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Colruyt Group: Belgium's Discount Retail Dynasty
Introduction & Episode Roadmap
Picture a no-frills warehouse in Lembeek, Belgium, where fluorescent lights cast a utilitarian glow across metal shelving and customers push carts along bare concrete floors. There are no shopping bags provided. No background music. No elaborate displays. Just row after row of groceries priced to beat every competitor in the neighborhood—guaranteed.
This is Colruyt, Belgium's largest supermarket chain, and its deliberate austerity conceals one of the most sophisticated retail operations in Europe.
With consolidated revenue approaching €11 billion for fiscal year 2024/25, Colruyt Group operates 782 owned stores and 1,006 affiliated outlets across Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, employing 33,852 people. The family-controlled conglomerate has transformed from a small colonial goods wholesaler into the dominant force in Belgian grocery retail, consistently holding a market share around 29-31% through the most competitive periods in the industry's history.
The central question driving this analysis: How did a business supplying bread, spices, and coffee to local grocers in 1928 become Belgium's dominant discount retailer—and remain family-controlled through nearly a century of retail transformation?
Colruyt competes with hard discounters such as Aldi and Lidl in Benelux countries where it is a well-established market leader. This alone sets Colruyt apart: while most traditional retailers have been devastated by the German discount invasion, Colruyt has thrived by out-discounting the discounters. The company represents perhaps the most successful example of a full-service supermarket chain beating Aldi and Lidl at their own game.
Several critical inflection points define the Colruyt story. The near-bankruptcy crisis in the mid-1980s when Aldi's Belgian entry nearly destroyed the company. The bold bet on offshore wind energy through Parkwind, culminating in a €1.6 billion exit to Japan's JERA in 2023. And the historic leadership transition when third-generation CEO Jef Colruyt handed the reins to Stefan Goethaert—the first non-family member to lead the company since its founding.
For investors, Colruyt presents a fascinating case study in family capitalism, where patient capital and generational thinking have created a durable competitive moat. The company's "lowest price guarantee" isn't marketing fluff—it's an operational system built over fifty years, involving dedicated pricing teams, real-time competitive intelligence, and a corporate culture fanatically committed to cost reduction.
Founding & Early Years: From Colonial Goods to Supermarkets (1928–1964)
The story begins with a Belgian baker named Franz Colruyt in the small town of Lembeek, situated along the Brussels-Halle corridor. Baker Franz Colruyt first supplied bread, and spices and coffee later on, to grocers around Lembeek. In 1928, he established a colonial wholesale goods business.
Franz possessed an entrepreneur's eye for opportunity. Belgium in the late 1920s was emerging from the devastation of World War I, and the grocery trade remained fragmented across thousands of small independent shops. These shopkeepers needed reliable suppliers—someone who could source the exotic colonial goods (coffee, spices, sugar) that Belgian consumers craved, alongside staples like bread and basic provisions.
In 1928, Franz Colruyt decided to shut down the bakery and start up a wholesale business in colonial goods, such as coffee and spices. Until the war, the wholesale business mainly served stores around Halle and Tubeke. After WW2, the business boomed and new customers were found in and around Brussels.
What set Franz apart was his obsessive focus on efficiency. Starting a business during a crisis year—Belgium was still recovering economically—forced disciplined operations from day one. Franz Colruyt had a lot of attention for matters such as work simplification, efficiency, simplicity and working with production lines. This was also a necessity. He started his business during a crisis year.
This DNA of efficiency would become the company's most enduring characteristic.
In 1950, Franz Colruyt founded the "Etablissementen Franz Colruyt nv" with a capital of 5 million francs (€125,000). His brothers Henri and Jules were also part of the business. By the early 1950s, Belgium's retail landscape was beginning to shift. The first mini-supermarkets and supermarkets appeared, introducing the revolutionary concept of self-service shopping to a market accustomed to shopkeepers fetching items from behind counters.
Franz recognized both the threat and opportunity this presented. In the 1950s, the first mini-supermarkets and supermarkets opened in Belgium. As a reaction to this, Franz Colruyt opened the Boni stores. These were run by independent shopkeepers that bought goods from Colruyt. The Boni stores, which opened in 1953, represented Colruyt's first foray beyond pure wholesale—a franchise-like model that kept the company close to consumers while preserving its core distribution competency.
Franz also introduced Boni stamps, a loyalty program that rewarded repeat customers and helped independent shopkeepers compete with the emerging chain stores. This early innovation in customer retention would echo through decades of Colruyt strategy.
In 1958, his son Jo Colruyt took over the company with his brothers. At that time, the company was already delivering to about 800 small independent stores and had about 150 employees.
The generational transition came at a pivotal moment. Jo Colruyt arrived as the American supermarket model was sweeping across Europe. Jo Colruyt tried to convince independent shop owners of the American 'supermarket' model, with self-service, and guided them in the change-over. The first Super Boni opened in 1958.
Crucially, in 1948 Franz sent his son Jo to follow a "work simplification" course (organized by the American army), which is still a key word in the company's approach today. This American influence—both in the supermarket concept and in industrial efficiency methods—would profoundly shape Colruyt's evolution.
Jo's challenge was existential: as supermarkets proliferated, they would bypass traditional wholesalers and source directly from manufacturers. Colruyt's entire business model faced obsolescence. The solution would be radical transformation.
The Discount Revolution: Jo Colruyt's Bold Bet (1964–1980s)
In 1964, Jo Colruyt made the decision that would define the company for the next sixty years. In 1964, Jo opened his first own supermarket, where he offered all known brands 10% cheaper and got rid of all superfluous infrastructure. After all, he had no money to advertise and competition was stiff.
This wasn't a minor adjustment to strategy—it was a complete reinvention of the business model. Jo had observed that the emerging supermarket chains required substantial investment in design, layout, and interior furnishing. But what if those costs were stripped away entirely? What if the savings were passed directly to consumers?
In the mid-1960s, Jo Colruyt chose to switch to retail and took over the self-service business Verloo in Ixelles/Elsene and launched his lowest prices policy, offering famous brands 10% cheaper. This was when the struggle for efficiency, simplicity and economy typical of Colruyt stores began.
With the opening of the first discount store in 1965, they introduced the discount concept to Belgium, revolutionizing the retail landscape. The bold approach of offering prices 10% lower than competitors immediately won over customers.
The timing was propitious—yet challenging. Jo had no advertising budget, and the retail establishment viewed discount stores with suspicion. But necessity bred innovation.
Jo Colruyt then decided to turn it into a large warehouse where the goods were presented in a sober manner to consumers, who were invited to take a punched card, read at the checkout, along with each item. This system, connected to a small computer, reduced costs and offered very low prices.
This represents one of the earliest applications of computer technology in European retail. Colruyt became one of the first supermarket groups in the world to incorporate computer technology as part of its cashier checkout process, with an IBM 360-20 in its headquarters linked to a tabulating machine in its store. Information technology was placed at the heart of the group's retail operation, enabling inventory tracking and unit pricing some 20 years and more ahead of most of its competitors.
Think about what this means: in the mid-1960s, while competitors were still using manual inventory systems, Colruyt was automating replenishment and tracking unit costs with mainframe computers. This wasn't just about efficiency—it was about building a sustainable competitive advantage that would compound over decades.
The expansion was rapid: in 1965, the turnover was 250 million francs; ten years later, it exceeded ten billion. A forty-fold increase in a decade, built on a simple insight: Belgian consumers would sacrifice shopping ambiance for genuinely lower prices.
By 1976, all retail outlets were unified under the Colruyt name. This rebranding consolidated the company's identity around the discount concept.
By the 1970s, Colruyt had introduced the self-service shopping format that would become standard across Belgium. In 1987, Colruyt became the first company in Belgium to use 'full scanning,' a barcode on the product to automate replenishment, stock management and orders.
The technological lead wasn't accidental—it reflected Jo Colruyt's understanding that lowest prices required lowest costs, and lowest costs required operational excellence supported by information systems.
Colruyt introduced a horizontal corporate structure with as few managers as possible. He paid attention to employee participation and viewed training of personnel as important. The flat organizational structure minimized overhead while the investment in employee training ensured productivity gains could be captured throughout the workforce.
The Near-Death Experience: Aldi Enters Belgium
Every successful company has a moment when its existence hangs in the balance. For Colruyt, that moment came in the mid-1980s when a far more formidable discounter arrived in Belgium: Aldi.
Aldi's successful entry to the market, combined with heavy investments and many new hirings (necessary to support growth), brought Colruyt to the brink of bankruptcy. By focusing on work simplification, craftsmanship and its lowest price policy, the company recovered. From then on the company has only known growth.
In the mid-1980s the Colruyt company was almost bankrupt, competing with newcomer Aldi. From 1988 the company slowly returned to profitability. Activities included the continuation of low prices on about 300 products.
This crisis deserves careful analysis because it shaped Colruyt's corporate DNA for the next four decades.
Aldi's German model was relentlessly efficient: tiny store footprints, ruthlessly limited SKU counts (typically 1,000-2,000 items versus 10,000+ at conventional supermarkets), almost no branded products, and prices that seemed impossibly low. Where Colruyt sold major brands at 10% discounts, Aldi sold only private label at prices that often beat Colruyt by 20% or more.
The challenge was existential. Colruyt had positioned itself as Belgium's price leader, but suddenly a competitor arrived who made Colruyt look expensive. Meanwhile, Colruyt had expanded rapidly, hiring extensively and investing heavily in new infrastructure—commitments that couldn't easily be reversed when revenues fell short.
Colruyt's expansion left it in a weak financial position as recession hit Belgium at the end of the decade. The company found itself clawing its way back from near collapse, and the period encouraged the company to adopt a more cautious expansion strategy.
The recovery strategy was three-pronged:
First, an even more fanatical focus on work simplification. Every process was re-examined for waste. The sparse store aesthetic, originally a cost-saving measure, was doubled down upon. Lighting was dimmed. Shopping bags were eliminated. Nothing that didn't directly serve customers was permitted.
Second, a sharpening of the lowest price promise around approximately 300 key products that drove the majority of household spending. If Colruyt couldn't beat Aldi across every category, it could ensure it won decisively on the items that mattered most.
Third, a fundamentally different competitive positioning. Rather than trying to match Aldi's private-label model, Colruyt leaned into its strength: offering major brands at the lowest prices. This appealed to consumers who wanted brand-name products but remained price-conscious.
As Jef Colruyt, who took over as company chairman from his father Jo in 1994, later told Trends: "We have learned the lesson that it's dangerous to grow rapidly if your financial base is weak. Since then, our strategy has been to grow step by step."
This philosophy—"step by step"—would become the company's mantra, reflecting hard-won wisdom from near-disaster. When Jo Colruyt died in 1994, his son Jef inherited a company that had been tested by crisis and emerged stronger, with a clear sense of its competitive identity.
For investors, the Aldi crisis offers critical insight: Colruyt's competitive moat isn't merely "low prices"—it's a comprehensive operational system refined over decades that enables sustainable price leadership. Companies can copy price points; they can't easily replicate decades of institutional learning around efficiency.
The Lowest Price Guarantee: Building the Moat (1990s–2000s)
If Colruyt had one core strategic insight that separated it from competitors, it was this: making a lowest price guarantee credible requires building an entire organizational system to support it. The promise is easy; the delivery is extraordinarily hard.
The story of Colruyt's lowest prices started nearly 50 years ago. "We launched our lowest prices promise in 1973 when we decided to set ourselves apart from our competitors by offering the lowest prices. That meant that we had to watch every penny," Chris Van Wettere explains. This cost awareness is still deeply ingrained in Colruyt today. The retailer keeps costs low to be able to offer the lowest prices to its customers.
The mechanism is sophisticated. "We record prices both offline and online. In this way, we guarantee the lowest prices in our Colruyt stores and on our webshop, via Collect&Go. Our team of 120 co-workers records 62,000 prices every day," Chris Van Wettere says.
Read that again: 120 employees recording 62,000 prices daily. This isn't a marketing claim—it's an industrial operation.
Another important aspect of Colruyt's lowest prices is that the purchasing policy and the sales policy are completely separate from one another. "Our products' purchase prices are always entirely independent of their sales prices. We negotiate the purchase price with our suppliers, thereby ensuring that these negotiations proceed in a constructive manner. Our products' sales prices are determined by the market. At Colruyt, we guarantee our customers the lowest prices. To achieve this, we monitor our competitors' prices and promotions, which determines the price of the products in the stores."
This organizational design is crucial: separating purchasing negotiations from retail pricing ensures Colruyt isn't tempted to pass procurement inefficiencies to consumers. The retailer must be efficient in purchasing and competitive in pricing—two distinct disciplines that reinforce each other.
"Colruyt is a price follower rather than a price fixer. In other words, we keep track of our competitors' prices and promotions and adjust where needed to guarantee the lowest prices. To achieve this, we need a high-performance system and a strong team of price experts."
The geographic dimension adds another layer of sophistication. According to consumer organization Test-Aankoop, Colruyt stores that are located near to a branch of Albert Heijn are 3% cheaper than the chain's other stores. Test-Aankoop's Simon November told journalists that "Colruyt has to make great efforts to undercut Albert Heijn's prices."
This means Colruyt runs effectively different pricing regimes across its store network, adjusting dynamically based on local competitive conditions. Product prices differ from Colruyt store to Colruyt store, as the retailer follows national prices and promotions as well as the prices and promotions of local competitors. In this way, customers are sure to find the lowest prices in the area of their Colruyt store.
Technology has become central to maintaining this system at scale. Colruyt and TCS collaborated successfully to implement the Next-Gen Pricing Engine, an algorithmic, near real-time, intelligent system that automates the deployment of the pricing strategy across products, linked items, stores, channels and brands. To improve the in-store price recording from competitor locations, a real time mobile app was launched to boost the productivity and accuracy. The system uses in-parallel memory processing for large volumes of data to generate price recommendations at near real-time speed.
Partnering with TCS for the innovative use of technology is helping Colruyt Lowest Prices respond to competitors with speed and agility, capturing over 100,000 competitor prices and processing up to 50 million reaction prices daily.
Fifty million reaction prices processed daily. This is the industrial infrastructure behind a deceptively simple consumer promise.
The 1990s also saw Colruyt respond to Belgium's dioxin crisis by pioneering food safety standards. In the 1990s, in the light of the dioxin affair, the company suggested to draw up specifications with requirements for suppliers, which were later also used by other distributors. This proactive approach to food safety strengthened supplier relationships and positioned Colruyt as an industry leader in quality assurance.
In 1996, Colruyt crossed the border into France for the first time. The French expansion represented a calculated bet on exporting the Colruyt formula to a larger market.
Diversification & Format Expansion (2000–2015)
By the late 1990s, a strategic reality was becoming clear: Aware that Colruyt's growth cannot continue indefinitely, Jef Colruyt focused on the development of formulas such as Okay and Bio-Planet and invested in non-food with Dreamland and Dreambaby.
The Belgian retail market was maturing, and Colruyt's core discount supermarket format was approaching saturation. Rather than pursue reckless expansion—the mistake that had nearly destroyed the company in the 1980s—Jef Colruyt chose disciplined diversification.
OKay, launched in 1998, targeted a different customer need: convenience. While Colruyt stores were large-format destination shopping experiences, OKay stores were smaller neighborhood outlets offering fresh produce and daily essentials. The format grew steadily and now comprises approximately 170 stores across Belgium.
Bio-Planet addressed the growing organic and natural products segment. With approximately 39 stores and online Collect&Go service, the format serves health-conscious consumers willing to pay premium prices for sustainable sourcing. The roughly 6,000-item assortment includes fresh organic fruits and vegetables, positioning Bio-Planet as a specialty complement to the value-focused Colruyt brand.
In 2000, Collect&Go offered Colruyt's food assortment online. This early move into e-commerce—years before most European grocers took online seriously—demonstrated Colruyt's willingness to embrace technology that served customers.
With the take-over of Spar in 2003, the company returned to its B2B roots. The Spar acquisition brought Colruyt back into wholesale distribution, supplying affiliated independent supermarkets. This diversified revenue streams while leveraging existing logistics infrastructure.
The non-food expansion proved more challenging. In 1994, the company moved into toys and seasonal goods with the acquisition of Droomland, a chain of five stores founded in 1979. Droomland featured a year-round assortment of toys, school and office supplies, infant needs, and gifts, as well as a constantly revolving assortment of items linked to the different seasons and holidays.
Dreamland and its spinoff Dreambaby (focused on infant products) expanded the group's reach but would later prove less strategically compelling than food retail.
The company operates through Food; Health & Well-Being and Non-Food; and Group Activities, Real Estate and Energy segments. It operates supermarkets under the Colruyt Lowest Prices brand name. The company also offers a range of food brands through its own stores and online retail channels. In addition, it operates Jims, a chain of physical fitness clubs; Yoboo, an online health platform; Newpharma, an online pharmacy; The Fashion Society, a multi-brand fashion chain; and Bike Republic.
By 2015, Colruyt Group had evolved from a single-format discount supermarket into a multi-format retail conglomerate with positions across the value spectrum—from hard discount to premium organic, from brick-and-mortar to e-commerce, from food to fitness.
The Energy Bet: Parkwind & Offshore Wind (2009–2023)
Perhaps no strategic decision better illustrates Colruyt's unconventional thinking than its dive into offshore wind energy—a venture that would ultimately generate a €1.6 billion exit for the family.
Parkwind roots stretch back as far as 1990 when the Colruyt Group launched the Greenline ecology program which included the reduction of energy consumption amongst other sustainability initiatives. This eventually evolved into the vision to become energy auto-sufficient.
For a supermarket company, energy self-sufficiency might seem like an odd aspiration. But Colruyt's operational philosophy—eliminating waste and controlling costs—naturally extended to energy. Electricity represents a significant operating expense for any retailer running refrigeration systems around the clock.
Back in 1999, Colruyt erected its first windmill at its distribution center and then many others followed. These onshore wind installations served the practical purpose of reducing electricity costs while aligning with emerging sustainability concerns.
The Belgian federal government designated an offshore wind energy development zone as a first major step towards its renewable energy goals, becoming one of Europe's leading nations in offshore wind. In 2004, as part of a consortium called "Eldepasco", the Colruyt Group and partners applied for the Northwind concession. The Northwind concession was awarded to Colruyt Group and partners and the project was constructed in 2013.
Then came the pivotal opportunity. The opportunity to accelerate the offshore ambition came in 2009 when the Colruyt Group agreed to step into the already developed Belwind project. The Colruyt Group, Korys and PMV took over the lead of the financially troubled Belwind project (one of the several concessions created in 2004). The wind farm construction started the same year.
The project was financed under a Project Finance structure by Project Company 'Belwind', after a number of delays that included bankruptcy of developer Econcern. Financial completion was eventually reached on 27 July 2009. The €614 million deal saw Colruyt Group, the Colruyt family, SHV, ParticipatieMaatschappij Vlaanderen, Meewind and Rabo Project Equity come together to invest in the construction of the 165 MW first stage of the Project.
In 2012, the Colruyt Group, Korys and PMV created Parkwind N.V. grouping all the offshore wind energy activities of the three shareholders.
Virya Energy, the energy holding company in which Colruyt Group owns a stake of 59.9 per cent, is active in the development, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of renewable energy sources, with a particular focus on offshore and onshore wind energy. Parkwind, founded in 2012, is one of the subsidiaries of Virya Energy and became the largest offshore wind platform in Belgium. Parkwind has stakes in four operational wind farms located off the Belgian coast, in the North Sea: Belwind, Northwind, Nobelwind, and Northwester 2.
For over a decade, Parkwind built and operated wind farms while Colruyt continued its core retail business. Then in 2023, geopolitical and market shifts created an exit opportunity.
Colruyt Group previously announced that Virya Energy was elaborating the option of a partial divestment of its subsidiary Parkwind. The reason being that the energy market situation, the Green Deal, and geopolitical tensions are having an impact on the speed of the evolution of the offshore industry. Colruyt Group said that this has resulted in a substantial increase in the size of offshore wind projects, resulting in a higher financial exposure of investors.
On 22 March 2023, Virya Energy reached an agreement with JERA Green Ltd, a subsidiary of JERA Co., Inc., to sell 100% of the shares of Parkwind NV, Virya Energy's offshore wind energy platform. Approval by the relevant competition and other regulatory authorities was obtained and on 26 July 2023, the sale of Parkwind to JERA was successfully completed. The final price was approximately EUR 1.6 billion (net of debt and transaction costs) at the level of Virya Energy.
The completion of the transaction led to a very large one-off positive effect in the consolidated net result of Colruyt Group in the financial year 2023/24. That effect was estimated at EUR 650 million to EUR 700 million.
What began as an operational initiative to reduce energy costs ended as a financial windfall exceeding €700 million in one-time gains—a remarkable return on a bet that many considered outside Colruyt's core competency.
Colruyt Group and Korys Investments NV, the investment company of the Colruyt family, reached an agreement whereby Colruyt Group sold approximately 30% of its stake in the energy holding company Virya Energy to Korys. As a result of this transaction, Colruyt Group's stake in Virya Energy decreased from approximately 60% to 30%. On 25 March 2024, Colruyt Group and Korys reached an agreement whereby Colruyt Group sold about 30% of its stake in Virya Energy to Korys.
The Parkwind saga illustrates several things about Colruyt. First, the company's willingness to think long-term—the energy investments began in 1990 and paid off over three decades later. Second, the discipline to exit when circumstances changed, rather than clinging to positions for emotional reasons. Third, the advantage of family ownership in pursuing unconventional strategies that public market investors might have questioned.
The Margin Squeeze & Competitive Pressure (2020–2023)
The post-pandemic period proved challenging for Colruyt, as multiple forces compressed margins and tested the durability of the lowest price guarantee.
Belgian retailer Colruyt Group saw its margins evaporating as a result of increasing price competition and rising costs. The retailer did gain some market share, but paid a high price for this. Its profits fell by a third, and would be even lower the following year. Although Colruyt Group's revenue rose slightly in the financial year 2021-2022 (+1.2%), its operating profit fell by a whopping 28.3%. The margin dropped from 5.3% to 3.7%.
The COVID-19 pandemic initially boosted grocery retailers as consumers ate at home. But the subsequent normalization, combined with supply chain disruptions and accelerating inflation, created unprecedented pressures.
The fact that prices are now high on the consumers' agenda again should be good news for a discounter, but the problem is that Colruyt cannot fully pass on price and cost increases because of its lowest price guarantee and strong competition. Especially Albert Heijn keeps the pressure high. Furthermore, Colruyt is hit more than others by Belgium's automatic wage indexation: the workforce has grown strongly and has a slightly higher seniority than that of most competitors.
Belgium's automatic wage indexation system—which adjusts wages based on inflation—hit Colruyt particularly hard. A mature workforce with significant tenure meant higher average wages, and automatic indexation during high-inflation periods amplified the effect.
However, this was no reason for Colruyt Group to adjust its strategy: the retailer stuck to its lowest price guarantee and limited price increases as much as possible.
This commitment to the lowest price promise during inflationary periods represents both a strategic strength and a financial burden. Colruyt chose market share and customer loyalty over short-term profits—a decision that only makes sense with patient, long-term-oriented ownership.
The competitive dynamics intensified as Dutch chains Albert Heijn and Jumbo expanded aggressively in Flanders. In the regions where Colruyt responds to the prices at Albert Heijn—which has been the case all over Flanders for several months—the price difference with the Dutch was just under 1%. The cheapest Colruyt stores were therefore located in Flanders. It was a logical outcome of the pressure that both Albert Heijn and Jumbo were putting on prices in the northern part of the country.
Since a few weeks, Colruyt reacts to price cuts at Albert Heijn in all its Flemish supermarkets, and no longer regionally. A logical consequence of the expansion policy of the Dutch chain. Price competition between market leader Colruyt and challenger Albert Heijn entered a new phase. Until recently, the market leader adjusted its prices regionally, in stores that had Albert Heijn as a direct competitor in their market area. But since a few weeks this was a thing of the past: when Colruyt has to react to a price cut at Albert Heijn, the retailer immediately does so in all its Flemish stores.
The war in Ukraine added further complexity through energy price spikes and commodity inflation. The combination of external shocks tested Colruyt's operational resilience.
Leadership Transition: The End of Family CEO (2023)
In June 2023, Colruyt Group announced a transition that marked the end of an era.
In early summer 2023, Jef Colruyt announced his retirement, handing over to Stefan Goethaert, marking a historic turning point in the Group's governance, as Goethaert was the first person from outside the family to lead the company.
Colruyt Group informed that Executive Chairman Jef Colruyt would hand over the day-to-day management of the group to Stefan Goethaert as of 1 July 2023. He would become the new CEO of Colruyt Group.
For the first time in its long history, a 'stranger' took the helm of Belgian retailer Colruyt Group. Jef Colruyt handed over the day-to-day management to Stefan Goethaert after more than 28 years as CEO, but he remained chairman.
The timing surprised observers. After all, at Colruyt Group, executives retire at 62 and the CEO was already 64. Analysts and investors had been pushing for renewal for some time, but the CEO's retirement came at a difficult time for the eponymous company. He announced his decision at the same time as the publication of the annual figures for the 2022/23 financial year, and they were not good.
Colruyt Group's revenue rose by 7.4% to 10.8 billion euros, but operating profit fell 25.8% to 279 million euros. Colruyt Group could not fully pass on the sharply increased costs to customers, due to its major chain's lowest price guarantee.
On 1 July, Goethaert (then COO Food Production, Business and Group Services) became CEO of Colruyt Group. Goethaert is a civil engineer, who started his career in chemicals at Prayon and joined Colruyt Group in 2012, initially in logistics. He became the first CEO who does not belong to the Colruyt family. "Stefan brings a solid international management experience, combined with the required leadership skills and a value-driven vision. Having worked in the group for ten years, he has the necessary competence and a thorough knowledge of the various activities to further shape and realise Colruyt Group's strategy in a retail market that is in full evolution."
After the death of his father Jo in 1994, Jef Colruyt, at 36 years old, became CEO of Colruyt Group faster than expected. Under his leadership, the group grew into the largest supermarket chain in the country.
The leadership transition raised important questions for investors. Would a non-family CEO maintain the same long-term orientation? Would capital allocation discipline continue? Would the family remain committed shareholders?
Several factors provided reassurance. Jef Colruyt remained as Chairman of the Board of Directors, maintaining family oversight of strategy. The significant influence of the founding family is evident, with Korys Investments NV, an entity closely associated with the Colruyt family, holding a substantial 67% of the outstanding shares as of May 8, 2025. Family control remains firmly in place even with professional management.
Chairman of the Board of Directors Jef Colruyt looks back with satisfaction on financial year 2023/24, in which Colruyt Group has undergone a drastic but successful transition and came back on track. CEO Stefan Goethaert looks to the future with confidence. "Over the next few years, we will continue to invest in our staff, in cost efficiency, Colruyt's lowest price promise, constructive relationships with partners and the implementation of our long-term strategy. At the same time, we remain on the alert, given the challenging macroeconomic environment."
Strategic Moves: M&A and Market Consolidation (2023–2025)
Under new leadership, Colruyt moved decisively on two major strategic fronts: acquisition in Belgium and divestiture in France.
On 21 September 2023, Colruyt Group reached an agreement with Match NV and Profi NV, subsidiaries of the group Louis Delhaize NV, to acquire 28 Match and 29 Smatch stores in Belgium.
The 57 stores concerned (on about 80) by the agreement employed 1,069 people and had realized together a turnover of approximately 300 million euros in 2022. Current workers would keep their jobs and conditions, Colruyt Group assured.
In September 2023, Colruyt Group reached an agreement to acquire 54 Match and Smatch stores in Belgium. About a year after Colruyt Group completed the conversion of Match and Smatch stores to Comarkt/Comarché, the final destinations of these stores were confirmed: Belgium would gain 21 Spar Colruyt Group stores, 14 Okay, 10 Colruyt, 6 Bio-Planet stores and 1 Cru market.
The Match and Smatch acquisition reflected several strategic objectives. It strengthened Colruyt's presence in Wallonia and Brussels, where the company had historically been underrepresented. It added revenue at attractive valuations given Match's financial distress. And it removed a competitor from the market—consolidating an already concentrated Belgian grocery sector.
Of the 54 supermarkets acquired in 2023, 39 were converted under the temporary Comarché brand, seven were directly relaunched under the Spar banner, seven others reopened under a new Colruyt Group brand, and one (at Belsele) permanently closed. Since then, the Colruyt Group reviewed all acquired branches to define a new allocation.
The France decision was more consequential—and more painful. Colruyt Group announced on 17 June 2025 that it had entered into exclusive negotiations for the sale of 81 Colruyt Prix Qualité stores and 44 DATS24 service stations. This operation, which follows a unilateral purchase promise from Groupement Les Mousquetaires, is still subject to consultation with social bodies and regulatory authorizations.
Belgian retailer Colruyt Group entered into a put option agreement to sell some of its French stores to Groupement Les Mousquetaires for a total cash consideration of approximately €215 million. The transaction, which includes the integration of employees, will see Groupement Les Mousquetaires acquiring 81 Colruyt Prix Qualité stores and 44 DATS 24 fuel stations.
The group is divesting its French retail operations, with a put option agreement in June 2025 for 81 stores that generated €716 million in revenue in 2024 but a €32 million loss. This allows a focus on core Belgian activities.
The French operations had been problematic for years. The Colruyt format—built around the lowest price guarantee and operational efficiency—never achieved the same traction in France's fiercely competitive grocery market. Persistent losses finally prompted an exit.
The integrated activities in France represented an operating loss of more than 20 million euros in the consolidated figures of Colruyt Group for the 2024-2025 financial year.
The strategic logic was clear: double down on Belgium where Colruyt held market leadership, exit France where profitability remained elusive. Capital discipline in action.
Current Position & Financial Performance (2024–2025)
Colruyt Group's revenue rose by 1.1% to nearly EUR 11.0 billion in 2024/25. The revenue evolution was primarily impacted by the intensified competitive landscape in the Belgian retail market, the decreased food inflation and the adverse weather conditions last summer.
Colruyt Group's market share in Belgium (Colruyt Lowest Prices, Okay, Spar and Comarkt/Comarché) declined to 29.0% in the financial year 2024/25 (29.3% in 2023/24).
Operating profit (EBIT) saw a 5% decrease to €446 million, representing 4.1% of revenue. This decline is attributed to intense competition in Belgium, lower-than-expected food inflation, and rising operational costs.
Net profit for FY 2024/25 was €337 million, down from €357 million in the prior year (excluding one-offs). Earnings per share stood at €2.73.
Investments totaled €479 million in FY 2024/25, focusing on store development, logistics, automation, and digital transformation.
The prior year, FY 2023/24, had shown strong headline results—but with important caveats. Colruyt Group released its 2023-2024 annual report covering the period from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024. The group reported a sharp increase in revenue, to €10.8bn, and a 78% rise in net profit. The Belgian retail corporation Colruyt Group posted a profit of €1.051bn for the 2023-2024 financial year, an increase of 424% in one year (profit the year before stood at €201m). Group revenue rose by 11.9% to €10.8bn, compared with €9.6bn in 2023.
The €1 billion+ profit headline was misleading—it included the massive one-time gain from the Parkwind sale. Operating profit increased to €470 million, accounting for 4.3% of revenue, while net profit from continuing operations reached €368 million, or 3.4% of revenue.
The underlying business remains healthy but challenged. Operating margins around 4% are respectable for European grocery retail, but below historical levels. Market share erosion—from above 31% to 29%—reflects intense competitive pressure from Albert Heijn, Lidl, and Aldi.
CEO Stefan Goethaert stated: "Our aim in 2024/25 was to match the 2023/24 results. Driven by the intensified competitive landscape in the Belgian retail market and the lower-than-expected food inflation, our group's operating profit experienced a limited decline, despite our continued efforts. Even in the face of headwinds, we remain committed to our group's long-term vision and continue to make the necessary investments to consistently pursue our strategy."
The group aims for a stable operating result in FY 2025/26. The group's forward-looking statement targets an operating result that is 'at least stable' for the fiscal year 2025/26, reflecting cautious optimism amidst ongoing market challenges.
Sustainability & Innovation Strategy
Sustainability has been woven into Colruyt's operations for decades—initially as a cost reduction measure, later evolving into a strategic differentiator.
By the end of 2025, all household packaging of private-label products should be reusable or recyclable.
Colruyt Group created a visual solution to show consumers the environmental impact of food products through the Eco-Score. Products of the Boni Selection, Colruyt's own brand, get an Eco-Score that represents the sustainability of the entire life cycle. Consumers can check this in Colruyt's SmartWithFood app. It's the retailer's ambition to help consumers adopt more sustainable shopping habits. The Eco-score is a unique initiative in Belgium. Colruyt is the first retailer to show consumers the environmental impact of food products by reviewing the entire life cycle of each product. In total, 2,500 products of the Boni Selection as well as a few private labels have received an Eco-Score.
Belgium's Colruyt Group announced that it is rebranding its 'Eco-score' sustainability label to 'Green-score' this autumn to better inform customers about the environmental impact of their purchases. This change, initiated by the French consortium that developed the label, also introduces an expanded A+ to F scale for more precise sustainability information.
Colruyt pursued animal welfare initiatives. No more meat from castrated pigs has been sold in the group's stores since early 2011. Later, other supermarkets like Delhaize and Lidl followed suit, urged on by GAIA, a Belgian organization for animal welfare.
In 2017, DATS 24 opened the first green hydrogen refueling station for the general public in Halle. The hydrogen initiative reflects Colruyt's continued investment in energy innovation, even after the Parkwind divestiture.
The sustainability positioning serves multiple objectives: it differentiates Colruyt from purely price-focused competitors, appeals to increasingly environmentally-conscious consumers, and often reduces operating costs through energy and resource efficiency.
Playbook: Business & Investing Lessons
Family Capitalism Done Right
Colruyt exemplifies how family ownership can create durable competitive advantages when structured thoughtfully. Three generations of Colruyt leadership—Franz, Jo, and Jef—each navigated distinct challenges while maintaining consistent strategic principles.
The key elements: - Patient capital: The Parkwind investment took 30+ years to mature. Few public company CEOs have that luxury. - Values transmission: Franz's focus on efficiency was instilled in Jo, refined by Jef, and continues under professional management. - Separation of ownership and management: The transition to Stefan Goethaert preserves family oversight while bringing professional expertise. - Skin in the game: With Korys Investments holding 67% of shares, family wealth is directly tied to company performance.
The Lowest Price Guarantee as Strategy
Colruyt's "lowest price" promise isn't marketing—it's an entire operational system that creates barriers to imitation: - 120 employees recording 62,000 competitor prices daily - Algorithmic pricing engine processing 50 million reaction prices - Geographic price differentiation responding to local competition - Organizational separation of purchasing and pricing functions - No-frills store design that minimizes non-product costs
Competitors can match prices temporarily; matching Colruyt's integrated system is far harder.
Vertical Integration
Colruyt's in-house capabilities span: - Fine Food production: Coffee roasting under Graindor brand, private label manufacturing - Energy: Formerly Parkwind offshore wind, currently onshore wind and hydrogen via Virya Energy stake - Logistics: Proprietary distribution centers optimized for efficiency - IT: In-house development including the pricing engine and Collect&Go e-commerce
This integration reduces dependency on external suppliers and creates operational control.
Knowing When to Exit
The Parkwind sale and France divestiture demonstrate capital allocation discipline: - Parkwind: Sold at €1.6 billion when offshore wind scale requirements exceeded Colruyt's risk appetite and capital capacity - France: Exited after years of losses, accepting €215 million rather than continuing to bleed cash
Both decisions required acknowledging limits—something family-controlled companies often do better than public corporations driven by growth narratives.
Counter-Positioning Against German Discounters
Colruyt's survival against Aldi and Lidl offers lessons for retailers facing hard discount competition: - Don't try to be Aldi—Colruyt sells brands at low prices rather than private label only - Invest in technology for efficiency, not customer experience frills - Build operational systems that enable sustainable price leadership - Serve different customer needs through multi-format strategies (Colruyt, OKay, Bio-Planet)
Bull Case and Bear Case Analysis
Bull Case
Porter's Five Forces Assessment: - Supplier Power: Moderate. Colruyt's scale provides negotiating leverage, while private label capabilities reduce dependency on national brands. - Buyer Power: High but managed. Belgian consumers are price-sensitive, but Colruyt's loyalty programs and lowest price guarantee create switching costs. - Competitive Rivalry: Intense but sustainable. Colruyt has proven it can compete with Aldi, Lidl, and Albert Heijn without margin collapse. - Threat of New Entrants: Low. Scale advantages, established logistics, and customer loyalty create meaningful barriers. - Threat of Substitutes: Low to moderate. Food retail faces limited substitution risk; meal kit and delivery services remain niche.
Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers: 1. Counter-Positioning: Colruyt's lowest price guarantee forces competitors to match prices while maintaining higher cost structures—a classic counter-position. 2. Process Power: The pricing engine, logistics optimization, and efficiency culture represent decades of accumulated operational know-how that competitors cannot easily replicate. 3. Scale Economies: Market leadership in Belgium provides purchasing leverage and logistics efficiency. 4. Switching Costs: Xtra loyalty program, Collect&Go e-commerce familiarity, and store location convenience create modest switching costs.
The bull case rests on Colruyt's proven ability to defend market share against world-class competitors while maintaining profitability. The family ownership structure ensures patient capital deployment and long-term strategic consistency.
Bear Case
Margin Pressure: Operating margins have compressed from historical 5%+ levels to around 4%. Continued competitive intensity from Albert Heijn, combined with Belgium's wage indexation system, could further squeeze profitability.
Market Share Erosion: The decline from 31%+ to 29% market share suggests Colruyt's lowest price positioning may be losing effectiveness as competitors close the price gap.
Belgium Concentration Risk: With France exit, Colruyt becomes heavily dependent on the Belgian market—a small, mature economy with limited growth potential.
Digital Disruption: While Collect&Go was an early e-commerce pioneer, larger players may eventually deploy superior digital capabilities.
Leadership Transition Risk: First non-family CEO in company history. Culture and strategic continuity are unproven under new leadership.
Comparison with Industry: - Aldi and Lidl continue expanding globally with proven hard discount models - Albert Heijn benefits from Ahold Delhaize's scale and technology investments - E-commerce pure plays like Picnic threaten traditional store-based models
Key Performance Indicators for Ongoing Monitoring
For long-term fundamental investors tracking Colruyt, three KPIs matter most:
1. Belgian Food Market Share The single most important indicator of competitive health. Track quarterly Nielsen data showing Colruyt Lowest Prices, OKay, Spar, and Comarkt combined market share. Current level: 29.0%. Any sustained decline below 28% would signal serious competitive deterioration.
2. Operating Margin (EBIT/Revenue) Reflects the sustainability of the lowest price strategy. Current level: 4.1%. The acceptable range is 3.5-5.0%; below 3.5% would indicate the pricing model is broken; above 5.0% might suggest underinvestment in price competitiveness.
3. Same-Store Sales Growth (Like-for-Like Revenue) Measures underlying customer demand separate from new store openings or acquisitions. Track excluding Comarkt conversions and format changes to see true organic performance.
Regulatory and Accounting Considerations
Belgian Wage Indexation: Colruyt's labor costs automatically increase with inflation via Belgium's indexation system. During high-inflation periods, this creates margin pressure that cannot be fully controlled by management.
Competition Authority Oversight: The Match/Smatch acquisition required Belgian Competition Authority approval, and market concentration may limit future acquisition options.
Discontinued Operations Accounting: French retail operations classified as discontinued affects year-over-year comparability. Ensure analysis distinguishes continuing operations performance.
Equity Method Investments: Virya Energy (30% stake) is accounted for using equity method. One-time effects from energy transactions have materially impacted reported earnings; focus on continuing operations profit for underlying performance.
Conclusion
Colruyt Group represents a fascinating study in retail resilience. From colonial goods wholesale in 1928 to Belgium's dominant discount retailer in 2025, the company has navigated technological revolutions, competitive onslaughts, and generational leadership transitions while maintaining its core identity: efficient operations enabling the lowest prices.
The near-bankruptcy experience of the 1980s forged the company's DNA—a fanatical commitment to cost control, step-by-step expansion, and the operational systems that make the lowest price guarantee credible rather than merely aspirational. The Parkwind venture demonstrated both strategic creativity and exit discipline. The leadership transition tests whether family values can persist under professional management.
For long-term investors, Colruyt offers exposure to a dominant market position in a stable developed economy, backed by proven operational excellence and patient family ownership. The challenges are real—margin pressure, market share erosion, digital disruption—but the company has survived existential threats before.
As Jef Colruyt once observed: "You have to know where you come from to understand where you're going." Colruyt's journey from a baker's wholesale business to a €11 billion retail empire offers lessons in competitive strategy, family capitalism, and the enduring power of operational excellence in an industry where many have tried—and failed—to build lasting moats.
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