vertical integration. Could Fielmann follow a similar path? The US expansion suggests the ambition is there.
XVII. Bull Case & Bear Case
Bull Case
Cost Leadership at Scale: Fielmann's vertically integrated manufacturing provides structural cost advantages that enable profitable pricing at levels competitors cannot match. Thanks to the dedication of its more than 24,000 people worldwide, the company consistently achieves customer satisfaction and retention rates of around 90% and has to date fitted more than 200 million pairs of individual prescription glasses.
Demographics: Aging populations in developed markets mean growing demand for vision correction. As populations age, the addressable market expands naturally.
US Market Opportunity: In the first nine months of 2025, the Fielmann Group generated consolidated sales of €1,842m, an increase of +9% over the same period in 2024. In the same period, our US business grew by +69%, driven by the successful integration of the Shopko Optical acquisition. If Fielmann can replicate its European playbook in the US, the growth runway is substantial.
Healthcare System Arbitrage: Fielmann has demonstrated the ability to thrive under multiple regulatory regimes in Germany. This regulatory resilience may transfer to other markets with different healthcare structures.
Family Control: Around 70% of the company is still held by the founding Fielmann family. Family control enables long-term strategic thinking without quarterly earnings pressure from activist investors.
Bear Case
US Execution Risk: The American optical market operates very differently from Germany. Vision insurance is fragmented, the competitive landscape includes powerful players like EssilorLuxottica's LensCrafters, and consumer behavior patterns differ. Current US margins at 9.9% are less than half of European levels, and achieving the targeted improvement requires operational transformation.
Digital Disruption: Online eyewear retailers like Warby Parker and Zenni Optical have demonstrated that some consumers will buy glasses without in-person fitting. While e-commerce remains under 5% of Fielmann's sales, secular shifts in consumer behavior could erode the value of physical retail presence.
Geographic Concentration: Despite international expansion, Germany still represents about 68% of revenue. The primary driver behind last 12 months revenue was the Germany segment contributing a total revenue of €1.54b (68% of total revenue). This concentration creates vulnerability to German economic conditions.
Valuation: As of the previous close price of €56.40, shares in Fielmann AG had a market capitalisation of €4.74bn. The Fielmann AG PE ratio based on its reported earnings over the past 12 months is 22.33. A P/E above 20 for a specialty retailer reflects growth expectations that must be met.
XVIII. Porter's Five Forces Analysis
Threat of New Entrants (Low to Moderate): Optical retail has moderate barriers to entry for individual stores but high barriers to achieving Fielmann-level scale. The combination of manufacturing capability, training infrastructure, and brand recognition creates significant competitive moats. Online-only entrants like Warby Parker have gained traction in some segments but haven't replicated the full-service model.
Bargaining Power of Suppliers (Low): Fielmann's vertical integration means limited supplier dependency for core products. The company manufactures its own frames and grinds its own lenses. For third-party branded frames, Fielmann's scale provides negotiating leverage.
Bargaining Power of Buyers (Moderate): Individual consumers have limited bargaining power, but insurance companies (particularly in Germany) represent concentrated buying power. Fielmann's strategy has been to make insurers partners rather than adversaries through the Nulltarif model.
Threat of Substitutes (Low): Eyeglasses have no direct substitute for most vision correction needs. Contact lenses and refractive surgery (LASIK) serve some of the same function but reach different customer segments. The aging population trend increases rather than decreases demand for glasses.
Competitive Rivalry (Moderate to High in Germany, High Globally): Germany's optical market is dominated by Fielmann, with Apollo-Optik as the primary competitor. Internationally, EssilorLuxottica's scale and brand portfolio create formidable competition. The US market includes Walmart, Costco, and EssilorLuxottica-owned chains.
XIX. Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers Analysis
Scale Economies: Fielmann benefits from scale in manufacturing (lens grinding, frame production), purchasing (raw materials, third-party frames), and marketing (TV advertising amortized over millions of customers). The company's €2.3 billion in sales enables fixed-cost leverage that smaller competitors cannot match.
Network Effects (Limited): Optical retail has minimal network effects. More customers don't make the service inherently better for other customers in the way that platforms exhibit.
Counter-Positioning: This may be Fielmann's most important power. The incumbent industry model—high margins, limited selection, opaque pricing—was vulnerable to Fielmann's transparent, cost-based approach. Established opticians couldn't adopt Fielmann's model without destroying their own profitability. EssilorLuxottica's brand-premium model similarly cannot easily pivot to value positioning.
Switching Costs (Low to Moderate): Eye prescriptions are portable; customers can take them anywhere. However, service history (previous prescriptions, frame preferences) creates some continuity benefit. The 90% customer retention rate suggests meaningful relationship stickiness despite low formal switching costs.
Branding: "Brille: Fielmann" has exceptional brand recognition in Germany. The association with value, quality, and customer service creates preference that transcends price comparison. Brand building in new markets (particularly the US) represents a significant challenge.
Cornered Resource: The Fielmann Academy at Plön Castle trains more opticians than any competitor. This human capital pipeline represents a sustainable advantage that cannot be easily replicated.
Process Power (Strong): Fielmann's operational excellence—from store layout to employee training to manufacturing integration—represents accumulated learning that competitors cannot quickly imitate. The company's ability to offer comparable products at materially lower prices reflects deep process advantages.
XX. Key Performance Indicators to Monitor
For investors tracking Fielmann's ongoing performance, three KPIs deserve primary attention:
1. Same-Store Sales Growth (Organic Growth) This metric strips out the effect of acquisitions to show underlying business momentum. Market share gains across major geographies Despite macroeconomic headwinds and low consumer sentiment, Fielmann in FY2024 continued its strong organic sales growth in Central Europe: According to preliminary financials, Germany grew +7%, Switzerland went up +5% and our sales in Austria improved by +10% compared to the previous year. Sustained high-single-digit organic growth indicates continued market share gains; deceleration would signal competitive pressure or market saturation.
2. Adjusted EBITDA Margin (Particularly US vs. Europe) The current gap—22.8% in Europe versus 9.9% in the US—reflects the integration and optimization opportunity. In light of our recent profitability improvements, the Fielmann Group is on track to deliver its 25% adjusted EBITDA margin goal in Europe as well as its 24% adjusted EBITDA margin goal at Group level. Watch whether US margins converge toward European levels; failure to improve would suggest the European playbook doesn't transfer.
3. Customer Satisfaction/Retention Rate The company consistently achieves customer satisfaction and retention rates of around 90%. This metric matters because Fielmann's competitive advantage depends on service quality, not just price. Declining satisfaction would signal that growth is coming at the expense of the customer experience that built the brand.
XXI. Risks & Regulatory Considerations
Healthcare Policy Risk: Fielmann's German business model evolved through multiple healthcare reforms, but each change required adaptation. Future reforms in Germany or other markets could alter the economics of vision coverage in unpredictable ways.
US Market Structure Risk: The American vision insurance market is dominated by EssilorLuxottica's EyeMed. Fielmann's ability to build insurance partnerships similar to its German AOK model remains unproven. The US healthcare system's complexity creates execution risk that the company has not previously navigated.
Currency Risk: US operations are denominated in dollars while reporting is in euros. Currency fluctuations affect both reported results and the economics of continuing to invest in US expansion.
Integration Risk: The company has acquired multiple businesses in rapid succession (SVS Vision, Befitting, Shopko Optical). Integration of different organizational cultures, systems, and operational practices creates execution risk.
Succession Concentration: While the first generational transition succeeded, the Fielmann family's continued majority control means that future leadership transitions remain family-dependent. No obvious third-generation succession plan is yet public.
XXII. Conclusion: The Next Fifty Years
Günther Fielmann spent a half-century proving that the optical industry's margin structures were artificial—products of information asymmetry and cartel-like coordination rather than genuine value creation. He built a company that made fashionable eyewear affordable while maintaining profitability through operational excellence rather than price exploitation.
The question for the next fifty years is whether that model can scale globally. CEO Marc Fielmann stated: "Together, we formed a modern family business that delivers quality and service at the best prices via its omnichannel platform. Our international sales tripled – nearly €1bn by year end – and we grew into the third largest vision care provider worldwide."
The US expansion represents the boldest bet in the company's history—an attempt to export German-style efficiency into the world's most competitive retail market, against the world's most dominant optical company. The outcome is genuinely uncertain. Success would validate Fielmann's model as globally applicable. Failure would define the limits of counter-positioning against entrenched incumbents.
For long-term investors, Fielmann represents a particular kind of opportunity: a company with proven operational excellence in its home market, clear growth ambitions, family control that enables patient capital allocation, and a competitive positioning that represents the philosophical opposite of industry consolidation.
Whether that's enough to take on EssilorLuxottica's €50+ billion empire remains the central strategic question. The Robin Hood of Eyewear has succeeded in Germany. The American frontier awaits.
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