BYD: From Battery Maker to Electric Vehicle Empire

I. Introduction & Episode Setup

Picture this: April 4, 2022. A Monday morning in Shenzhen, China. BYD announced Monday it has stopped the production of automobiles powered only by gasoline, with the final model rolling off the assembly line in March. No fanfare. No grand ceremony. Just a simple press release that marked the end of an era—and the beginning of another.

This wasn't some struggling automaker abandoning a dying business. In 2021, gasoline vehicles still accounted for nearly 19% of BYD's production, over 140,000 units annually. Gasoline passenger vehicles account for 18.78% of the total production capacity, with an annual output of over 140,000 vehicles, accounting for more than 1/5. BYD sold over 130,000 gasoline vehicles for the full year, accounting for 18.42%, also more than 1/5. The decision to cease production wasn't about failure—it was about conviction.

Fast forward to today. China's EV giant BYD recorded revenues of 777 billion yuan ($107 billion) for 2024, surging ahead Elon Musk's Tesla in annual sales amid intensifying competition in the global market for clean-energy cars. In a filing on Monday, BYD reported a 29% jump in sales from the previous year on deliveries of 4.27 million cars, including fully electric vehicles and hybrids. By comparison, Tesla's 2024 revenue was $97.7 billion, and it delivered 1.79 million battery-powered vehicles.

The question that should keep every automotive executive awake at night: How did a battery company founded by a chemistry professor with a $35,000 loan become the world's largest EV manufacturer by revenue?

This is a story about seeing around corners. About building capabilities when nobody's watching. About the power of vertical integration in an era of outsourcing. And ultimately, about how the future of transportation was written not in Silicon Valley or Detroit, but in the industrial sprawl of Shenzhen.

↑ Back to Top

II. Origins: The Battery Years (1995-2002)

The humidity of Shenzhen in 1995 could make you feel like you were breathing through a wet towel. The city itself was barely 15 years old as a Special Economic Zone, a giant construction site where rice paddies were becoming factories at breakneck speed. This was where 29-year-old Wang Chuanfu decided to bet his future.

On 18 November 1994, Wang Chuanfu gathered a team of 20 people and founded BYD in Buji Town, Longgang District, Shenzhen. The company was formally founded on 10 February 1995 as Shenzhen BYD Battery Company Limited with CN¥ 2.5 million of capital, with a focus on producing rechargeable nickel–cadmium (NiCd) batteries. Wang, at 29 years old, founded the company after noticing an opportunity presented by the shift in Japanese companies from NiCd to high-value nickel–metal hydride (NiMH) and lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries while he was working as a vice supervisor at the Beijing Nonferrous Research Institute. He moved to Shenzhen with his cousin Lu Xiangyang and started the company in 1995 to capitalize on the opportunity.

Wang's backstory reads like something from central casting for inspirational business stories. Wang was born in Wuwei County, Anhui, into a poor farming family with eight children. After the death of his parents, he was raised by his elder brother and sister while attending high school. His brother and sister-in-law sacrificed everything for his education—When she learned that Wang Chuanfu could not afford review textbooks for the critical final year of high-school, she sold some of the only jewellery she had from her dowry.

But this wasn't just another rags-to-riches tale. Wang had a secret weapon: he understood both the chemistry and the economics of batteries. While working at the Beijing Nonferrous Research Institute, he'd watched Japanese giants like Sony and Sanyo abandon older battery technologies for newer, more profitable ones. They were leaving money on the table.

The strategy Wang deployed would become BYD's signature move for the next three decades: don't innovate from scratch—improve what exists. His team would buy Sony and Sanyo batteries, meticulously disassemble them, analyze every component, then figure out how to make something similar for a fraction of the cost. BYD's business grew by implementing a redesigned manufacturing approach by incorporating more manual labour, in contrast of the capital-intensive and highly automated processes in Japan.

Where Japanese factories used million-dollar automated systems, BYD used armies of workers with jigs and fixtures Wang's engineers designed themselves. The result? Unit costs that were five to six times lower than Japanese competitors. This wasn't about cutting corners—it was about recognizing that in China in 1995, labor was cheap and capital was expensive. Why fight that reality?

The orders started rolling in faster than Wang could have imagined. By 1997, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis when everyone else was retrenching, Philips, Panasonic, and Motorola had all become major BYD clients. The company that started with 20 people and $35,000 was suddenly supplying batteries to the world's biggest electronics brands.

Five years. That's all it took. On July 31, 2002, BYD went public on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Wang Chuanfu, the orphaned farm boy from Anhui, was now worth hundreds of millions of dollars. But for him, this was just the beginning. He had bigger dreams—dreams that would make his shareholders very, very nervous.

↑ Back to Top

III. The Automotive Pivot: An Unlikely Acquisition (2003-2007)

January 2003. BYD's stock price was riding high, investors were happy, and the battery business was printing money. Then Wang Chuanfu dropped a bombshell: he wanted to buy a car company.

Not just any car company—Xi'an Qinchuan Automobile, a failing state-owned enterprise that was hemorrhaging cash. The acquisition would cost BYD 270 million yuan. When the news broke, BYD's stock price plummeted 30% in three days. Funds dropped the upstart, and BYD's share price sank by 30% in the first three days of announcing the purchase. Deutsche Securities saw "four unfavorable factors" in the move: cars were not related to BYD's main business, BYD bought in at too high a price, Qinchuan was not very competitive and all in all, BYD stocks were tarnished by the risky move.

Shareholders were furious. This wasn't in the IPO prospectus. One fund manager reportedly threw the prospectus at Wang during a meeting, shouting that he'd been deceived. Wang's response? "With such a platform, BYD's electric vehicle battery industrialization process was accelerated by 2-3 years. Cooperation with car makers alone is not enough," said Wang Chuanfu.

Here's what the critics didn't understand: Wang wasn't buying a car company. He was buying time.

The first attempt was a disaster. The car, codenamed 316, was so ugly that dealers refused to even look at it. Wang's response was characteristically dramatic—he personally took a sledgehammer to the prototype, smashing it to pieces in front of his engineering team. One hundred million yuan in R&D, destroyed in minutes. The message was clear: we can do better.

Enter the F3. If the 316 was BYD trying to innovate, the F3 was BYD doing what it did best—taking something that worked and making it cheaper. The car bore more than a passing resemblance to the Toyota Corolla. Some called it a copy. Wang called it market research. The BYD F3, the first car developed by BYD Auto, began production in 2005. At 73,000 yuan (roughly $10,000), it was half the price of a Corolla.

The market's verdict was swift: 63,000 units sold in the first year. By 2006, it was one of the best-selling sedans in China. The automotive establishment was shocked. How could a battery company build cars?

The answer was vintage Wang Chuanfu. He didn't try to build cars the way Toyota or Volkswagen did. He built them the way BYD made batteries—with massive amounts of manual labor, extreme vertical integration, and an obsessive focus on cost. While other automakers outsourced to hundreds of suppliers, BYD made everything itself. Seats? BYD made them. Mirrors? BYD. Air conditioning units? BYD.

Critics called it primitive. Wang called it control.

↑ Back to Top

IV. Warren Buffett's Bet: The Inflection Point (2008)

September 2008. Lehman Brothers had just collapsed. The global financial system was in freefall. Credit markets were frozen. And Charlie Munger wanted Warren Buffett to invest in a Chinese car company.

Berkshire Hathaway purchased 225 million shares in BYD in 2008 for $230 million. Munger was key to Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway's investment in BYD, calling Wang Chuanfu, the company's CEO, a "combination of Thomas Edison and Jack Welch" in a 2009 interview with Fortune.

Buffett's initial reaction was skepticism. "I don't know a thing about cellphones or batteries," he admitted. "And I don't know how cars work." This violated every principle of staying within your circle of competence. But Munger was insistent. He'd met Wang through Li Lu, a Chinese-American investor, and came away mesmerized.

What Munger saw in Wang wasn't just intelligence—it was intensity. Wang worked 16-hour days, seven days a week. He lived in company housing. He ate in the company cafeteria. When engineers had problems, Wang would sit with them at their desks, working through equations and sketches until 2 AM. Wang claims to spend 60-70% of his time on technology and product development. He often implements minor design changes to bypass existing patents.

The deal almost didn't happen. In late 2008, Berkshire Hathaway ponied up the aforementioned $232 million for a roughly 10% stake in BYD. As Buffett recalled, Berkshire initially tried to buy 25% of the company, but Wang refused to release more than 10% of BYD's stock. "This was a man who didn't want to sell his company," he told Fortune. "That was a good sign."

What Buffett and Munger saw that others missed was timing. 2008 wasn't just a financial crisis—it was an inflection point for electric vehicles. Oil had hit $147 a barrel earlier that year. China was choking on pollution. The government was preparing massive subsidies for "new energy vehicles." And BYD had just launched something unprecedented: The company launched its first plug-in hybrid electric vehicle, the BYD F3DM in 2008, followed by the BYD e6, its first battery electric vehicle, in 2009.

The F3DM was not a beautiful car. It was not a fast car. But it was a $22,000 plug-in hybrid when the Chevrolet Volt would cost $41,000. And unlike the Volt, it was actually for sale.

The investment would become one of Berkshire's greatest hits. By 2022, that $230 million stake had grown to be worth over $8 billion—a 35-fold return. But the real value wasn't in the stock price. It was in the credibility. With Warren Buffett's stamp of approval, BYD went from "that Chinese battery company" to "the Buffett-backed EV maker." Doors that were closed suddenly opened. Partnerships that were impossible became inevitable.

↑ Back to Top

V. Building the Electric Foundation (2009-2019)

The decade after Buffett's investment was BYD's wilderness years. Not a wilderness of failure—sales grew steadily—but a wilderness of preparation. While Tesla was capturing headlines with the Model S, BYD was doing something far less sexy but ultimately more important: building the infrastructure for mass production.

The Chinese government's New Energy Vehicle (NEV) policy, launched in 2009, was the catalyst. In January 2009, as China launched the "10 cities and 1,000 vehicles" pilot for new energy vehicles, China's national finance would provide subsidies for the promotion of EV models. Shenzhen, where BYD was headquartered, was among the first pilot cities to join the scheme. Its F3DM model was among the first in China's Ministry of Industry and Information list. Seizing this opportunity, the only EV sedan in the line-up, BYD's E6, became a taxi demo model in Shenzhen.

But subsidies alone don't build industries. What BYD did during these years was methodically construct capabilities that would only pay off a decade later. They built their own semiconductor subsidiary to make the IGBTs (insulated-gate bipolar transistors) that control electric motors. They developed their own battery management systems. They even started making their own electric motors.

This extreme vertical integration made Wall Street analysts nervous. Why make your own chips when you could buy them from Infineon? Why build motors when Bosch would sell them to you? The answer wouldn't become clear until 2020, when a global chip shortage brought the auto industry to its knees—except for BYD, which kept churning out cars because it made its own chips.

The period from 2017-2019 nearly broke the company. Between 2017 and 2019, due to several factors such as the slowdown of BYD Auto's sales, BYD saw its net profit has falling sharply for three consecutive years, especially in 2019 when it dropped to CN¥ 1.6 billion. Wang Chuanfu described it as the "darkest moment", since at that time the company had only one goal, which was to survive. However, Wang insisted on investing CN¥ 8.4 billion in research and development.

This was the crucial moment. When profits collapsed, most companies cut R&D. Wang did the opposite. While BYD was barely profitable, he was pouring billions into developing new platforms: the e-Platform for pure electric vehicles, the DM-i system for hybrids. Products that wouldn't see the market for years.

In 2020, in the depths of the pandemic, BYD made two moves that would define its future. First, it created FinDreams, a subsidiary that would sell components to other automakers—even competitors. Second, and more importantly, it launched something called the Blade Battery.

↑ Back to Top

VI. The Blade Battery Revolution (2020)

March 29, 2020. The world was in lockdown. Stock markets were crashing. And BYD held an online press conference for a battery. Not a car. A battery.

Born out of this relentless research and development, and a major advancement for the EV industry, is the ground-breaking Blade Battery, an innovation launched by BYD in March 2020.

To understand why this mattered, you need to understand the battery wars. For years, the industry had been moving toward nickel-manganese-cobalt (NMC) batteries. They packed more energy, enabling longer range, but they had a dirty secret: they could explode. Videos of Teslas bursting into flames had become a PR nightmare for the entire industry.

BYD went the opposite direction. They stuck with lithium iron phosphate (LFP)—a chemistry everyone else had abandoned as too primitive. But Wang's engineers had figured out something clever. The blade battery is most commonly a 96 centimetres (37.8 in) long and 9 centimetres (3.5 in) wide single-cell battery with a special design, which can be placed in an array and inserted into a battery pack like a blade. The space utilization of the battery pack is increased by over 50% compared to most conventional lithium iron phosphate block batteries.

The name wasn't just marketing. These cells really did look like blades—long, thin, and flat. By eliminating the module level entirely and packing cells directly into the battery pack, BYD achieved energy density comparable to NMC batteries but with LFP's inherent safety.

Then came the nail test—the most brutal battery safety test in existence. A nail is driven through the battery at high speed, creating an internal short circuit. It's designed to simulate what happens in a severe crash. While undergoing nail penetration tests, the Blade Battery emitted neither smoke nor fire after being penetrated, and its surface temperature only reached 30 to 60°C. Under the same conditions, a ternary lithium battery exceeded 500°C and violently burned, and while a conventional lithium iron phosphate block battery did not openly emit flames or smoke, its surface temperature reached dangerous temperatures of 200 to 400°C.

BYD didn't just pass the test—they livestreamed it. They put eggs on top of three different batteries and drove nails through them. The NMC battery exploded instantly, cooking the egg. The conventional LFP battery reached 400°C, burning the egg. The Blade Battery? The egg remained raw. Surface temperature: 60°C. No fire. No smoke.

The Han EV, BYD's flagship sedan model slated for launch this June, will come equipped with the Blade Battery. This wasn't just a new product—it was a statement. BYD was saying: we've solved the fundamental problem of EV batteries. Safety and performance were no longer a trade-off.

The industry impact was immediate and profound. Within months, Tesla announced it would use LFP batteries in its standard-range vehicles. Other automakers scrambled to develop their own blade-like cells. The battery chemistry wars were over. BYD had won.

↑ Back to Top

VII. The Great Acceleration: Stopping ICE Production (2022)

The decision came down in early 2022, but it had been years in the making. Wang Chuanfu gathered his senior leadership team and laid out the numbers. In January and February, BYD had sold 180,399 new energy vehicles. Gasoline cars? Just 5,049 units—barely 2.7% of total sales.

The finance team argued for keeping gasoline cars as a hedge. The marketing team worried about brand perception. The dealers were terrified—gasoline cars were still profitable, especially in third-tier cities. Wang listened to everyone. Then he made the call.

BYD announced Monday it has stopped the production of automobiles powered only by gasoline, with the final model rolling off the assembly line in March. The Shenzhen, China-based automaker will turn its focus to manufacturing innovative battery-electric vehicles, including high-tech battery electric cars and trucks and plug-in hybrids.

This wasn't a gradual phase-out. This wasn't a "by 2030" pledge. This was immediate. In March 2022, BYD became the world's first automotive company to officially cease the production of vehicles with internal combustion engines.

To understand how radical this was, consider the context. In March 2022, General Motors was still saying EVs would be "profitable by 2025." Volkswagen was talking about "50% electric by 2030." Toyota was still pushing hydrogen. And BYD just... stopped. No more gasoline engines. Period.

The Western media largely missed the significance. This wasn't just about BYD abandoning gasoline—it was about BYD declaring that the transition was over. The debate was done. Electric had won. Everyone else was just catching up.

The production lines that had been making gasoline cars were immediately converted to DM-i hybrids and pure EVs. The supply chain contracts were rewritten. The dealer network was retrained. In three months, BYD transformed from a company that made electric and gasoline cars to a pure-play new energy vehicle manufacturer.

The results were immediate. In 2023, BYD sold over 3.0 million passenger plug-in electric cars (in line with the target), which is 62% more than a year ago. Monthly sales records fell like dominoes. The company that had been fighting for survival just three years earlier was now capacity-constrained, with six-month waiting lists for popular models.

↑ Back to Top

VIII. Global Domination: Overtaking Tesla (2023-2024)

December 31, 2023. The numbers were in. During the fourth quarter of 2023, BYD sold 942,651 rechargeable passenger cars, including 526,409 all-electric and 416,242 plug-in hybrids. Tesla reports that it delivered over 484,000 vehicles in Q4, so it appears BYD did it fact pass the American company as the world's top EV seller.

For the first time in history, BYD had outsold Tesla in battery-electric vehicles in a quarter. The student had become the master.

But this was about more than bragging rights. It represented a fundamental shift in the global auto industry. For a century, the car business had been dominated by companies from three countries: the United States, Germany, and Japan. Now, for the first time, a Chinese company was setting the pace.

The product offensive was relentless. While Tesla was still milking four models (S, 3, X, Y), BYD was launching a new vehicle every few weeks. The Dynasty series (Han, Tang, Song, Qin) covered sedans and SUVs. The Ocean series (Dolphin, Seal, Seagull) targeted younger buyers. The Denza brand went upmarket. Yangwang aimed at the ultra-luxury segment with million-yuan SUVs. Fangchengbao tackled the pickup market.

Each brand had its own design language, its own dealer network, its own identity. But underneath, they all shared the same platforms, the same batteries, the same motors. This was platform economics at massive scale.

The international expansion was equally aggressive. Europe was the beachhead. Starting with Norway in 2021, BYD methodically expanded across the continent. By 2024, you could buy a BYD in Germany, France, the UK, and a dozen other countries. BYD will build its first European passenger car factory in Szeged, Hungary, which will build new energy vehicles with an annual capacity of over 100,000 vehicles.

Southeast Asia was next. In 2023, BYD announced plans to construct a new electric vehicle manufacturing plant in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) special zone in Rayong, Thailand with an annual capacity of 150,000 vehicles. The facility was officially opened on 4 July 2024, coinciding with the production of BYD's 8,000,000th new energy vehicle. This plant is BYD's first wholly owned facility outside of China.

Latin America followed. BYD took over a former Ford factory in Brazil. They partnered with dealers in Mexico, Colombia, Chile. The Dolphin and Yuan Plus became common sights on the streets of São Paulo and Mexico City.

The numbers tell the story. China's EV giant BYD recorded revenues of 777 billion yuan ($107 billion) for 2024, surging ahead Elon Musk's Tesla in annual sales. In a filing on Monday, BYD reported a 29% jump in sales from the previous year on deliveries of 4.27 million cars, including fully electric vehicles and hybrids. By comparison, Tesla's 2024 revenue was $97.7 billion, and it delivered 1.79 million battery-powered vehicles.

↑ Back to Top

IX. The Playbook: How BYD Won

So how did they do it? How did a battery company from Shenzhen dethrone the Silicon Valley darling? The answer isn't one thing—it's everything.

Start with vertical integration. BYD makes its own batteries, motors, chips, and even the seats in its cars. When the 2021 chip shortage hit, Ford was parking thousands of half-finished F-150s in fields waiting for semiconductors. BYD kept shipping cars because they made their own chips. When lithium prices spiked in 2022, other automakers saw margins evaporate. BYD had already locked in supply through mining investments.

Then there's the "China speed" of iteration. While German automakers spend five years developing a new platform, BYD can go from concept to production in 18 months. The Seagull, their $12,000 city car, went from sketch to showroom in 15 months. When something doesn't work, they kill it fast and move on. No committees. No politics. Just speed.

The cost structure is perhaps the most remarkable achievement. BYD sells the Dolphin profitably for $15,000. The Yuan Plus, a compact SUV with 400km of range, costs $20,000. These aren't stripped-down penalty boxes—they have rotating screens, vegan leather seats, and advanced driver assistance systems. How is this possible?

The answer is the manufacturing philosophy Wang developed in the battery days: smart automation combined with massive amounts of well-trained labor. A BYD factory doesn't look like a Tesla factory. There are robots, yes, but there are also thousands of workers. The robots do what robots do best—precision welding, painting. The humans do what humans do best—complex assembly, quality control, problem-solving.

This hybrid approach is cheaper, more flexible, and surprisingly more efficient than full automation. When Tesla's Fremont factory was struggling with "production hell" on the Model 3, BYD was churning out 50,000 cars a month with no drama.

The battery technology remains the core differentiator. The Blade Battery isn't just safe—it's cheap to produce, lasts over a million kilometers, and can be recycled efficiently. BYD's Cell-to-Pack technology eliminates entire layers of packaging, reducing weight and cost while increasing range. The second-generation Blade Battery, launched in 2024, charges to 80% in 10 minutes.

But perhaps the biggest advantage is one that's hardest to replicate: ecosystem control. When BYD designs a new car, they're not negotiating with suppliers about specs and prices. The battery team, motor team, chip team, and vehicle team all sit in the same building. They can optimize the entire system, not just individual components.

This is why a BYD can be profitable at price points that would bankrupt other automakers. They're not paying supplier margins at every level. They're not dealing with coordination costs between dozens of companies. Everything is internal. Everything is optimized. Everything is under control.

The hybrid strategy deserves special mention. While Tesla went all-in on pure electric, BYD hedged with the DM-i plug-in hybrid system. These cars can run 100km on electricity for daily commuting, then switch to gasoline for long trips. For Chinese consumers worried about charging infrastructure, it's the perfect bridge technology. In 2024, BYD sold 2.5 million hybrids—more than their pure electric sales.

↑ Back to Top

X. Bear vs. Bull Case & Future Outlook

The Bull Case:

The optimists see BYD as unstoppable. They've won the technology war with the Blade Battery. They've won the cost war with vertical integration. They've won the scale war with 4+ million annual sales. The moat is widening, not shrinking.

China's domestic market alone could support massive growth. With 33% market share in Chinese NEVs, BYD has become what Volkswagen was to Germany or GM to America—the national champion. BYD dominates China, the world's largest auto market. In 2024, BYD had a 32% share of China's total market for new energy vehicle sales, which includes hybrids. Tesla claimed only 6.1% of the market, despite reaching a record high in terms of shipments.

Global expansion is accelerating. Europe is embracing Chinese EVs despite protectionist rhetoric. Southeast Asia has no domestic auto industry to protect. Latin America needs affordable electric transportation. Even without the US market, BYD has plenty of room to grow.

The technology pipeline is robust. BYD's R&D expenditure reached 54.2 billion yuan in 2024, an increase of 36% year on year and far in excess of its net profit. During the past 14 years (2011–2024), BYD has invested more in R&D than its net annual profit 13 times. That's $7.5 billion annually—more than Tesla, Rivian, and Lucid combined.

The Bear Case:

The skeptics see storm clouds gathering. Geopolitical tensions are escalating. The EU has already imposed tariffs on Chinese EVs. The US market is completely closed. Other countries might follow suit to protect domestic industries.

Quality perception remains a challenge. "Made in China" still carries stigma in many markets, fairly or not. BYD's designs, while improving, lack the cachet of European luxury brands or Tesla's tech-forward image. Moving upmarket is harder than moving downmarket.

Competition is intensifying from every direction. Tesla is developing a $25,000 car. Volkswagen is pouring billions into EVs. Stellantis is partnering with Chinese companies. The Koreans are coming on strong. Even Chinese competitors like Geely, Nio, and Xiaomi are gaining ground.

The dependency on China is a double-edged sword. Over 80% of sales are domestic. If China's economy slows or consumer preferences shift, BYD has limited cushion. The property crisis, youth unemployment, and potential deflation all pose risks.

The Buffett Exit:

Perhaps most telling is what Warren Buffett has done. BYD shares rose about 20-fold between Buffett's 2008 investment and August 2022, the month which Berkshire first started trimming its BYD stake. Before Monday's disclosure, the last time the company disclosed its BYD stake was on June 19 when it reduced its stake to 5.99%.

By 2024, Berkshire had reduced its stake from 20% to below 5%, pocketing billions in profits. Was this just prudent portfolio management, or did Buffett see something concerning? The Oracle of Omaha isn't talking, but the selling speaks volumes.

↑ Back to Top

XI. Lessons & Reflections

What can we learn from BYD's journey? Five lessons stand out:

First, vertical integration isn't dead—it just went out of fashion. The conventional wisdom since the 1980s has been that companies should focus on core competencies and outsource everything else. BYD proves the opposite can work. When you control the entire stack, from raw materials to final assembly, you can optimize in ways that networked suppliers never can.

Second, patient capital matters more than ever. BYD survived multiple near-death experiences because Wang Chuanfu could think in decades, not quarters. The Blade Battery was in development for five years before launch. The DM-i system took seven years. The semiconductor subsidiary lost money for a decade before becoming profitable. Public markets would never tolerate this. Chinese capital markets, with their different expectations and government support, enabled long-term thinking.

Third, the innovator's dilemma works in reverse too. Clayton Christensen taught us that incumbents fail because they can't abandon profitable products for unproven technologies. But BYD shows that insurgents can succeed by abandoning profitable products (gasoline cars) for the future (EVs). Sometimes the bravest decision is to kill your cash cow before someone else does.

Fourth, manufacturing still matters. Silicon Valley convinced the world that software would eat everything, that atoms were yesterday and bits were tomorrow. BYD reminds us that someone still has to make physical products. And whoever can make them better, cheaper, and faster wins. Manufacturing excellence isn't sexy, but it's essential.

Fifth, China's industrial policy worked—this time. For every BYD, there are a hundred failed state-supported companies. But when industrial policy aligns with entrepreneurial execution, market demand, and technological transition, magic happens. BYD didn't succeed because of subsidies—they succeeded despite the subsidy reduction. But the early support gave them the runway to develop capabilities that now dominate globally.

The Ultimate Question

As we close this marathon exploration of BYD's rise, one question haunts: Is this the future of all industries? Will Chinese companies use the same playbook—massive scale, vertical integration, patient capital, and government support—to dominate semiconductors, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and AI?

BYD's story suggests the answer might be yes. But it also shows that success requires more than just copying. It requires leaders like Wang Chuanfu—visionary enough to see the future, practical enough to build it, and stubborn enough to survive the journey.

The battery maker from Shenzhen has become an empire. The chemistry professor has become an industrialist. The company that nobody wanted to fund has surpassed Tesla in revenue.

Build Your Dreams, indeed.