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CTS Eventim: Europe's Ticketing Empire
I. Introduction — The Toll Booth of Live Entertainment
Picture a system where every time a fan yearns to see their favorite artist perform—whether Ed Sheeran at a stadium in Milan, Taylor Swift across European capitals, or a local theater production in Vienna—a small, predictable fee flows through a single digital gateway. Now imagine this gateway processes over 300 million tickets annually, operates across 25 countries, and has built such deep moats that even the world's largest entertainment conglomerate struggles to dislodge it from its European stronghold.
This is CTS Eventim. The Bremen-based events giant reported record high revenue of €2.809 billion ($3.04 billion) for calendar 2024—a number that, while seemingly modest compared to Live Nation's $23 billion, obscures the company's true competitive position. In sheer scale, CTS Eventim remains considerably smaller than global leader Live Nation, which reported revenues more than seven times greater. But CTS Eventim's revenue growth came in at 19.1% year-over-year, compared to Live Nation's mere 3%.
The central question this analysis addresses is deceptively simple: How did a German ticketing company, founded by a concert promoter who discovered a teenage Schlager singer in the early 1970s, become the only meaningful global competitor to the Live Nation/Ticketmaster behemoth?
As the first company in Europe to sell tickets online—and, perhaps most significantly, the first in the world to run a ticketing operation alongside a concert promotion division—Eventim under Schulenberg set the template for the modern, vertically integrated concert business prevalent in the 21st century.
The themes that emerge from CTS Eventim's story resonate far beyond the entertainment industry. This is a masterclass in founder-led discipline, vertical integration executed with surgical precision, European expansion without overreach, and the art of building durable competitive advantages in what has become a two-player global market.
As of November 2025, CTS Eventim's market capitalization stands at approximately $9.4 billion (roughly €7.7 billion), making it one of the most valuable pure-play live entertainment companies outside the United States. But perhaps more impressive than the current valuation is the trajectory: this is a company that suffered an 82% revenue collapse during COVID, emerged stronger, and has since grown its top line by more than 63% above pre-pandemic levels.
For investors seeking to understand how moats are built in winner-take-most industries, CTS Eventim offers a compelling case study in patience, strategic restraint, and the power of integrated ecosystems.
II. Origins — The Concert Promoter Who Saw the Future
The Klaus-Peter Schulenberg Story
The story of CTS Eventim begins not in a corporate boardroom but on the stages of provincial German venues in the early 1970s, where a teenage economics student was hustling gigs for his mediocre high school band.
Klaus-Peter Schulenberg began booking concerts for other bands while still a teenager, scaling his business before he could legally sign contracts. His commercial breakthrough came when signing a German Schlager icon, the late Bernd ClĂĽver, as a management client in the early 1970s.
Since Schulenberg was only 19 at the time—Germany lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18 in 1975—his father had to sign the contract. A wise move, as Clüver's first single ("Der Junge mit der Mundharmonika") was an instant hit, selling some two million copies.
In a revealing interview, Schulenberg reflected on this pivotal moment: "Without the complete support from my parents, none of it would have been possible. In 1970/1971, my father signed a contract, in which I guaranteed that I would pay the artist Bernd ClĂĽver 30,000 Deutschmarks annually, which was considerable... it was a huge vote of confidence from my parents."
This detail matters because it reveals something fundamental about Schulenberg's approach to business: even as a teenager, he understood that success in entertainment required taking calculated risks backed by conviction. The 30,000 Deutschmarks his father guaranteed was substantial money in early 1970s Germany—roughly equivalent to an average annual salary at the time.
Still in his student years at the University of Bremen, Schulenberg founded an artist management and event agency in 1973 that organized concerts for Alice Cooper, The Rolling Stones, and other major acts in Germany. In 1977, he staged his first concert with the Rolling Stones.
The ClĂĽver deal marked the beginning of Schulenberg's commercial success as an artist manager and concert and tour promoter, although he soon diversified and invested in other businesses as well, including dailies, ad journals, radio stations and more.
What distinguishes Schulenberg from other entertainment entrepreneurs of his era is his early recognition that the concert business had a scalability problem: each show was essentially a one-off production, requiring enormous effort for a single night's revenue. Ticketing, by contrast, was inherently scalable—a platform business where incremental volume required minimal incremental cost.
The CTS Acquisition (1996)
CTS Computer Ticket Service GmbH was founded by Munich-based concert promoters Marcel Avram and Matthias Hoffmann on 4 November 1989. It was acquired in 1996 by Klaus-Peter Schulenberg.
By 1996 and the dawn of the digital age, Schulenberg had his sights set on buying a ticketing company. "I could see that CTS wasn't successful, and in 1996 I made them an offer and Marcel, Marek and Matthias finally accepted."
Signing Bernd ClĂĽver marked the beginning of real commercial success. It placed Schulenberg in a position to acquire CTS in 1996, which generated some 6 million Deutschmarks in revenue annually back then.
Why was a concert promoter buying a struggling ticketing platform contrarian? The conventional wisdom in the mid-1990s held that ticketing was a commoditized service business—a necessary but unglamorous function that existed to serve the more exciting world of live entertainment. Promoters were the stars; ticketing was plumbing.
Schulenberg saw something different. He recognized that as the internet began to transform commerce, ticketing would become a gateway—a control point where customer relationships, data, and transaction fees would concentrate. More importantly, he understood that combining ticketing with concert promotion could create a self-reinforcing flywheel: promoters need ticketing platforms to sell their shows; ticketing platforms need inventory from promoters to attract consumers.
André Béchir, founder and CEO of Switzerland's abc Production, describes Schulenberg as a "visionary"—someone who, at an early stage, saw the potential both of selling tickets online and of bringing together ticketing with live entertainment under one corporate umbrella. "He's much cleverer than I am," Béchir says.
The acquisition price has never been publicly disclosed, but the 6 million Deutschmarks in annual revenue suggests a modest transaction—likely in the low-to-mid single-digit millions. Within four years, Schulenberg would take this small acquisition public, setting in motion one of the most successful vertical integration strategies in European entertainment history.
III. The IPO and Vertical Integration Strategy (2000-2008)
Going Public and the Strategic Vision
Schulenberg took the company partially public on 1 February 2000 on the Frankfurt stock exchange. The timing was audacious—CTS went public at the absolute peak of the dot-com bubble, when investors were throwing money at anything with an internet angle.
That same year, the company entered into the live entertainment market with the partial acquisitions of several German concert promoters, such as Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur, Peter Rieger Konzertagentur, Semmel Concerts, Argo Konzerte, FKP Scorpio, and Dirk Becker Entertainment.
This flurry of acquisitions immediately after the IPO reveals Schulenberg's strategic clarity: he wasn't going public merely to monetize his stake or fund general corporate purposes. He had a specific plan—to vertically integrate ticketing with concert promotion at unprecedented scale.
The "Partial Acquisition" Strategy
The word "partial" in "partial acquisitions" deserves emphasis. Unlike Live Nation, which typically sought full control of acquired promoters, Schulenberg developed a distinctive approach: buy minority or majority stakes in independent promoters while preserving their entrepreneurial culture and operational independence.
This strategy had several advantages:
Capital Efficiency: Partial stakes required less upfront capital, allowing CTS Eventim to spread its acquisition budget across more targets and geographies.
Incentive Alignment: By leaving founders with meaningful ownership, CTS Eventim ensured continued entrepreneurial drive. Promoters weren't hired employees; they remained entrepreneurs with skin in the game.
Regulatory Flexibility: Minority stakes attracted less antitrust scrutiny than full acquisitions, particularly important in European markets with aggressive competition authorities.
Local Expertise: Concert promotion is intensely local—requiring relationships with venues, knowledge of regional tastes, and connections with local media. Maintaining independent management preserved this institutional knowledge.
The result was EVENTIM LIVE, an umbrella organization that would grow to encompass 39 members as of 2024, making it the largest festival promoter in Europe.
European Expansion Through Ticketing
CTS Eventim (co-)owns several ticketing companies in 21 countries, using various brands.
This multi-brand, localized approach—eventim.de, oeticket.com, ticketcorner.ch, ticketone.it, and entradas.com—represents a deliberate strategic choice. Rather than force a single "Eventim" brand across all markets, the company maintained or acquired locally recognized ticketing brands, preserving consumer trust and market-specific positioning.
The Venue Play Begins
In the late 2000s, the company started operating several venues, starting with the WaldbĂĽhne in Berlin.
WaldbĂĽhne, Berlin, has been operated since 2009. Lanxess Arena, Cologne, operated since 2012. Hammersmith Apollo, London, owned since 2013 for 50%.
The venue strategy completed the vertical integration trifecta: ticketing → promotion → venues. Control of venues provides guaranteed inventory for the ticketing platform, guaranteed dates for promoters, and stable, recurring cash flows from naming rights, concessions, and facility fees.
By 2008, CTS Eventim had assembled the building blocks of what would become Europe's dominant live entertainment ecosystem. The company was profitable, growing, and had established positions across multiple European markets. But a storm was brewing across the Atlantic that would test the entire business model.
IV. Inflection Point #1 — The Live Nation/Ticketmaster War (2007-2013)
The Partnership That Turned Hostile
In December 2007, CTS Eventim secured what appeared to be a transformational deal. Live Nation announced an agreement with CTS Eventim ("CTS"), the leading German primary ticketing provider. Under the agreement, Live Nation would use CTS technology to provide primary ticketing services to Live Nation's venues as well as third-party venues in the United States.
Under the agreement, Live Nation received a 10-year software and technology license from CTS Eventim to operate a ticketing system in North America. In return, it committed to have its ticket distribution in mainland Europe and the United Kingdom handled by CTS Eventim.
When the deal was announced in December 2007, Schulenberg said it was worth $100 million per year to Eventim. Over a 10-year term, this represented a billion-dollar opportunity.
The strategic logic was compelling: Live Nation would use Eventim's technology to challenge Ticketmaster's North American dominance, while Eventim would gain access to Live Nation's European ticketing volume. Live Nation sold millions of tickets using the CTS system.
The Merger Fight
Then came the bombshell. In early 2009, Live Nation and Ticketmaster announced plans to merge—a deal that would combine the world's largest concert promoter with the world's largest ticketing company.
For CTS Eventim, this was an existential threat disguised as a business opportunity. The Live Nation partnership had been predicated on Live Nation's need for an alternative to Ticketmaster. With Ticketmaster now becoming Live Nation's subsidiary, the entire rationale for the CTS Eventim partnership evaporated.
At the time of Eventim UK's launch, the company had already arranged to take over Live Nation's UK ticketing operations, including the installation of CTS ticketing hardware at various UK stadiums and theatres—Manchester Apollo, Motorpoint Arena Cardiff, and Southampton Guildhall.
Bremen-based CTS Eventim AG challenged the Competition Commission's approval of the proposed merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster in the United Kingdom, arguing that the antitrust authorities didn't give its concerns about the merger a fair hearing.
On 5 April 2010, Eventim lodged an arbitration action against Live Nation at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), suing Live Nation for various breaches of contract, demanding that Live Nation fulfil the terms of agreement and pay damages.
Schulenberg was reportedly asking the Paris-based court for $2 billion in damages.
The Aftermath
The International Court of Arbitration ruled that Live Nation Entertainment justifiably terminated the contract with CTS Eventim. Prior to Live Nation's 2010 merger with Ticketmaster Entertainment, CTS was enlisted by the concert-promotion giant to create a ticketing system to compete with Ticketmaster.
In June 2013, the arbitration between CTS Eventim and Live Nation was settled, over 3 years after it was initially filed. It was ruled that Live Nation were not liable for any costs to CTS Eventim.
This ruling removed a possible $210 million charge for Live Nation.
The loss was a bitter pill. But Schulenberg's response demonstrated the strategic acumen that would define CTS Eventim's subsequent trajectory: rather than continue fighting a losing battle for North American market share, he pivoted to doubling down on Europe.
At the beginning of 2013, a partnership between Eventim and SMG Europe was officially announced. At the time of the deal, SMG Europe were the UK's largest arena operator. The deal meant Eventim would be responsible for ticketing at five SMG venues including the newly constructed First Direct Arena, the Manchester Arena, Metro Radio Arena, Playhouse Whitley Bay and Mill Volvo Tyne Theatre.
In the summer of 2013, Eventim UK announced it was to become the name sponsor of the Hammersmith Apollo in partnership with co-owners AEG Live. The venue was renamed the Eventim Apollo ahead of the first event after its refurbishment on 7 September 2013.
The Live Nation battle taught Schulenberg a crucial lesson: in a two-player global market, geographic focus and operational excellence matter more than worldwide ambition. CTS Eventim would build an unassailable European fortress rather than dissipate resources on a frontal assault against Ticketmaster's North American dominance.
V. Inflection Point #2 — The Italian Battleground (2009-2019)
Italy as Strategic Priority
Italy became the proving ground for CTS Eventim's vertical integration strategy—and the arena where its competitive tactics would face regulatory scrutiny.
In terms of revenue, Italy is CTS Eventim's second largest market after Germany. Before the start of the coronavirus pandemic, the region generated around €271 million in the ticketing and live entertainment segments in 2019.
The Italian market presented a unique opportunity because it was fragmented—neither Ticketmaster nor any other player had established the dominant position seen in the UK or North America. CTS Eventim moved aggressively to consolidate.
Over the years, CTS Eventim would acquire several other ticketing and live entertainment companies, including Austrian promoter Barracuda Music, Italian-based promoters Vertigo and Friends & Partners, Holiday on Ice.
The Antitrust Battle
On 22 December 2020, the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) issued an important decision fining CTS Eventim €10.9 million for having implemented an unlawful exclusive strategy in the Italian market of pop music events ticket sellers. In September 2018, the AGCM launched an investigation alleging an infringement of Article 102 TFEU by TicketOne and its parent company CTS Eventim.
TicketOne holds a dominant position in the market for ticketing services for pop and rock concerts. The Authority investigated the agreements TicketOne entered into with event organisers since 2013, confirming that TicketOne and CTS Eventim had put in place a complex exclusive strategy with the double aim of boycotting competing ticket sellers and imposing exclusivity agreements on event organisers.
The contested acquisitions were explicitly aimed at mitigating the expansion of the Live Nation/TicketMaster group, which had begun to pursue ticketing activities in Italy expanding its presence from the live event promotion market. The aim of the acquisitions made by CTS Eventim - Ticketone was therefore to vertically integrate itself by expanding into the live event promotion market.
This is a critical admission that reveals CTS Eventim's strategic calculus: the Italian acquisitions weren't merely opportunistic—they were defensive moves designed to prevent Live Nation from establishing a beachhead in CTS Eventim's second-largest market.
On 24 March 2022, the Lazio Regional Administrative Tribunal annulled the January 2021 decision of the Italian Competition Authority in which CTS Eventim-Ticket One was fined 10.9 million euros after it was found to have abused its dominant market position.
On 24 October 2022, the Italian Supreme Administrative Court affirmed the Tar Lazio judgment, annulling the Italian Competition Authority decision to impose the fine on CTS Eventim – Ticketone for abuse of a dominant position in the market for live event ticket sales in Italy.
According to the Italian Supreme Court, the contested practices—in particular the acquisitions and related exclusivity clauses—may plausibly be objectively justified and do not necessarily result in an unlawful restriction.
The Italian courts essentially validated CTS Eventim's competitive defense argument: acquiring promoters to compete against a vertically integrated rival (Live Nation/Ticketmaster) represents legitimate competitive behavior, not anticompetitive foreclosure.
Breaking the €1 Billion Revenue Mark
In November 2019, CTS Eventim's revenue exceeded €1 billion for the first time in a nine-month period, and the share price had risen 60% that year to reach a market capitalisation of €5.2 billion.
The company broke the awe-inspiring $1 billion revenue mark in its earnings report for the fiscal year of 2017 and continued to grow both its ticketing and promotion segments in every quarter that followed.
By the end of 2019, CTS Eventim had assembled a formidable European empire: dominant ticketing positions in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and the Netherlands; a growing UK presence; ownership stakes in dozens of promoters; and a portfolio of premier venues. The company appeared unstoppable.
Then a novel coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, China.
VI. Inflection Point #3 — The COVID Crisis and Digital Transformation (2020-2022)
The Near-Death Experience
Few industries were hit harder by COVID-19 than live entertainment. For CTS Eventim, the pandemic represented an existential crisis—the first true test of whether the company's model could survive a complete shutdown of its core business.
CTS Eventim reported a revenue fall of more than 82 per cent in 2020 to €256.8m, which was down from €1.4bn the prior year.
The Berlin-based ticketing and live entertainment company saw normalised EBITDA come in at -€2.9m, down from a positive €286.5m the year prior.
CTS Eventim reported a 34.7% year-on-year nosedive in group revenue in the first quarter of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, falling from €282.7m to €184.6m.
CTS Eventim reported a 92 per cent drop in revenue in the third quarter of 2020, compared to the prior year.
These numbers are almost incomprehensible for a company that had grown consistently for two decades. An 82% revenue decline would destroy most businesses. What saved CTS Eventim?
The Schulenberg Playbook: Never Waste a Crisis
CTS EVENTIM responded promptly to the pandemic by adjusting its cost structure and boosting its efficiency, saving a double-digit million figure. Investments were also reduced to a minimum.
The company's financial foundations, which remain very robust even after a year of pandemic, is manifested by the EUR 741.2 million in cash and cash equivalents at the end of 2020.
"Never at any stage did we experience any kind of shock paralysis," Schulenberg said. "It was clear to us from the very beginning that, with our outstanding teams, we will emerge from this crisis stronger than before, by continuously extending our core competencies in technology and industry know-how."
This statement reveals Schulenberg's temperament: rather than panic-selling assets or making desperate cost cuts, he viewed the pandemic as an opportunity to invest in capabilities that would pay dividends during recovery.
Digital Innovation During Lockdown
With concerts cancelled worldwide, CTS Eventim pivoted its technology teams toward crisis response:
Vaccination Scheduling: The company adapted its ticketing platform for an entirely different use case. When millions of Germans and Austrians needed vaccination appointments, CTS Eventim's infrastructure—designed to handle massive, simultaneous demand spikes for concert tickets—proved ideal for scheduling jabs.
Digital Ticketing: CTS Eventim developed the EVENTIM.Pass, a proprietary digital ticket designed to provide better protection against unauthorized resale of tickets, where tickets can only be downloaded to the purchaser's smartphone using the EVENTIM.App.
Health Compliance: The company developed software solutions ensuring compliance with social distancing requirements through algorithmic seat allocation.
Strategic Expansion During the Pandemic
What separates great companies from merely good ones is how they behave during crises. While competitors retrenched, CTS Eventim made bold strategic moves:
On February 21st, 2020, it was announced that the company would enter the US market via a new joint venture based in New York City with promoter Michael Cohl.
The foundations for expansion in North America were laid in the beginning of 2020, just before the crisis hit, when Schulenberg partnered with Michael Cohl, the Canadian promoter icon and former Live Nation chairman who helped pioneer the modern-day mega tour. Like most of the deals Schulenberg has entered into, this one's a partnership, where CTS Eventim and Michael Cohl will each hold 50 percent of shares.
In July 2021, CTS Eventim launched Eventim Live Asia.
The pattern is unmistakable: while the rest of the industry focused on survival, CTS Eventim planted seeds for post-pandemic growth in new markets.
VII. Inflection Point #4 — Post-COVID Acceleration and Global Push (2022-Present)
The Explosive Recovery
The post-pandemic recovery exceeded even optimistic projections. Pent-up demand for live entertainment combined with CTS Eventim's expanded footprint to produce record-breaking results.
Consolidated revenue rose by 372% year on year, from EUR 408 million in 2021 to EUR 1.924 billion in 2022. This means that CTS EVENTIM's revenue reached a new all-time high of almost EUR 2 billion, an improvement of 33% compared with the previous record figure from 2019, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Group's normalised EBITDA amounted to EUR 384 million in 2022, following EUR 208 million in 2021 and EUR 287 million in 2019.
CTS Eventim, the German concert promoter and ticketing company, surpassed 2 billion euros in annual revenue for the first time in 2023. Revenue jumped 22% to 2.36 billion euros while normalized EBITDA grew 32% to 501.4 million euros.
CTS Eventim's annual results are further proof the concert business has been booming since COVID-19 restrictions were lifted. The company's total revenue was 63.4% higher than in 2019, the last full year before the pandemic temporarily halted the touring industry. Last year's live entertainment revenue was 70.1% above 2019 and ticketing revenue was 48.9% greater.
The Acquisition Spree
With strong cash flows restored, CTS Eventim resumed its acquisition-driven expansion with unprecedented ambition:
Specifically, those acquisitions were the ticketing market leaders in Chile (Punto Ticket) and Peru (Teleticket) in November 2023, and See Tickets – acquired from Vivendi and especially strong in the UK and the US – in June 2024.
The See Tickets acquisition was particularly significant. The total enterprise value of the transaction was approximately €300 million. Vivendi's ticketing and festival activities acquired by CTS EVENTIM collectively produced €137 million in revenues in 2023.
In addition to the UK, the business that CTS EVENTIM acquired also operates in seven other countries in Europe (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland), and in the US. Globally, See Tickets sold about 44 million tickets in 2023.
The German live entertainment behemoth was among several parties to register interest in buying See Tickets, along with Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG). CTS Eventim outbid AEG—a remarkable victory that demonstrates the company's willingness to pay for strategic assets.
The company's books also include what is now a majority stake in France Billet, the ticketing company in which CTS Eventim took a minority stake in 2019. In late 2024, CTS acquired an additional 17% stake, giving it majority control.
2024: Record-Breaking Year
CTS EVENTIM reports record revenue and earnings once again in 2024. Consolidated revenue for 2024 was up by 19.1% at EUR 2.809 billion, while adjusted EBITDA increased by 21.9% to reach EUR 542.2 million.
The company's ticketing segment saw revenues jump 22.7% YoY to €879.9 million, and the segment's adjusted EBITDA rose 21.1% YoY to €416.5 million. The company sold 103.4 million tickets online in 2024, up from 82.9 million the year before.
Management guidance for 2025 defines "moderate" growth as an internal increase of between 5% to 15%, with targets of EUR 3 billion in revenues and EUR 600 million in EBITDA by year-end.
Building Arena Infrastructure
CTS Eventim is now constructing its own venues—a capital-intensive but strategically valuable expansion:
The new CTS Eventim Arena in Milan will be Italy's largest indoor venue, accommodating up to 16,000 visitors. Managed by European ticketing and live-event giants CTS Eventim, it will debut at the Milan-Cortina Winter Olympic Games in 2026, showcasing the men's ice hockey competition, before hosting a wide range of live entertainment and sports events.
CTS Eventim has been awarded a contract to develop a new arena in Vienna, Austria. The contract for construction and operation has been awarded to CTS Eventim.
Once it has been completed at the end of 2025, ARENA MILANO will complement the portfolio, as will a new arena in Vienna for which CTS EVENTIM won the tender in November 2024.
Olympic Partnerships Signal Global Ambitions
AXS, a leading company in sports and live entertainment ticketing, and CTS EVENTIM have been appointed the Official Ticketing Service Provider for the LA28 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The agreement will see the two companies form a joint venture which will combine their technological know-how and considerable marketing assets to promote, sell, and distribute LA28 tickets on a global basis.
CTS EVENTIM's high-performance technology has reliably managed Olympic ticketing on several occasions over the past two decades, including at Turin in 2006, Sochi in 2014, Rio in 2016, and Paris in 2024.
The LA28 partnership—in collaboration with AEG's AXS ticketing platform—represents a significant North American foothold without requiring CTS Eventim to build competing infrastructure from scratch.
VIII. The Toll Road Detour (2018-2020)
No analysis of CTS Eventim would be complete without examining the company's most significant strategic misstep: the German passenger vehicle toll contract.
In December 2018, the German Federal Ministry of Transport notified a joint venture between CTS EVENTIM and Kapsch TrafficCom that they intended to award a contract for collecting the German infrastructure charge ("passenger vehicle toll"). CTS EVENTIM is an international leader in the ticketing and live entertainment sector, while Kapsch TrafficCom is a globally recognized provider of intelligent transportation systems.
For the operating company (the joint venture), the total volume throughout the minimum term of the contract amounted to almost EUR 2 billion.
It was the first time CTS Eventim's technology would be used for an application outside the ticketing sector.
The logic was seductive: CTS Eventim's core competency was processing millions of high-volume, time-sensitive transactions. Toll collection—essentially digital micropayments at scale—seemed like a natural extension.
In June 2019, the European Court of Justice overturned the German road toll plans, arguing that the fee violated EU law by discriminating against non-German drivers. The Austrian toll operator Kapsch TrafficCom as well as German ticket specialist CTS Eventim were affected by the termination of contracts.
The passenger car toll—a CSU prestige project—had been halted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in June 2019 as illegal. The intended operators claimed 560 million euros in damages after the federal government cancelled the contracts following the ruling.
As a result of the collapsed passenger car toll, the federal government must pay 243 million euros in damages to the intended operators. Federal Transport Minister Volker Wissing confirmed an agreement to this effect, saying, "This is a bitter sum."
Originally, more than 700 million euros in damages had been claimed.
The toll road saga offers several lessons:
Diversification Risk: Even seemingly natural extensions of core competencies carry execution and political risks. The toll project exposed CTS Eventim to regulatory uncertainty entirely outside its control.
Management Distraction: For two years, senior management attention was diverted toward a project that ultimately generated nothing but legal fees and recovery efforts.
Reputational Exposure: The project attracted political controversy, linking CTS Eventim's brand to an unpopular government scheme.
The €243 million damage award provides partial compensation, but the opportunity cost—management attention and capital that could have been deployed toward core entertainment operations—was substantial. To Schulenberg's credit, the company never wavered from its core business focus, and the toll road remained a sideshow rather than a strategic centerpiece.
IX. Business Model Deep Dive
The Two-Segment Structure
CTS Eventim operates through two segments, Ticketing and Live Entertainment. The Ticketing segment produces, sells, brokers, distributes, and markets tickets for concerts, theatre, art, sports, and other events. It markets events through eventim. Web and using its network platform, EVENTIM.Net.
Ticketing Economics: The "Toll Booth" Business
The ticketing segment is where the magic happens. Consider the economics:
Third-quarter 2025 revenue increased 3.5% to €854.2 million. Adjusted EBITDA jumped 13.8% to €137.3 million, lifting the company's margin to 16.1%, up from 14.6% a year earlier.
Ticketing revenue rose 2.1% to €211 million, while adjusted EBITDA improved 8.1% to €91 million during Q3 2025. That pushed the segment's EBITDA margin to 43.1%, up from 40.7% last year—a notable benchmark in the global ticketing landscape, where margins above 40% are rare among major operators.
A 43% EBITDA margin deserves emphasis. This is a business where incremental tickets sold require minimal incremental cost—the platform exists, the technology is built, the customer relationships are established. Each additional transaction flows almost directly to the bottom line.
Why does ticketing generate such high margins?
Low Marginal Cost: Once the platform is built, selling one more ticket costs essentially nothing. Server capacity is scalable, and labor doesn't increase proportionally with volume.
Network Effects: More events on the platform attract more consumers; more consumers attract more promoters listing events. This virtuous cycle creates market power that enables pricing leverage.
Data Moat: Every ticket sold generates customer data—preferences, purchase patterns, willingness to pay—that improves marketing effectiveness and attracts more event partners.
Switching Costs: Venue and promoter contracts are typically multi-year, creating predictable revenue streams. Changing ticketing providers requires retraining staff, integrating new systems, and risking customer confusion.
Live Entertainment Economics
The Live Entertainment segment recorded revenue of EUR 1.971 billion (+17.6%) in 2024, with adjusted EBITDA of EUR 125.6 million (+24.4%). This meant that the adjusted EBITDA margin was increased by just under half a percentage point despite persistent upward pressure on the cost of infrastructure, personnel and fees.
Live entertainment operates on fundamentally different economics than ticketing:
Capital Intensity: Promoting concerts requires upfront investment in artist guarantees, venue deposits, marketing, and production. Revenue is concentrated around event dates, creating lumpy cash flows.
Cost Inflation: Artist fees, venue costs, and production expenses have risen faster than ticket prices in recent years, compressing margins across the industry.
Weather/Force Majeure Risk: Outdoor festivals and events carry execution risk that ticketing platforms don't face.
The Live Entertainment segment's ~6% EBITDA margin pales compared to Ticketing's 43%. So why own promoters at all?
Content Control: Promoters provide guaranteed inventory for the ticketing platform. Without events to sell, a ticketing platform is worthless.
Competitive Defense: Owning promoters prevents rivals from securing exclusive content. If Live Nation acquired all of CTS Eventim's promoter partners, the ticketing platform would wither.
Vertical Synergies: Integrated promoters don't pay third-party ticketing fees, improving their competitive position versus independent promoters.
The Flywheel Effect
"Rising demand, organic growth, ongoing synergies and a successful international acquisition policy are the pillars of our robust growth," CEO Klaus-Peter Schulenberg said.
The CTS Eventim flywheel operates as follows:
Ticketing Technology → Attracts promoters seeking reliable, high-conversion platforms → Generates more events on the platform → Drives ticket volume → Funds technology investment → Creates better ticketing technology
Each revolution of this flywheel strengthens competitive position. New promoters join because the platform has scale; scale enables investment in better technology; better technology attracts more promoters.
X. Competitive Analysis and Strategic Framework
Porter's Five Forces Analysis
1. Threat of New Entrants: LOW
Entry barriers in ticketing are formidable:
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Network Effects: A new entrant must simultaneously attract venues, promoters, and consumers. Without events, no consumers come; without consumers, no events list. This chicken-and-egg problem has defeated numerous well-funded challengers.
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Switching Costs: Venue contracts are multi-year, ticketing systems integrate with venue operations, and staff training creates organizational inertia.
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Capital Requirements: Building a scalable ticketing platform requires significant technology investment. Adding live entertainment operations requires even more capital for artist guarantees and venue relationships.
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Data Advantages: Incumbents possess decades of transaction data enabling sophisticated pricing, marketing, and fraud prevention. New entrants start with no data.
2. Bargaining Power of Suppliers (Artists/Promoters): MEDIUM
Top-tier artists have significant leverage—Ed Sheeran or Taylor Swift can demand favorable terms from any promoter. However:
- Artists need distribution: Even the biggest stars require ticketing platforms with reach.
- Promoter fragmentation: CTS Eventim's partial ownership stakes in dozens of promoters provide diversification.
- Long-term relationships: EVENTIM LIVE promoters have multi-decade relationships with artists and managers, creating switching costs.
3. Bargaining Power of Buyers (Consumers): LOW
Ticket buyers face limited alternatives:
- For most events, a single ticketing platform controls inventory.
- Fans have strong emotional attachment to artists, making demand inelastic.
- Convenience fees are small relative to total event cost (travel, accommodation, merchandise).
4. Threat of Substitutes: LOW
Live entertainment has no true substitute. Streaming concerts, VR experiences, and recorded music serve different purposes than the irreplaceable experience of attending a live event. The post-COVID surge in ticket demand demonstrates entertainment's experiential component cannot be digitally replicated.
5. Competitive Rivalry: MEDIUM
The ticketing industry has consolidated into essentially a duopoly: Live Nation/Ticketmaster globally, CTS Eventim in Europe. This structure produces:
- Rational pricing: Neither player has incentive to destroy margins through price wars.
- Geographic respect: CTS Eventim dominates Europe; Live Nation dominates North America. Neither has successfully invaded the other's core territory.
- M&A discipline: Both players compete for acquisition targets, but bidding wars are rare.
Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers Framework
1. Scale Economies: Ticketing platforms exhibit powerful scale economies. CTS Eventim's infrastructure serves 300+ million tickets annually at near-zero marginal cost. A competitor processing 10 million tickets faces the same fixed technology costs spread over far fewer transactions.
2. Network Effects: The platform benefits from demand-side scale effects. More events attract more consumers; more consumers attract more events. These network effects create winner-take-most dynamics within geographic markets.
3. Counter-Positioning: When CTS Eventim pioneered vertically integrated ticketing-plus-promotion, incumbent ticketing companies (focused solely on ticketing) couldn't easily respond without cannibalizing relationships with independent promoters—their customers.
4. Switching Costs: Venue contracts, staff training, system integration, and consumer habits all create friction that makes switching ticketing providers painful. These switching costs enable pricing power and reduce churn.
5. Branding: CTS Eventim's localized brand strategy (eventim.de, TicketOne, oeticket) builds consumer trust at the market level. For Germans buying concert tickets, eventim.de is the default choice—a position earned through decades of reliable service.
6. Cornered Resource: The company's relationships with promoters—many of whom sold stakes to CTS Eventim decades ago—represent irreplaceable strategic assets. These relationships were built through personal trust, cannot be easily replicated, and are contractually locked in.
7. Process Power: CTS Eventim's ability to execute complex acquisitions, integrate diverse promoter cultures, and manage pan-European operations represents organizational capabilities refined over 25+ years.
Comparison with Live Nation
Live Nation generated revenues of $23.16 billion in 2024—more than seven times CTS Eventim's revenue. This size differential matters less than it appears:
| Metric | CTS Eventim | Live Nation |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 Revenue Growth | 19.1% | ~3% |
| Ticketing EBITDA Margin | ~43% | ~30% |
| Geographic Focus | Europe (dominant) | North America (dominant) |
| Founder Leadership | Yes (50+ years) | No |
| Regulatory Scrutiny | Moderate | Intense |
Live Nation faces mounting antitrust pressure in the United States, with the Department of Justice pursuing a breakup lawsuit. CTS Eventim, while not immune to regulatory scrutiny (as the Italian case demonstrated), operates in a less hostile regulatory environment.
XI. Investment Framework: KPIs and Considerations
Key Performance Indicators
For investors tracking CTS Eventim's ongoing performance, three metrics matter most:
1. Online Tickets Sold
This is the single most important operational metric. The company sold 103.4 million tickets online in 2024, up from 82.9 million the year before. This 25% increase demonstrates both organic growth and the impact of acquisitions. Watch this number quarterly—ticket volume is the fundamental driver of ticketing revenue.
2. Ticketing EBITDA Margin
The segment's EBITDA margin rose to 43.1%, up from 40.7% last year. This margin expansion reflects operating leverage—the incremental profitability of each additional ticket processed. Sustained margin above 40% indicates pricing power and cost discipline. Margin compression would signal competitive pressure or integration challenges.
3. Revenue Growth by Segment
Disaggregating revenue growth between Ticketing and Live Entertainment reveals business quality. High-margin ticketing growth is inherently more valuable than low-margin live entertainment growth. The ideal scenario: ticketing growing faster than live entertainment, with stable or expanding live entertainment margins.
Myth vs. Reality
| Consensus Narrative | Reality Check |
|---|---|
| "CTS Eventim is too small to compete globally" | Geographic focus is a feature, not a bug. European dominance generates superior margins versus global dilution. |
| "The company is a 'mini Live Nation'" | Fundamentally different strategy: partial ownership, localized brands, founder leadership. Different playbook entirely. |
| "COVID proved live entertainment is too risky" | CTS Eventim emerged stronger post-COVID, with revenue 63%+ above 2019 levels. The crisis demonstrated resilience, not fragility. |
| "Ticketing fees are politically vulnerable" | European regulators have been more focused on data privacy than fee regulation. The Italian case was ultimately decided in CTS Eventim's favor. |
Bull Case
- European Fortress: Dominant positions across major European markets with high switching costs and network effects
- Recovery Has Room to Run: Post-COVID demand remains elevated; major tours (Taylor Swift, Coldplay, Ed Sheeran) continue driving record volumes
- Acquisition Optionality: Strong balance sheet enables continued M&A; See Tickets integration opens North American opportunity
- Olympic Visibility: LA28 and Milano Cortina 2026 partnerships provide global brand exposure without capital risk
- Arena Development: Milan and Vienna venues provide long-term recurring revenue and guaranteed ticketing inventory
- Founder Alignment: Schulenberg's significant ownership ensures aligned incentives and long-term thinking
Bear Case
- Live Nation Competition: If Live Nation aggressively targeted Europe, CTS Eventim would face well-funded competition
- Regulatory Risk: European antitrust authorities could eventually target ticketing consolidation
- Artist Leverage: Mega-stars increasingly control their own ticketing (Taylor Swift's relationship with Ticketmaster)
- Economic Sensitivity: Discretionary spending on entertainment is vulnerable to recession
- Integration Execution: See Tickets and France Billet acquisitions require successful integration
- Succession Risk: Schulenberg, born in 1951, has led the company for nearly 30 years. No clear succession plan is public
Material Risks and Regulatory Considerations
Ongoing Legal Matters: While CTS Eventim won its Italian antitrust appeal, the court indicated that certain practices "may in fact constitute abuses of dominance requiring further investigations." The regulatory environment remains fluid.
Accounting Considerations: The company's partial ownership structure—with minority stakes in numerous promoters—requires careful attention to consolidation methods and minority interest accounting. Revenue and EBITDA figures can differ depending on proportional versus full consolidation treatment.
Currency Exposure: Operating across 25+ countries exposes CTS Eventim to euro/pound/franc/krona fluctuations. Reported results can be materially impacted by currency movements.
XII. Conclusion — The Ticket Collector at the Colosseum Gates
In ancient Rome, the Colosseum required no tickets. Citizens simply arrived, and seating was determined by social rank. The entertainment was free—subsidized by emperors seeking popular legitimacy.
Two millennia later, live entertainment operates on different principles. The ticket has become the gateway—not just to a seat, but to an experience that no streaming service, virtual reality headset, or social media post can replicate. And at that gateway, collecting a small fee from each of hundreds of millions of annual transactions, sits CTS Eventim.
Klaus-Peter Schulenberg has been active in the entertainment industry for more than 45 years. From booking gigs for his mediocre high school band to commanding a €7+ billion enterprise, his trajectory embodies the power of compounding—not just financial returns, but relationships, knowledge, and competitive position.
The business Schulenberg has built represents a masterclass in vertical integration done right. Rather than pursuing global empire, CTS Eventim focused on European excellence. Rather than demanding full control, partial ownership preserved entrepreneurial energy. Rather than fighting Live Nation worldwide, strategic retreat to defensible territory preserved profitability.
"Our performance in the third quarter illustrates once again that we are not only growing but also creating long-term value," Schulenberg said. "We are benefitting from continually modernising our technological infrastructure, significantly optimising our processes and making progress with the integration of our acquisitions."
For investors, CTS Eventim presents a rare opportunity to own a dominant position in an essential industry with durable competitive advantages and aligned founder leadership. The company's €7+ billion market capitalization represents a meaningful discount to Live Nation's ~$30 billion valuation, despite superior margins and comparable European dominance.
The risks are real: succession uncertainty, regulatory evolution, and competitive dynamics could all impair the investment thesis. But the underlying business—collecting a small toll on every transaction in an industry with irreplaceable experiential value—remains as attractive as it was when Schulenberg first recognized the potential of digital ticketing three decades ago.
In a world increasingly dominated by digital substitutes, live entertainment stands apart. You cannot stream the crowd's roar when your team scores, the collective gasp when an acrobat defies gravity, or the transcendent moment when 80,000 voices sing in unison with their favorite artist. That experience has no substitute—and CTS Eventim owns the entrance gate.
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